Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1622
2006-08-25 18:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES

Tags:  PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1659
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUCNDT #1622/01 2371825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 251825Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9969
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001622 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE
SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES
SECRETARIAT ON BORDER SECURITY


SIPDIS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, per 1.4 (b) and (
d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001622

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO IS LE
SUBJECT: UNIFIL FORCE GENERATION UPDATE: A/S HILLEN PRESSES
SECRETARIAT ON BORDER SECURITY


SIPDIS

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, per 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary. During separate meetings with UN Deputy
Secretary-General Mark Malloch Brown and Department of

SIPDIS
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General
Hedi Annabi on August 24, PM A/S Hillen emphasized the
importance of ensuring that the international community helps
the Government of Lebanon (GOL) secure its borders in
accordance with UNSCR 1701. While conceding that Israel may
be within its rights to draw a link between a secure border
and its naval/air blockade of Lebanon, Malloch Brown averred
that the blockade is "rapidly becoming counter-productive"
and asked if a formal request by Lebanese PM Siniora for
UNIFIL assistance in border security would persuade the USG
to try to convince Israel to lift the blockade. Even if
Siniora submits this request, however, Malloch Brown made
clear that SYG Annan believes UNIFIL should only play a
supporting role to the GOL in border security efforts.


2. (C) Summary, cont'd. Welcoming Italian and (subsequent)
French commitments to UNIFIL, Malloch Brown also expressed
support for the Italian proposal to establish a UNIFIL
"strategic cell" in New York to give guidance to the force
commander, but appealed for caution in describing the new
unit lest it provoke other TCCs. He and Annabi appealed to
the USG to urge Poland, Turkey, Belgium, Romania, and Spain
to make firm commitments to contribute to UNIFIL. Malloch
Brown said current UNIFIL Force Commander Pelligrini should
remain in place until at least February 2007, at which time
he might be succeeded by an Italian general. Malloch Brown
also noted that the Secretariat wants to appoint a Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Lebanon
once SYG Annan returns from his regional tour. A/S Hillen
previewed USG comments on the draft Rules of Engagement (ROE)
and Concept of Operations (CONOPS),and outlined USG support
for the expanded UNIFIL as well as for the Lebanese Armed
Forces (LAF). End Summary.

Status of Force Generation

--------------


3. (C) Malloch Brown and Annabi both welcomed Italy's
willingness to provide up to 3,000 troops for the expanded
UNIFIL force and predicted that French President Chirac's
August 24 announcement would be good for the force generation
effort (Note: Both meetings took place before Chirac's
announcement that France would send a total of 2,000 troops
to the expanded UNIFIL force. End Note.) Noting that he had
recently spoken with EU Foreign Policy Chief Solana as well
as the Finns (as President of the EU),however, Malloch Brown
suggested there was still "a lot of softness" in terms of
contributions by other TCCs. He and Annabi urged A/S Hillen
to encourage Poland, Turkey, Belgium, Romania, and Spain, in
particular, to contribute forces. Annabi also noted that
DPKO was "moving ahead" with Indonesia's offer of one
battalion of troops because Israel had not yet clarified to
the Secretariat which countries it could absolutely not
accept because they do not have diplomatic relations with the
GOI.


4. (C) Outlining the status of new offers, Annabi noted that
SYG Annan had recently spoken to Turkish PM Erdogan but that
the GOT was still asking many questions about the ROE and
CONOPS and had yet to make a firm commitment. Spain would
hopefully contribute a battalion, as might Tanzania.
Germany, claiming difficulty in obtaining parliamentary
approval to send border police personnel to Lebanon, was now
talking only about providing training and equipment for
border security. Qatar had offered one company of helicopter
pilots (?). While Annabi suggested that India might consider
sending additional troops and noted a SYG Annan call to PM
Singh, DPKO staff later clarified that the SYG spoke to the
Indian PM before comments to the press by the Indian Defense
Minister that India might withdraw its current contingent of
troops assigned to UNIFIL. Annabi reported that the SYG had
also called the Ghanaians, who might be willing to send more
soldiers. Romania had yet to make a firm commitment.

UN Wants GOL to Monitor Borders
--------------


5. (C) A/S Hillen emphasized that the USG wants to ensure
that the international community, in accordance with UNSCR
1701, helps the GOL secure its borders against unauthorized

USUN NEW Y 00001622 002 OF 003


arms shipments. Syrian President Asad cannot be allowed to
intimidate the international community into not carrying out
a UNSC mandate, he argued. Ensuring the security of
Lebanon's borders is also key to preventing a resumption of
hostilities, because Israel will act to block re-supply of
Hizballah if the international community or GOL do not.
Observing that the international community's support for GOL
border security efforts could come either from UNIFIL or
through bilateral assistance, Hillen suggested it would be
necessary to think creatively about the right vehicle for
such aid. He added that the USG is encouraging Lebanese PM
Siniora to either request help from UNIFIL in securing
Lebanon's borders, which would satisfy the requirement in
UNSCR 1701, or support alternate means of achieving the same
objective.


6. (C) Malloch Brown agreed that the issue of border security
is important, especially given Israel's announcement that it
will only lift its naval and air blockade of Lebanon once
UNIFIL reinforcments arrive to help secure the border. While
conceding that Israel may be within its rights to draw a link
between the blockade and a secure border -- despite
conclusions by UN lawyers that UNSCR 1701 is "ambiguous" on
this point -- Malloch Brown averred that the blockade is
"rapidly becoming counter-productive" and that the "two
issues cannot be linked together forever." He asked if a
formal request from Siniora that UNIFIL help secure Lebanon's
borders might be enough to persuade the USG to convince
Israel to lift its blockade.


7. (C) Even if Siniora does request UNIFIL's assistance in
securing Lebanon's borders, though, Malloch Brown made clear
that SYG Annan believes the UN mission should only play a
supporting role to the GOL in this effort. The D/SYG opined
that Germany, the U.S., and the UK should ensure that Lebanon
has all the necessary surveillance equipment to monitor its
borders and ports. But the question would then become which
party would interdict illegal shipments? Arguing it would be
"very difficult" to have UNIFIL TCCs take on this role,
Malloch Brown averred that the first option should be the LAF
with UNIFIL as a fallback. Annabi added that while it would
be a problem to have UNIFIL troops support the GOL in terms
of border security, it might be possible to provide this
assistance through police forces or customs officials.

Malloch Brown Supports Italian Proposal
for Second-Line UNIFIL Command in New York
--------------


8. (C) Malloch Brown also expressed support for Italy's
proposal that the Secretariat establish a second-line UNIFIL
command in New York to strengthen DPKO and help give the
Force Commander guidance (septel),but emphasized that the
new office must be called a "strategic cell" rather than a
"strategic headquarters" in order to preclude accusations
from other TCCs -- which had been leveled in the past -- that
DPKO was allowing secunded western officers to manage the
entire mission. He said the UNIFIL Force Commander would
report to the head of the strategic cell, whom Malloch Brown
said would be a three-star Italian general, who would then
report to Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie
Guehenno. The result of this arrangement would be that DPKO
Military Advisor Lt. General Mehta would no longer have
responsibility over the expanded UNIFIL mission.


9. (C) Malloch Brown argued that current UNIFIL Force
Commander Pelligrini should remain on the job until February
2007, when his contract with the UN expires. At that point,
the UN could give command of UNIFIL to the Italian three-star
general who will soon be appointed head of the strategic
cell, although Malloch Brown cautioned that command of the
force has been the subject of "intense" negotiations between
French President Chirac and Italian PM Prodi. In addition to
discussing the military command structure, Malloch Brown also
disclosed that the UN planned to appoint a Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Lebanon
upon SYG Annan's return from the region. While the SRSG
could ensure that all the UN's humanitarian and political
efforts are coordinated, Malloch Brown confirmed that the
SRSG would have no role in the military command structure.

Rules of Engagement
--------------


10. (C) Congratulating Malloch Brown and Annabi on the

USUN NEW Y 00001622 003 OF 003


success of the draft ROE and CONOPS, A/S Hillen said the USG
would give DPKO a non-paper August 25 with some suggestions
to tighten up the documents. These suggestions, he noted,
would include language to state more explicitly UNIFIL's
posture regarding armed elements between the Litani River and
the Blue Line, the link between the arms embargo and border
security, the connection between UNIFIL's humanitarian and
security missions, and IDF-LAF-UNIFIL coordination. While
agreeing to "take a look" at USG suggestions on the draft
ROE, Annabi noted that the documents were in an "advanced
stage" after consultations with the French, Italians, and
other TCCs. Noting that the French and Italians were pleased
with the ROE and CONOPS, he urged A/S Hillen to share USG
suggestions with those two countries before presenting them
to DPKO.

USG Support for UNIFIL
--------------


11. (C) Recalling President Bush's remarks on August 21 about
USG support for the expanded UNIFIL force and Lebanon, A/S
Hillen noted that the USG had earmarked USD 42 million in aid
to train and equip the LAF as part of an international effort
that would include the UK and France. Confirming that the
UN's request for free strategic lift assistance would be
difficult to satisfy, A/S Hillen urged the Secretariat to
consider commercial transportation options and forward
specific requests for items that cannot be shipped
commercially to the USG for consideration. The DPKO
logistics officer accompanying Annabi replied that using
commercial lift should not be a problem -- assuming Israel
lifts its blockade of Lebanon -- because Lebanon is easily
accessible by air and sea and because DPKO had asked TCCs to
self-deploy to the theater. A/S Hillen also noted that the
USG would soon dispatch a U.S. military officer to support
DPKO planning efforts.


12. (U) A/S Hillen cleared this message.
BOLTON