Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK2123
2006-11-06 17:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IR 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002123 

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TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE

REF: STATE 178693

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 002123

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TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL UNSC PGOV IR
SUBJECT: UNSC/IRAN: NOVEMBER 3RD MEETING P5 PLUS ONE

REF: STATE 178693


1. Summary: The P5 plus one met on Friday, November 3, at
the UK Mission at 11:30 to discuss the EU3 draft resolution
on Iran. Russia reiterated its complaints about the EU3 text
and circulated its extensive &corrections8 (emailed to
State and NSC),which Ambassador Churkin described as
consistent with the overall P5 plus one strategy agreed by
Foreign Ministers. China claimed it had not studied the
Russian revisions, but Ambassador Wang said they could
possibly alleviate many of China's concerns regarding the EU3
draft. When Ambassador Bolton asked for an explanation as to
where the EU3 draft oversteps the &elements8 paper agreed
by Political Directors, Churkin and Wang ) drawing a clear
distinction between &agreements8 reached by Foreign
Ministers and &discussions8 between Political Directors -
said their Political Directors never agreed to the elements
paper. German Ambassador Matussek contended that Political
Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on specific
elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely called on New
York to translate the elements paper into a Security Council
resolution. Specific revisions were not debated in detail,
as P3 Ambassadors first wanted to report back to capitals.
Following the meeting, USUN circulated U.S. edits to the EU3
draft to P5 plus one Missions, so capitals could review them
along side Russia,s extensive revisions. End Summary.


2. Churkin began the meeting by circulating Russia's
extensive revisions to the EU3 text. He then read from
prepared remarks, which began by criticizing the EU3 draft as
going beyond the P5 plus one framework and certain to
antagonize Iran. The resolution should convince Iran to
comply with the IAEA, not cause Iran to refuse cooperation
with the IAEA, which, in turn, would leave the world without
any monitors. The measures should be imposed stage-by-stage,
commensurate with Iran's actions, and they should be
reversible.


3. Churkin then reviewed Russia's edits to the text. He
said a blanket reference to Chapter VII would send the wrong
signal to Iran and raise fears about the use of force.

Regarding the EU3,s subtle reference to the UNSC,s role in
addressing threats to peace and security, he said there is no
present threat to address. (Note: The UK and Germany made
similar comments when the U.S. deployed its guidance on
inserting a threat determination during P3 plus one
discussions. End note.)


4. Moving to the resolution's operative paragraphs, Churkin
said that the current draft is too broad and would deny Iran
what it needs to develop peaceful nuclear power. The focus
of the resolution,s demands should be narrowed to preventing
Iran from receiving assistance that would help with sensitive
elements of a nuclear fuel cycle. He said pages five through
eight should be deleted because the measures, such as a
travel ban and assets freeze, go beyond what was agreed to by
Foreign Ministers. The measures would antagonize Iran and
back it into a corner. Limits on IAEA assistance are
inappropriate in this context because the IAEA is independent
and the Council should not instruct it. The measure would
also provoke Iran to cease cooperation with the IAEA. The
Bushehr exemption is no longer necessary in light of the
Russian edits to the paragraph on preventing the transfer of
nuclear items. If an item were deemed safe for Bushehr, then
certainly it would be safe for other peaceful projects as
well. New Russian paragraphs would give a clearer impulse to
a negotiated solution to the Iran problem.


5. Amb. Bolton responded by showing Churkin the &elements8
paper agreed to by Political Directors in Vienna. He asked
what in the EU3 text is not found in elements paper.
Ambassador Bolton then said Russia has produced a text today
that if not 180 degrees opposite to what Political Directors
agreed upon, it was at least 135 degrees. Churkin and Wang
) drawing a clear distinction between &agreements8 reached
by Foreign Ministers and &discussions8 between Political
Directors - replied that their Political Directors did not
agree to the elements paper because their concerns were never
taken into account. German Ambassador Matussek claimed that
Political Directors had indeed reached agreement in Vienna on
specific elements, and the agreed &methodology8 merely
called on New York to translate the elements paper into a
Security Council resolution. French Ambassador de La
Sabliere and U.K. Ambassador Jones Parry also took turns
arguing against Churkin,s version of the outcome of

USUN NEW Y 00002123 002 OF 002


Political Director discussions, while conceding that they
were not present during those meetings.


6. Ambassador Churkin responded that Foreign Ministers had
reached agreement and the "philosophy" that emerged from
those discussions was a phased approach. The P5 plus one
package for Iran remains in effect and UNSC efforts should be
focused on getting Iran back to the table. The resolution
should reflect the spirit of the IAEA resolutions. Churkin
went on to say that some Political Directors had attempted to
alter agreements reached by Foreign Ministers and &we here
in New York8 are just trying to make the best of the
situation. Churkin agreed that certain ideas were discussed
by the Political Directors, but Russia reserves its right to
take what it believes is the right approach. He believes the
Iranians are interested in continued dialogue and suggested
that the UNSC should foster a negotiated solution.


7. Ambassador Bolton suggested that to expedite matters it
would be useful to explore where differences or
misunderstandings exist in the &elements8 paper, and report
to capitals. The U.S. views the EU3 draft as generally
consistent with the broad agreements reached by Foreign
Ministers and Political Directors, but if there is
disagreement on what was agreed by capitals the P5 plus one
would have a difficult time moving forward in New York. He
suggested that Political Directors might want to talk again
and discuss what was and was not agreed. Churkin at first
said that he could try, but then reconsidered. He replied
that the Russian edits reflect Russia's official response to
the EU3 draft.


8. Ambassador Wang made brief remarks. He believes that
Political Directors had a general exchange. The elements
were presented by the EU3, but that does not mean the P5 plus
one reached agreement. China supports efforts by the EU and
Solana to reach agreement. Any UNSC action should leave room
for a diplomatic solution. Sanctions have a role but they
are not the objective. The UNSC should support the IAEA and
not weaken it because the Iran problem should be resolved
within the IAEA framework. Iran is not North Korea, yet the
EU3 text relies too much on 1718 language. Wang then said he
was in Beijing last week, and the general feeling is of
concern about the consequences of this text. Wang claimed
that China is still studying the text, and it will study the
Russian text as well, but at first glance the Russian text
should be considered because it would alleviate many of
China's concerns.


9. As the meeting came to a close, Ambassador Bolton said he
would send electronically the US edits to the EU3 resolution
later that day, so that capitals would be able to review U.S.
edits along side Russian revisions. Ambassadors agreed to
discuss next steps after conferring with capitals.
BOLTON