Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK2155
2006-11-14 23:56:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:
NEPALESE PERMREP TO FORMALLY ASK FOR UN
VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUCNDT #2155/01 3182356 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 142356Z NOV 06 FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0752 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0883 RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO PRIORITY 0175 RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA PRIORITY 0192 RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI PRIORITY 0461 RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 1297 RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU PRIORITY 0131 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1064 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0912 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1530 RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 0694 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0992 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8231 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 002155
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV IN NP UNSC
SUBJECT: NEPALESE PERMREP TO FORMALLY ASK FOR UN
ASSISTANCE/ARMS MONITORING
REF: A. KATHMANDU 3023
B. KATHMANDU 3034
Classified By: DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS
1.4 B/D
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 002155
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV IN NP UNSC
SUBJECT: NEPALESE PERMREP TO FORMALLY ASK FOR UN
ASSISTANCE/ARMS MONITORING
REF: A. KATHMANDU 3023
B. KATHMANDU 3034
Classified By: DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS
1.4 B/D
1. (C) Summary and comment: DPR Wolff met November 13 with
Indian DPR Malhotra and November 14 with Nepalese PermRep
Acharya to discuss the Nepalese request for UN assistance in
implementing the November 8 peace deal between the government
of Nepal and the Maoists. Malhotra and Acharya confirmed
that their governments would not object to a UNSC resolution
authorizing assistance, even if they preferred a Presidential
letter or PRST, but tied their support to rapid Council
action in support of the peace deal. Amb. Wolff pressed
Acharya to send a letter to the Secretary-General that
informs him of the November 8 deal and requests UN
assistance. Acharya said he planned to do so quickly.
Following receipt of the letter, the Secretary-General is
expected to share the letter with the Security Council.
Consideration of the matter will likely occur quickly. USUN,
the Indian Mission and the Nepalese Mission have all queried
UNSC members, and do not expect any significant objections to
an UNSCR addressing a potential UN role in arms monitoring,
provided that the government of Nepal clearly supports the
request. End summary and comment.
2. (C) Indian DPR Malhotra told Amb. Wolff on November 13
that India would support SC action authorizing assistance in
support of the Government of Nepal,s peace deal with the
Maoists, as long as the UN involvement is limited to arms
management. He added that speed was of the essence,
indicating that the form of the SC authorization was
secondary. Malhotra urged that some initial monitoring
presence be put in place before November 21, possibly as an
advance or a preliminary assessment team. Amb. Wolff said
the Security Council would likely react quickly, as long as
the Nepalese government sent a letter noting the November 8
peace deal and requesting UN support in its implementation.
Wolff also queried Malhotra regarding Indian PermRep Sen,s
recent conversation with Amb. Bolton, when Sen said the
Maoists might be wary of an UNSCR. Malhotra said he doubted
this was the case. (Comment: It appears there has been an
evolution in the position of the Indian government, which now
could accept a UNSCR, even if they would prefer something
less. End comment.)
3. (C) On November 14, Nepalese PermRep Acharya called on
Amb. Wolff to discuss UN action in response to the peace
agreement. Acharya confirmed that he was preparing a letter
to send to the UN Secretary-General noting the November 8
agreement and requesting UN assistance in its support of its
implementation. He planned to send that letter November 14.
Nepal would support "anything that comes before the Security
Council," said Acharya, as long as the Council authorized a
clearly defined mission and acted quickly. Amb. Wolff
explained that an UNSCR would set the UN,s activities in
Nepal on a more solid footing.
4. (C) Acharya said Nepal did not have a preference over
which UN department (the Department of Political Affairs or
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) took the lead on
the mission, although he noted that both the government and
the Maoists would prefer that the UN personnel be called
monitors or observers and not "peacekeepers," and perform
their duties in civilian attire. (Comment: USUN is
scheduled to meet with DPA and DPKO November 15 to explore
further the UN's view of assistance.) Although he understood
that setting up a robust arms monitoring mission would
require planning and mobilization, Acharya pushed for a
speedy process. He also suggested that a preliminary press
statement by the Security Council that welcomed the peace
deal and noted Council consideration of the matter would help
sustain the momentum of the peace process.
BOLTON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV IN NP UNSC
SUBJECT: NEPALESE PERMREP TO FORMALLY ASK FOR UN
ASSISTANCE/ARMS MONITORING
REF: A. KATHMANDU 3023
B. KATHMANDU 3034
Classified By: DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE ALEX WOLFF, FOR REASONS
1.4 B/D
1. (C) Summary and comment: DPR Wolff met November 13 with
Indian DPR Malhotra and November 14 with Nepalese PermRep
Acharya to discuss the Nepalese request for UN assistance in
implementing the November 8 peace deal between the government
of Nepal and the Maoists. Malhotra and Acharya confirmed
that their governments would not object to a UNSC resolution
authorizing assistance, even if they preferred a Presidential
letter or PRST, but tied their support to rapid Council
action in support of the peace deal. Amb. Wolff pressed
Acharya to send a letter to the Secretary-General that
informs him of the November 8 deal and requests UN
assistance. Acharya said he planned to do so quickly.
Following receipt of the letter, the Secretary-General is
expected to share the letter with the Security Council.
Consideration of the matter will likely occur quickly. USUN,
the Indian Mission and the Nepalese Mission have all queried
UNSC members, and do not expect any significant objections to
an UNSCR addressing a potential UN role in arms monitoring,
provided that the government of Nepal clearly supports the
request. End summary and comment.
2. (C) Indian DPR Malhotra told Amb. Wolff on November 13
that India would support SC action authorizing assistance in
support of the Government of Nepal,s peace deal with the
Maoists, as long as the UN involvement is limited to arms
management. He added that speed was of the essence,
indicating that the form of the SC authorization was
secondary. Malhotra urged that some initial monitoring
presence be put in place before November 21, possibly as an
advance or a preliminary assessment team. Amb. Wolff said
the Security Council would likely react quickly, as long as
the Nepalese government sent a letter noting the November 8
peace deal and requesting UN support in its implementation.
Wolff also queried Malhotra regarding Indian PermRep Sen,s
recent conversation with Amb. Bolton, when Sen said the
Maoists might be wary of an UNSCR. Malhotra said he doubted
this was the case. (Comment: It appears there has been an
evolution in the position of the Indian government, which now
could accept a UNSCR, even if they would prefer something
less. End comment.)
3. (C) On November 14, Nepalese PermRep Acharya called on
Amb. Wolff to discuss UN action in response to the peace
agreement. Acharya confirmed that he was preparing a letter
to send to the UN Secretary-General noting the November 8
agreement and requesting UN assistance in its support of its
implementation. He planned to send that letter November 14.
Nepal would support "anything that comes before the Security
Council," said Acharya, as long as the Council authorized a
clearly defined mission and acted quickly. Amb. Wolff
explained that an UNSCR would set the UN,s activities in
Nepal on a more solid footing.
4. (C) Acharya said Nepal did not have a preference over
which UN department (the Department of Political Affairs or
the Department of Peacekeeping Operations) took the lead on
the mission, although he noted that both the government and
the Maoists would prefer that the UN personnel be called
monitors or observers and not "peacekeepers," and perform
their duties in civilian attire. (Comment: USUN is
scheduled to meet with DPA and DPKO November 15 to explore
further the UN's view of assistance.) Although he understood
that setting up a robust arms monitoring mission would
require planning and mobilization, Acharya pushed for a
speedy process. He also suggested that a preliminary press
statement by the Security Council that welcomed the peace
deal and noted Council consideration of the matter would help
sustain the momentum of the peace process.
BOLTON