Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1613
2006-08-23 21:11:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC CONSULTATIONS: BRIEFING ON KINSHASA VIOLENCE

Tags:  PGOV UNSC KPKO CG 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9167
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUCNDT #1613/01 2352111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 232111Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9955
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0928
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001613 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV UNSC KPKO CG
SUBJECT: UNSC CONSULTATIONS: BRIEFING ON KINSHASA VIOLENCE

REF: KINSHASA 1334 AND PREVIOUS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001613

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV UNSC KPKO CG
SUBJECT: UNSC CONSULTATIONS: BRIEFING ON KINSHASA VIOLENCE

REF: KINSHASA 1334 AND PREVIOUS


1. Summary: On August 22, Assistant SYG for Peacekeeping
Operations Hedi Annabi briefed the Security Council on the
violent clashes of feuding forces in Kinshasa on August 21
and 22 and on efforts by UN officials and CIAT ambassadors to
restore calm. Annabi confirmed that representatives of the
government and Vice President Bemba's militia had agreed to
withdraw their troops from Kinshasa's streets and to leave
Congolese police, assisted by MONUC and EUFOR police, in
charge of public order. Annabi said President Kabila had
agreed in his meeting with CIAT on August 22 to disengage his
forces but that he had not committed to a meeting with
Bemba. Annabi also noted that Kabila had alluded to the
proposal to move up the date for the runoff election. In
response to a question, Annabi said that the runoff could not
be moved up from October 29 for technical, logistical and
financial reasons. In their interventions, Security Council
delegations expressed concern about the violence and some
relief that the situation had not deteriorated further. They
approved a press statement that demanded that the Congolese
political leadership exercise restraint and refrain from any
threats or use of force or intimidation against political
opponents. End Summary.


2. A/SYG Annabi's briefing to the Council on August 22 in
informal consultations on the latest violence in Kinshasa
generally corroborated the outline of events as reported in
reftels. Annabi suggested wryly that the Presidential guard
had displayed "an acute sense of timing" by firing upon
Bemba's compound on August 21 while SRSG Swing and CIAT
ambassadors were inside encouraging Bemba to participate
peacefully in the second round of elections. Despite
promises by President Kabila's to Swing that the guards would
be withdrawn, firing by heavy and light weapons had lasted
for several hours. In follow on phone calls, SYG Annan had
urged Kabila and Bemba to withdraw their forces and to meet
to resolve the situation. After MONUC troops had evacuated
the CIAT dignitaries from Bemba's residence, three MONUC
platoons were assigned to the compound and a EUFOR company
was deployed in the area of a major boulevard where security
was problematic.



3. Following an overnight lull, the fighting between the
Presidential guard and Bemba's forces recommenced early the
next morning. MONUC forces subsequently had replaced EUFOR
forces on the boulevard. During the day, MONUC
reinforcements were flown in from Lumumbashi and EUFOR
reinforcements arrived from Libreville.


4. Meeting with SRSG Swing and CIAT ambassadors on August
22, President Kabila had agreed to the immediate cessation of
hostilities, the disengagement of forces, the policing of
streets by Congolese police, and the broadcasting of this
information through the media. Annabi added that Kabila had
agreed specifically to the deployment of MONUC forces to
protect Bemba. Kabila also had reiterated his commitment to
participating in the second of elections but had alluded to
the proposal of his supporters to move up the October 29
runoff date. SRSG Swing had encouraged Kabila to meet with
Bemba, but Kabila made no commitment to do so.


5. Annabi said that security officials representing both of
the feuding camps had met that afternoon at MONUC
headquarters. He reported that they had agreed to order all
Congolese troops in Kinshasa to return to their positions
before the fighting, to establish mixed verification teams,
and to accept the fact that the Congolese police, with the
assistance of MONUC and EUFOR police elements, would have
sole responsibility for maintaining public order. Annabi
said MONUC's assessment of the overall security situation in
Kinshasa was that the situation seemed to be calming down.
Reports of looting by youth gangs however were a concern.


6. Annabi noted that the SYG Annan had issued a public
statement on the situation and suggested that the Council
might also wish to send a strong message to the parties.


7. In their interventions, Security Council delgations
expressed concern about the flare up of violence and the need
to ensure satisfactory completion of the election process.
The US deplored the fighting and called on all military
forces to return to their barracks, sentiments echoed by most
other members. The UK suggested ruefully that the period of
relative calm after elections perhaps had been too good to be
true. The Congo pointed out the irony that it was the
winners of the election and not, as feared, the losers who
were turning out to the initial spoilers. Denmark emphasized
the importance of sending a message to Kabila and Bemba that
they must not allow their forces to intimidate each other.

USUN NEW Y 00001613 002 OF 002


Many delegations, including the US, expressed appreciation
for MONUC's actions in evacuating the CIAT ambassadors from
Bemba's residence.


8. Several members stressed the importance of adhering to
the scheduled October 29 runoff date. Ghana and Congo
suggested that President Kabila was pursuing an earlier date
for his own political advantage. Annabi made clear that the
election date was an issue solely for the Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC) to determine and that he believed
this date had been set appropriately.


9. The UK recounted speculation that Kabila's forces may
have acted to preempt claims of electoral fraud by Bemba's
supporters and asked Annabi for his assessment of the
accuracy of the provisional election results. Annabi
acknowledged some reports of discontent with the results but
said he believed the IEC had done an honest job. The UK also
asked for Annabi's assessment of the pros and cons of moving
the runoff election date forward. Annabi said proponents on
both sides of the issue had put forward legal arguments on
the issue. As a practical matter, he remarked that the
second round could not be held before the October 29 date set
by the IEC because of technical, logistical and financial
reasons. Annabi added that both SRSG Swing and President
Chissano (in his role as chairman of the Commission of the
Wise) had discussed the issue with Kabila to try to persuade
him on the importance of not meddling with the electoral
timetable.


10. Members concluded the session by agreeing to following
statement to the press:

BEGIN TEXT:

The members of the Security Council took note of the official
announcement, on 20 August 2006, of the provisional results
of the first round of the presidential election in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.

They reiterated their appreciation to the Independent
Electoral Commission for its remarkable work that enabled the
holding of that poll in the best possible conditions, and
commended the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
for their commitment to the democratic process, as
demonstrated by the high voter turnout. They appealed to the
political leaders to respect the electoral calendar as
established by the Independent Electoral Commission.

They expressed their serious concern about the violent
clashes between armed elements that have taken place n
Kinshasa on 20 and 21 August 2006, and that continue today,
and about the looting that has occurred. They demanded that
the Congolese political leadership exercise restraint and
immediately implement the cease-fire agreed between their
forces and henceforth refrain from any threats or use of
force or intimidation against political opponents or their
supporters. They emphasised that there can be no military
solution to political issues in the DRC and urged all parties
to take immediate steps to support the democratic process
that is underway. They called on the Congolese leadership
not to allow the progress made by the people of the DRC to be
jeopardised at this stage, and to this end expressed the hope
that the proposed meeting between President Joseph Kabila and
Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba would be held as soon as
possible to defuse the current political tension.

They expressed appreciation for the effective operation of
EUFOR R.D. Congo in support of the United Nations Mission in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). They renewed
their support for the International Committee in Support of
the Transition (CIAT) and for MONUC and condemned any action
threatening their security.

END TEXT



BOLTON