Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1934
2006-10-10 22:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
USUN New York
Cable title:  

SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO 
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VZCZCXRO4888
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK
DE RUCNDT #1934/01 2832212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 102212Z OCT 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0401
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0736
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0419
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0202
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001934 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 01911

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001934

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: SE NATSIOS' MEETING WITH SYG ANNAN ON DARFUR

REF: USUN NEW YORK 01911

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During an October 5 meeting with UN SYG Kofi
Annan, Special Presidential Envoy for the Sudan Andrew
Natsios underscored the importance of moving forward with UN
support for AMIS and persuading Sudanese President Bashir to
back down from his rejection of a UN peacekeeping force in
Darfur. Accompanied by UN DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie Guehenno and
Political Affairs U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, Annan spoke
optimistically, but cautiously, about indications the
Government of Sudan (GOS) may have begun to retreat from its
hard-line position on UN deployment. Annan described
Bashir's October 3 letter to the UN and Arab League,
reportedly positive conversation with Arab League SYG Amr
Moussa, and Bashir's interest in addressing the UNSC as
evidence that the Government of Sudan has begun to move in
the right direction. Annan made the case for using UN
support for AMIS as a mechanism to push the Sudanese
Government to accept a peacekeeping force. Annan said AU
plans to retain control of the political aspects of the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) even after the transition to a
UN force is a bad idea, and we need to think "creatively"
about how to effect a transition to the UN on the political
aspects of DPA implementation as well. Natsios highlighted
the importance of coordinating diplomatic efforts on various
fronts. END SUMMARY.


2. (U) UN Participants: SYG Kofi Annan, DPKO U/SYG Jean Marie
Guehenno, and Political Affairs U/SYG Ibrahim Gambari, UN
Notetaker. USG Participants: Special Envoy Andrew Natsios,
Chief of Staff Andrew Steinfeld, USUN MSC LTC Patrick Murray,
USUN Poloff (notetaker).

--------------
Annan: Bashir May Be
Beginning to Blink
--------------


3. (C) Annan downplayed the significance of a threatening
diplomatic note distributed by the Sudanese Permanent Mission
to the UN to potential troop contributing countries on

October 3 (reftel),instead highlighting positive diplomatic
developments originating in Khartoum. While acknowledging
that newly arrived Sudanese PermRep Abdul Mahmood Mohammad
would not have sent such a provocative message without
instructions from Khartoum, Annan emphasized that AMB
Mohammad is newly arrived at the UN and lacked the diplomatic
experience to push back on ill-advised guidance from his
capital. Natsios concurred that there have been mixed
messages coming from Khartoum, adding that the diplomatic
note was unprecedented and outrageous.


4. (C) Annan emphasized growing signs that Bashir may be
prepared to step back from his refusal to accept the will of
the international community. Annan provided a copy of
another letter from Bashir, also dated October 3, detailing
Sudanese acceptance of the UN assistance package to AMIS and
pledging his "personal support." (NOTE: Bashir's letter does
not address the peacekeeping provisions of UNSCR 1706. END
NOTE.) Annan reported that he had met with President Bashir
on the margins of the NAM summit in Havana and the Sudanese
President had agreed to visit New York to address the UNSC
"sometime during Ramadan." The UN SYG is providing the
Government of Sudan with possible dates.

--------------
Arab League
Proving Helpful
--------------


5. (C) Annan said he had spoken with Arab League SYG Amr
Moussa following his October 2 meeting with President Bashir.
Moussa purportedly described Bashir as isolated and looking
for a face-saving way of backing down on his stance on UNSCR

1706. Reportedly, Bashir again raised the idea of an
international, i.e. dual hatted, force led by an AMIS
commander or an entirely African, or possibly Muslim, force.
Annan described these overtures as evidence of Bashir's
willingness to consent to a peacekeeping force provided there
is a way for him to avoid further political embarrassment,
"Making AMIS plus as elastic as possible is the best way to
push Bashir in the right direction." Natsios responded that

USUN NEW Y 00001934 002 OF 002


the US is ready to consider an arrangement that keeps with
the letter and spirit of UNSCR 1706.

--------------
AU Wants to Keep Control of
Political Aspects of the DPA
--------------


6. (C) In response to a question, Annan reported the AU plans
to retain control of the political aspects of DPA
implementation, in contrast to its desire to turn over the
military aspects to the UN. Annan viewed this as
problematic, given the weakness of the AU implementation team
in Khartoum. He noted that we would have to think
"creatively" to get around this.

--------------
Natsios: Diplomatic Efforts
Must Proceed in Concert
--------------


7. (C) Natsios emphasized the importance of diplomatic
efforts proceeding in coordinated fashion. Annan concurred
and said he is coordinating his message to the GOS closely
with all the relevant actors. Annan commented, however, that
he was not optimistic about diplomatic efforts spearheaded by
HMG, and was not yet sure an October Heads of State FM
meeting made sense. Pushing Bashir yet again publicly just
when he may be showing signs of willingness to compromise
might not be optimal, Annan pointed out. Rather, Annan
pointed to the Arab League, Egypt, Qatar, Libya and Jordan as
the best intermediaries with Khartoum. The Egyptians, in
particular, have a &special relationship with Bashir8 and a
strong interest in a stable Sudan because of their proximity.
Annan commented, "Mubarak doesn't want more trouble because
of Sudanese stubbornness." Natsios concurred that the Arab
League and the Egyptians could potentially play a very
positive role, adding that any long-term peace in Sudan will
be built on an arrangement that addresses the long-standing
grievances of all the parties.


8. (U) Special Envoy Andrew Natsios' staff cleared this
message.

BOLTON