Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1610
2006-08-22 23:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UNSC/DARFUR: NEGOTIATIONS STALLED OVER TIMING AND

Tags:  ET PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8058
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #1610/01 2342337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 222337Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9948
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/OAU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0370
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0955
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0711
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0347
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001610 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: ET PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: NEGOTIATIONS STALLED OVER TIMING AND
SUBSTANCE

REF: A. A.USUN NEW YORK 1599


B. B.SECSTATE 137766

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MOLLY PHEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: ET PGOV PREL SU UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: UNSC/DARFUR: NEGOTIATIONS STALLED OVER TIMING AND
SUBSTANCE

REF: A. A.USUN NEW YORK 1599


B. B.SECSTATE 137766

Classified By: ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR MOLLY PHEE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Negotiations on the UK-U.S. draft Darfur
resolution are at a standstill after the second Experts
Meeting August 22. There are disputes over both the timing
and content of our draft. Some delegations failed to provide
formal comments pending external input. Others, including
the P5, maintained their objection to selected elements of
the text. Overall, delegations seem content to defer action
until the August 28 special Council session with
representatives of the GNU and AU. Of note, Russia came to
the Experts Meeting prepared to accept the language on date
of transition contained in the draft we circulated August 17,
but rejected the revised language we presented August 22 per
ref B. END SUMMARY.

TIMING
--------------

2. (C) During expert negotiations August 22, China, Qatar and
Congo made a concerted effort to delay Council consideration
of the UK-U.S. draft resolution. Qatar reiterated its
refusal to engage in any discussion at all until GNU consent
is secured. Congo demanded there be no Council action until
the AU offered its comments on the draft (expected by August
25). In this regard, the representative of the Congo
inaccurately accused the UN of adopting a unilateral approach
toward the issue of AMIS transition and failing to work in
cooperation with the AU. DPKO representatives tried in vain
to explain otherwise.


3. (C) China fully supported Congo in its insistence that the
Security Council take no action until the African Union
pronounced itself on the draft. Congo also reported that AU
Commission Chair Konare is preparing to go to Khartoum to
talk to President Bashir; then, Konare intends to consult
with Congolese President and AU Chair Sassou-Nguesso on next
steps regarding Darfur. The representative of Congo pressed
for the Council to delay action until those talks conclude.
In general, Congo insisted on greater African ownership of

the draft resolution process.


4. (C) Several delegations, including Russia, Japan, and
France, are awaiting input from DPKO before endorsing a final
text. Japan and France would not commit to discussion of
troop numbers until DPKO reverts early in the week of August
28 with its financial breakdown of the SYG's three options
for UNMIS deployment in Darfur. Russia is awaiting DPKO
clarification on the need to review the existing SOFA between
the UN and the GNU. Qatar alleged that DPKO did not do an
adequate job of addressing Qatar's questions about the GNU's
submitted plan for stabilizing Darfur and demanded a DPKO
briefing. (Note: This request is another stall tactic, as
DPKO has already made clear that the GNU plan is inconsistent
with the Darfur Peace Agreement). In subsequent Council
consultations August 22, Congo asked the Ghanaian Council
president to request a formal briefing from the Secretariat
on the GNU proposal.


5. (C) Overall, delegations seem content to defer action on
the draft until the convening of the August 28 special
Council session with a GNU official (now expected to be FM
Lam Akol instead of VP Taha),AU Commissioner Djinnit and an
OIC representative. Note: If the Arab League, which has
reversed its intial acceptance and declined the Council's
invitation to participate in this meeting, is successful in
pressuring the OIC, the AU, and the GNU into declining as
well, this meeting may be postponed.

SUBSTANCE
--------------

6. (C) GNU Consent: Russia and China continue to insist on a
mention of the need for GNU consent in OP1. We raised the
possibility, per ref B guidance, of 'demanding' that the GNU
live up to its governmental responsibilities to protect its
citizens by granting its consent for UN deployment in OP1,
but Russia was unwilling to be flexible on the wording.
Russia agreed with the Chinese proposal to add in PP3,
'bearing in mind that such transition should be approved by
the Government of National Unity,' an amendment China had

USUN NEW Y 00001610 002 OF 002


first raised in P5 discussions two weeks ago. We are working
with Ghana on additional preambular language that would
acknowledge past and ongoing efforts to secure GNU consent in
order to balance the Chinese and Russian proposals.


7. (C) Date of Transition: Per ref B guidance, we circulated
a revised text containing our new OP5 formulation. In
response, Russia announced it would have been willing to
accept the original OP5 language, with the understanding that
October 1 did not imply transition start date but rather that
UN assistance be provided to AMIS NLT October 1. However,
Russia reported that Moscow could not accept our revised
language. China repeated its earlier position of opposition
to reference of an October 1 transition date. UKUN is
opposed to the re-hatting of existing AMIS forces on October
1, but would support the new language proposed by the U.S. if
the adjective 'current' is dropped from the reference to the
AMIS mandate. France said nothing during the meeting but
told UKUN separately that Paris would not support October 1
re-hatting, per ref A.


8. (C) Qatar raised the renewed Arab League offer to fully
fund AMIS for six months beginning October 1. Note: If we
are unable to win Council support for the UK-U.S. draft in a
timely manner, and the AL steps in with funding, the AU would
have to extend the AMIS mandate beyond September 30, most
likely until the UN's target deployment date of January 1,

2007.


9. (C) Chapter VII: China reiterated its desire to replace in
OP12(a) the phrase, 'use all necessary means,' with the UNSCR
1590 language, 'take all necessary action.' Russia supported
China's position. France expressed concern that the 1590
formulation would not be adequate to provide for protection
of civilians and requested DPKO confirmation. We, the UK,
Greece, Japan and Denmark voiced support for the current
language.


10. (C) Responsibility to Protect: China reiterated its
request for deletion of the last phrase of PP2. Russia
reiterated its preference that the reference to paras 138-139
of the Outcome Document be deleted but remained flexible as
it had been in previous meetings on this point.


11. (C) Danish amendment: Despite our arguments per ref B
guidance, Denmark continues to stand firm on its proposal for
an additional sub-paragraph in OP8 addressing gender-based
discrimination, which would read, 'To ensure adequate human
rights and gender presence, capacity and expertise within
UNMIS to carry out human rights promotion, civilian
protection and gender sensitive monitoring activities.'
BOLTON