UN DPKO GUEHENNO: BASHIR HAS NOT MADE A STRATEGIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002232

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, IO A/S
SILVERBERG, NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: UN DPKO GUEHENNO: BASHIR HAS NOT MADE A STRATEGIC
SHIFT

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Presidential Special Envoy for the Sudan
Andrew Natsios met with UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno on
December 4 to discuss next steps for Darfur. Guehenno stated
that Sudanese President Bashir has still not made a
"strategic shift" in his position that would allow for the
three-phased deployment plan outline in the Addis Ababa
consensus agreement. Natsios agreed with Guehenno's
assessment, adding that if such a shift does not happen by
January 1, the USG is poised to take a dramatically different
approach with the Government of Sudan (GOS). END SUMMARY.

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Guehenno: Bashir Has Not
Made a Strategic Shift
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2. (C) Guehenno opened the meeting with a readout of his
discussion with Sudanese officials at the margins of the
November 30 AU PSC meeting in Abuja saying that he had pushed
the GOS to accept all aspects of the Addis Ababa consensus
agreement and emphasized the practical necessities of UN
involvement. The Sudanese had responded by accepting all
three phases of the deployment plan in principle with some
qualifications. In regard to force size, the Sudanese had
indicated privately a willingness to accept a force size of
17,300.


3. (C) Guehenno noted, however, that the GOS commitments at
Abuja conflicted with President Bashir's public statements
and November 29 correspondence with SYG Annan rejecting a
AU-UN hybrid force. In regard to phase 1 of Addis Ababa
consensus (the UN light support package for AMIS),the GOS is
still preventing UN personnel from deploying to Darfur over a
"disagreement over what color berets they will wear" despite
public commitments to facilitate the assistance. Guehenno
concluded that President Bashir has not yet made a "strategic
shift" in his thinking. Natsios said that President Bashir's
behavior is most consistent with a strategy of delay.

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AMIS Commander is
the "Enemy"
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4. (C) Natsios queried whether AMIS Commander General Aprezi
is responsible for delaying UN assistance to AMIS. Guehenno
confirmed that Aprezi had declined to accept UN assistance or
offer alternative ideas for improving AMIS performance.
Guehenno quipped, "Aprezi is the enemy. It is clear he will
not get us anywhere." Guehenno reported that Nigerian
President Obasanjo promised to replace Aprezi with a "better
commander" before phase 3 of the Addis Ababa deployment plan.


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Pressure DPA
Non-Signatories Too
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5. (C) Guehenno commented that diplomatic pressure on the GOS
needed to be complemented with equal pressure on the DPA
non-signatory rebel groups. The international community has
so far focused too much on the GOS, but the non-signatories
are "also part of the problem." Natsios concurred, adding
that a cease-fire and a revitalized political process were
essential components of any settlement.

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The Way Forward
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6. (C) Guehenno provided some details on DPKO progress with
phases 1 and 2 of the Addis Ababa deployment plan (light and
heavy assistance packages for AMIS). A DPKO team is now in
Addis Ababa to work out details of the heavy support package
with the AU. DPKO now has plans for almost 3000 personnel to
go in to Darfur: 1220 military, 750 police and 1000
civilians. If and when the GOS agrees to a hybrid force of
some 17,000 troops, Guehenno observed that there is "no way"
that DPKO could put together a purely African force of such
numbers. The UN will need non-AU support, i.e. an Indian or
Pakistani brigade and associated enablers.


7. (C) Natsios said he planned to visit Khartoum very soon,
hopefully within a matter of days. He explained that for the
US, next steps entailed one last attempt to get Bashir to go

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along with the Addis Ababa consensus. If Bashir remained
defiant, the US is prepared to shift to a series of
&sticks8 after January 1. The US preferred not to go this
route but saw little alternative since President Bashir
appeared intent on continuing his destructive path.


8. (U) SE Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this message.

BOLTON