UNSC CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUDAN 10/27

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002077

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, AF, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUDAN 10/27

REF: KHARTOUM 02539

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During an October 27 briefing to the UNSC
on the Sudan, UN DPKO U/SYG Jean-Marie Guehenno called for
"creativity" to break the diplomatic impasse with Khartoum
regarding a UN peacekeeping deployment in Darfur. UK PermRep
Emyr Jones Parry presented a UK compromise proposal for a
Darfur deployment aimed at balancing military effectiveness,
i.e. capacity to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),
with Sudanese consent. Delegations responded generally
positively to the UK proposal. China, Qatar and Russia
concurred with the need to show "flexibility" to attain
Sudanese consent, but emphasized the need to move forward
with the AMIS support package first. Guehenno also briefed
on the deteriorating security conditions along Sudan's
borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) and
presented a "light" and a "heavy" option for addressing the
problem under the UNSCR 1706 mandate. SRSG Jan Pronk, who
was expelled by the Sudanese Government on October 22, said
he believes progress in bringing non-signatories into the DPA
and a UN peacekeeping mission are the only solution to the
Darfur crisis. USUN Pol Minister Counselor voiced USG
support for the SYG statement rejecting Pronk's expulsion and
our position that an effective peacekeeping force as outlined
in UNSCR 1706 should be pursued. END SUMMARY.

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UK Presents Alternative
Deployment Ideas
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2. (SBU) Guehenno opened his comments on alternative Darfur
deployment options by describing the current situation as an
"ongoing stalemate." DPKO is prepared to explore "creative"
ideas regarding alternative deployment scenarios in a "more
private setting" with interested delegations.


3. (C) UK AMB Jones Parry spoke first following Guehenno's
comments and outlined UK proposals for a compromise solution.
The UK proposed an African-led, multinational force, under
AU control and financed by the UN under Chapter VIII as a
possible compromise the Government of Sudan might accept
while ensuring adequate "military effectiveness" (See
paragraph 9 for text of the UK proposal). AMB Jones Parry
emphasized that his comments were intended to "spark
discussion" on ways to break the standoff with Khartoum and
not a "finished proposal."


4. (SBU) UNSC members greeted the UK proposal with positive
comments regarding the need to address Sudanese concerns.
France, Argentina, Ghana, Tanzania, Denmark, Greece and
Slovakia concurred on the need to balance "flexibility" with
"military effectiveness." China, Qatar and Russia agreed
that the UK proposal is step towards assuaging Sudanese
concerns, but focused on the need to move forward with the
AMIS support package first. USUN Pol Minister Counselor
responded that the goals for a peacekeeping force in Darfur
as outlined in resolution 1706 should be actively pursued.
The Security Council must continue to press for the force
standards that were articulated in resolution 1706, including
the protection of civilians and ensuring humanitarian access.

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Chad/CAR Border
Security Deteriorating
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5. (SBU) Guehenno presented a "light" and a "heavy" option
for dealing with the deteriorating security conditions along
Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic
(CAR). The movement of refugees and the use neighboring
countries as rear bases by rebel groups are fueling the
increase in violence. Since early October, border violence
has increased significantly, most notably with the October 15
rebel seizure of towns deep in the interior of Chad.


6. (SBU) Noting the provisions of UNSCR 1706 that provide a
mandate to address regional security issues and protect
civilians in refugee camps in Chad, Guehenno said UN DPKO has
been preparing two options to improve border security:


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-- UN liaison/monitoring mission in Chad and CAR; a light
option to include monitoring capacity at key locations for
IDPs (several hundred personnel).

-- Multidimensional UN Peacekeeping presence in eastern Chad
and northeast CAR; a heavy option to include (several
thousand personnel).

Guehenno admitted the capacity of the light option would be
limited to monitoring conditions and would likely require
some sort of quick reaction force to ensure security. While
the "heavy" option would have greater capacity to improve
security in border areas, it risked creating a "pull factor"
for refugees looking to escape harsher conditions in Darfur.
Delegations responded with promises to study the ideas
further and communicate them to their capitals.

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Pronk Expulsion
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7. (SBU) SRSG Jan Pronk, who had arrived in New York the day
before following his expulsion by the government of Sudan,
spoke briefly on the situation in Darfur (reftel). Pronk
highlighted the need to find a way to bring non-signatory
rebel groups into the DPA and convince the Government of
Sudan (GOS) to accept a UN peacekeeping force. Every
delegation, with the exception of Qatar, thanked Pronk for
his service and voiced support for the October 27 SYG press
statement confirming that Pronk will remain the SRSG until
his contract expires in January. Guehenno stated that Pronk
will return to Sudan for a "reasonable period" of time in
order to facilitate the transition to the new SRSG. The
Qatari representative made a vague reference to "other
information" emanating from Khartoum regarding Pronk's
expulsion and said his delegation could not yet comment on
the issue. USUN Pol Minister Counselor expressed USG support
the UN SYG's statement rejecting Pronk's expulsion.

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Text of UK Alternative
Deployment Proposal
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8. (SBU) UKUN provided USUN with a copy of their proposal for
an alternative deployment in Darfur. The UK outlined the
proposal and criteria during consultations, but have not yet
distributed the paper to other delegations. In a subsequent
meeting with the UK Sudan expert, USUN poloff communicated
USG concerns that an AU-led mission would not meet the
minimal requirements for an effective peacekeeping
deployment. We understand from UKUN that HMG has passed a
refined version of their proposal to Main State and the NSC.


9. (SBU) Begin Text:

-- Objective: A robustly mandated, manned and equipped force
capable of effective implementation of the DPA and the
protection of civilians in Darfur while still being
acceptable to Bashir.

-- Concept: A robust African-led multinational force under AU
control, but with significant international involvement,
including UN support and non-African (i.e. Asian and other
Muslim countries,) troops.

-- Force must meet eight criteria:

i. Sufficient troop numbers: approaching the 17,000 the UN
estimates is required. The force would re-hat (as UNMIS
would have) the better African battalions in AMIS (plus any
additional battalions the AU deploys). To bring the force
size up to that mandated by 1706, the AU (possibly
subcontracting force generation to the UN) would generate
additional Asian and Arab contributions (we should target
Muslim countries such as Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Malaysia and Indonesia).

ii. Sufficient capability/enablers ) similar to that a UN
force would have had: the force should have a spine of UN and
international support (technical, logistical, etc);

iii. Strong, robust mandate, including on protection of

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civilians and the force itself, explicitly linked to
implementation of the DPA.

iv. Be composed only of African troops and troops from
non-African Muslim countries (but with Western and non-Muslim
enablers).

v. A robust African Force Commander who would have headed
the UNMIS operation in Darfur. The planning cell under the
force commander would be a multinational structure involving
UN political, military and financial experts as well as AU
staff. Current (or additional) NATO and EU secondees to AMIS
could also be included.

vi. Financed by the UN under Chapter VIII of the Charter
(regional organisations) and operating with UN structures and
accounting requirements.

vii. Have free movement around Darfur without needing prior
approval from GoS.

viii. Have a chain of command to the AU in Addis but with UN
consultation (e.g. on finance issues). Although the force
would be responsible primarily to the AU, it could also (via
its head of mission or Konare) report to the Security Council.

-- The deal with Bashir: In return for the international
community accepting an AMIS Plus force (instead of UNMIS),
Sudan must agree:

i. to work with the AU (supported by the UN) on moving
forward the political process in Darfur. In particular, the
establishment of conditions for a cease-fire in Darfur, the
launch of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation and the
opening of negotiations with the DPA non-signatories;

ii. to the full opening of humanitarian corridors and the
free movement of humanitarian personnel;

iii. to accelerating UN support to AMIS in the meantime (as
AIF would take time to deploy). First batch of support (105
UN personnel) must be deployed ASAP, with UN numbers
increasing to 1,000 (UN heavy package of support) as soon as
possible thereafter.

iv. to free movement of support/enablers/equipment for the
force into Sudan/Darfur.

-- Sudan must be clear that without agreement to such a
force, the international community will pursue the imposition
of sanctions against it.

-- Next steps: getting diplomatic agreement: UN/AU/AL to
agree concept with Bashir. AU would then approve the
mandate, which would be endorsed by the UN in a new SCR (any
force increase would also have to be approved by the UN).
Approval to Chapter VIII financing would also need approval
from the Fifth (Budget) Committee of the GA as well as by a
two-thirds of the GA plenary.

End Text.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) While it is useful to pursue alternatives in the face
of Bashir's refusal to consent to a UN peacekeeping mission,
the UK concept needs careful vetting. We should continue to
pursue a "unity of command" solution for Darfur, and avoid
recommendations that would establish a hybrid AU/UN command
structure that would be fraught with problems.

BOLTON