UNSC/DARFUR: DEPUTY SYG CALLS FOR AFRICAN, ARAB

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001822

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: DEPUTY SYG CALLS FOR AFRICAN, ARAB
AND ASIAN PRESSURE ON KHARTOUM

REF: A. KHARTOUM 02240


B. USUN NEW YORK 01780

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR JACKIE W. SANDERS FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Mark
Malloch Brown convened a September 14 meeting of P5
Ambassadors plus the Greek Ambassador (as current UN Security
Council President) to discuss the way forward on Darfur,
based on the briefing SRSG Pronk gave to Darfur Partners in
Khartoum (ref A). Malloch Brown said that in the wake of
unsuccessful UN and 'Western' attempts to persuade Sudanese
President Bashir to accept AMIS transition to a UN operation,
it was time for Africans, Arabs and Asians, in particular
China, to take the lead on this responsibility. Chinese
PermRep Wang was non-committal on Malloch Brown's call for
Chinese intervention with Khartoum.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTD. Russian PermRep Churkin alluded to the
possibility of a Chapter VIII deployment in Darfur (under
which the Council would use regional arrangements or agencies
for enforcement action under its authority) if the Government
of National Unity (GNU) continued to refuse its consent for
UN deployment. USUN Ambassador Sanders reminded that the
obligations of resolution 1706 should serve as the basis of
any SYG intervention with President Bashir. Both the UK and
French PermReps stressed the need for the UN to address the
Chad dimension of the Darfur crisis. Malloch Brown agreed to
re-convene the group September 25 to compare notes on the
SYG's Havana trip, the extension of AMIS' mandate, the Arab
League's pledge to fund AMIS, the possibility of a new
diplomatic initiative in Khartoum led by China, the Africans
and the Arab League and a short CONOPs from DPKO on Chad.
END SUMMARY.


3. (C) Accompanied by DPKO U/SYG Guehenno and A/SYG Annabi
and by OCHA U/SYG Egeland, Malloch Brown sought the views of
P5 Ambassadors and the Security Council Presidency on a
potential 'package' that could be presented to the Sudanese,
the African Union (AU) and the Arab League (AL) in order to
promote Khartoum's acceptance of UNSCR 1706, including an
extension of AMIS' mandate until December 31 and provisions
for operationalizing a UN support cell to assist AMIS in
non-monetary terms. Guehenno reported that DPKO was
exploring ways, ahead of the September 18 AU Peace and
Security Council meeting, to consolidate the 'light support'
for AMIS which AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit had
just requested of DPKO. UK PR Jones Parry insisted that this
support package should include financial details, and USUN
Ambassador Sanders advised that the any package not deviate
from the obligations of resolution 1706.


4. (C) Both Malloch Brown and Egeland stressed the need to
get African and Arab countries, as well as the AU and the AL,
more engaged in the process of persuading Bashir to accept a
UN force in Darfur, citing Egyptian FM Aboul Gheit as a
candidate to 'sell' such a package in Khartoum. UK PR Jones
Parry raised Nigerian President Obasanjo and Congolese
President Sassou-Nguesso as other possible interlocutors,
adding that AL SYG Amre Moussa must also be convinced to
assist. Malloch Brown and Egeland pointedly asked Chinese PR
Wang how China could help in this effort, now that exhaustive
efforts by the UN, the USG and the UK had failed to change
Bashir's mind. Wang demurred, saying that 'quiet diplomacy'
in the form of bilateral and collective efforts must be
undertaken to convince the GNU that the Council harbored no
'evil' intentions and that the Council needed GNU consent to
proceed with 1706 implementation. Wang saw a joint
African-Arab mission and a 'qualified' UN Secretariat
representative as useful vehicles for approaching Bashir.


5. (C) In direct reference to the draft PRST on Darfur
circulated by USUN (ref B),Wang warned against the Council's
adopting any measures in the coming days and weeks that might
be interpreted as pressure on the GNU, a reaffirmation of his
delegation's adamant stance against adopting prior to the AU
PSC meeting (NOTE: In subsequent Security Council

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consultations September 15, irreconcilable differences among
Members over the issue of timing led to the failure to adopt
the draft PRST, despite general agreement on its content.
END NOTE). Russian PR Churkin stressed that the level of AU
activity and engagement in the near future would be crucial
in turning Khartoum around, particularly a strong statement
from the PSC in unambiguous support of AMIS transition to a
UN operation. Ambassador Sanders also pushed for the need to
lobby the AU before September 18.


6. (C) Russian PR Churkin warned that if the GNU continued to
refuse its consent to UN Darfur deployment, deployment in the
form of an AU operation supported by the UN might become a
real possibility (an allusion to a Chapter VIII model),a
plan Malloch Brown acknowledged as a reluctant Plan B. In
the meantime, Malloch Brown requested participants to
reconvene September 25 to re-assess the situation after SYG
Annan's September 15 meeting in Havana with President Bashir
and after the September 18 AU PSC meeting. He also requested
answers to outstanding questions of proposed AL funding for
an extended AMIS and of commitments from China and from
African and Arab countries to launch a new diplomatic
initiative toward Khartoum.


7. (C) UK PR Jones Parry and French PR de La Sabliere were
insistent that Chad not be neglected in the Council's
consideration of the Darfur crisis. Guehenno agreed to
present a short concept of operations pursuant to OP13 of
UNSCR 1706 at the September 25 meeting.
BOLTON