QATAR PERMREP: WE CAN BEST HELP WITH DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001935

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: QATAR PERMREP: WE CAN BEST HELP WITH DARFUR
OUTSIDE UNSC

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 5 meeting with US Special
Envoy for the Sudan Andrew Natsios at the United Nations,
Qatar PermRep Nassir Abdul Aziz al-Nasser said Qatar is eager
to play an expanded role in creating a solution to the crisis
in Darfur and can best influence the Government of Sudan
(GOS) outside of the Security Council. Natsios underscored
the necessity of prompt implementation on UNSCR 1706 and his
approach to persuading non-signatories to the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) to play a constructive role in the political
process by addressing underlying development problems. END
SUMMARY.

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Qatar Urges Caution on the UNSC;
Quiet Approach with Bashir
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2. (C) Qatar PermRep Nassir Abdul Aziz al-Nasser urged a
cautious approach to the Sudan saying, "any sanctions or
aggressive statements will prove counterproductive with the
Sudanese." AMB al-Nasser described Bashir as deeply isolated
and paranoid that the US views the deployment of UN
peacekeepers in Darfur as "a prelude to regime change."
"Diplomatic posturing" will only reinforce these notions in
Khartoum, isolate moderates, and bolster "those around Bashir
who are giving him bad advice." Rather, al-Nassir argued the
US should focus its efforts on "quiet diplomacy" and
persuading the GOS that accepting a UN force is ultimately in
their own best interests.


3. (C) Al-Nassir offered Qatar's assistance and influence in
persuading the Sudanese to accept a UN peacekeeping force in
Darfur saying, "We have a special relationship with the
Sudanese, and we can help you outside of the Security
Council." Al-Nassir made the case for greater Qatari
involvement in diplomatic efforts, highlighting Qatar's
substantial pledges of development assistance and support for
AMIS. The more aggressive an approach the UNSC adopts,
however, the less influence Qatar can exert over the GOS.
Al-Nassir quipped that if the UNSC takes an aggressive stand
against the GOS, "Bashir will ask us (Qatar) why haven't you
helped me on the Security Council?"


4. (C) Natsios acknowledged Qatar's particular position on
the UNSC and potential to influence the GOS, but cautioned
that it was important for everyone, including the Sudanese,
to use words carefully. The October 3 letter from the
Sudanese UN Permanent Mission addressed to potential troop
contributors was "entirely unacceptable for a UN member
state." Likewise, the US cannot accept Bashir's refusal to
accept the peacekeeping provisions UNSCR 1706 indefinitely.
Al-Nassir promised to pass both messages to the Sudanese.

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DPA Non-Signatories
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5. (C) Natsios outlined his plans to persuade DPA
non-signatories join the political process and address
underlying development issues in north Sudan that fuel the
conflict in Darfur. AMB al-Nassir praised Natsios' knowledge
of the region and the wisdom of addressing development
issues. Al-Nassir concurred that it will be important to
balance pressure on Bashir with pressure on rebel groups that
reject the DPA. Al-Nassir closed the meeting by again
offering Qatar's assistance saying, "Let's bring all the DPA
non-signatories to Doha for talks."


6. (U) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios staff cleared this
message.

BOLTON