Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1609
2006-08-22 22:16:00
UNCLASSIFIED
USUN New York
Cable title:  

WAR ON TERRORISM - THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE -

Tags:  PREL PTER UNGA UNSC KTFN 
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DE RUCNDT #1609/01 2342216
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 222216Z AUG 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9942
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001609 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER UNGA UNSC KTFN
SUBJECT: WAR ON TERRORISM - THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE -
MAKING IT WORK FOR THE U.S.

REF: A. A. USUN 1410

B. B. USUN 1407

C. C. USUN 1409

D. D. USUN 1436

E. E. 2005 USUN 375

F. F. USUN 1207

G. G. USUN 1253

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001609

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER UNGA UNSC KTFN
SUBJECT: WAR ON TERRORISM - THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ROLE -
MAKING IT WORK FOR THE U.S.

REF: A. A. USUN 1410

B. B. USUN 1407

C. C. USUN 1409

D. D. USUN 1436

E. E. 2005 USUN 375

F. F. USUN 1207

G. G. USUN 1253


1. Summary: UN efforts to counter terrorism have increased
significantly since September 11, 2001. Pre-9/11 focus on
negotiating conventions in the General Assembly has shifted
to more robust and aggressive counter-terrorism measures
mandated by the Security Council. Although the General
Assembly has reacted by trying to map out a system-wide
strategy, negotiations have been hampered by the insistence
of some states on clinging to theological positions instead
of embracing a more action-oriented pragmatic approach. As a
result, this cable addresses only SC counter-terrorism
efforts, describes limitations to the UN,s ability to be a
lead actor in countering terrorism, and suggests ways to
strengthen UN effectiveness in those areas where it can
contribute to the war on terrorism. End Summary.



--------------
UN,s Role in US Counter terrorism
--------------


2. As we prepare for the renewal of several UN Committees,
the United States has an opportunity to reassess the
effectiveness of our efforts to counter terrorism
multilaterally through the UN. Given the difficulties of
sharing intelligence and law enforcement information broadly,
the UN is inherently a highly limited mechanism for
conducting counter-terrorism operations, and its bureaucratic
structure imposes other obstacles to developing robust
counter terrorism policy. On the other hand, the UN,s
global reach and the Security Council,s Chapter VII
authority are valuable assets.


3. As a supplement to the main elements of a U.S. program
centered on G-8 and bilateral efforts, the UN can play a
useful role. Financial sanctions, travel bans, arms
embargoes, and technical assistance to states to upgrade
their counter-terrorism capacities, have been identified and
undertaken, principally by the Security Council. Even so,
changing the way that 192 member states approach and deal
with the problem of international terrorism will be a
protracted process and dramatic results should not be

expected in the short run but these efforts should improve
the international climate for US CT operations.


4. The experience of the UN,s work in counter-terrorism
underscores the need to focus on areas where member states
can agree. USUN,s assessment is that the supporting role
for the UN has the most promise for making a lasting
contribution to the war on terrorism. It offers an
opportunity to use the resources of the international
community to enhance the CT capacity of states that share US
objectives and enable them to become more effective partners
in counter-terrorism operations.



--------------
UNSC Leads UN CT Effort
--------------


5. Before SC resolution 1267 (1999) imposed sanctions aimed
at the operations of the Taliban, SC action against terrorism
was sporadic and for the most part confined to the issuance
of statements in reaction to specific terrorist acts. The
Council, which has primary responsibility for threats to
international peace and security, had largely left counter
terrorism to the General Assembly, although it responded to
the bombings of Pan Am and UTA airliners in 1988 and 1989 by
imposing sanctions on Libya. This changed after September
11, 2001. Resolution 1368 (2001) adopted on September 12
stated clearly that terrorism constitutes a threat to
international peace and security and a series of resolutions
adopted since September 2001 form the foundation of an active
SC program to build a unified offense and defense against
terrorism. As part of this program, UN resolutions 1267,
1373, 1540 and 1566 established the following Council
sub-committees and Working Group:

--SC Resolution 1267 (1999) - Established the 1267 Committee,
which oversees sanctions on the Taliban, Usama bin Laden,
al-Qa'ida, and associated individuals and entities. The 1267
Committee differs significantly from CTC and 1540 because it
can impose sanctions. To date, the Committee has designated
481 terrorists and their supporters for sanctions (travel


ban, assets freeze, arms embargo),and frozen over 100
million dollars in terrorist assets making it the most active
of the UN Security Council's sanctions committees. The work
of the Committee has benefited from international agreement
on the need to fight al-Qa'ida. The U.S. relies on the 1267
Committee as a key tool in the fight against al-Qa'ida,
specifically to counter terrorism finance but its mandate is
limited to al-Qa,ida, the Taliban, and associated
individuals

The Committee is supported by a Monitoring Team (MT) of eight
experts, who assist in implementing the sanctions regime.
The MT has prepared five comprehensive reports for the
Council on states' implementation of the sanctions measures.
These reports also make recommendations for strengthening the
sanctions and responding to the evolution of al-Qa'ida. The
MT and/or the 1267 Chairman visit states to help them
understand their obligations and enhance enforcement of the
sanctions regime, and to encourage states to participate in
enhancing the sanctions regime by submitting names for the
Committee's sanctions list. The 1267 Committee requested all
states to submit one report on their implementation of the
sanctions measures, and the MT developed a questionnaire to
help states in their reporting and analyzed those reports.
The MT also coordinates with other international
organizations as a way to increase awareness of the sanctions
and the obligations of states to enforce those sanctions. The
MT,s mandate expires on December 31, 2006.

-- SC Resolution 1373 (2001) - Established the
Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC),which monitors states'
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001) and engages in
capacity-building work. France and the UK proposed the
CTC,s creation, and the U.S. accepted it with initial
skepticism. Since 2001, the United States has participated
actively in and supported the CTC, but as we approach the
fifth anniversary of resolution 1373, we need to review how
the CTC can further U.S. counter-terrorism objectives. Among
other things, resolution 1373 obligates states to prevent and
suppress terrorist financing; refrain from supporting
terrorists, including by suppressing of recruitment of
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons to
terrorists; take the necessary steps to prevent terrorist
acts; deny safe haven to terrorists and their supporters;
bring terrorists to justice; provide states assistance in
criminal investigations or proceedings relating to the
financing or support of terrorist acts; and prevent the
movement of terrorists through effective border controls and
controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents.
Resolution 1373 imposes many of the same obligations as
resolution 1267 and its successor resolutions -- freezing
assets, denying weapons to terrorists, and preventing
terrorists from travel -- although 1373 is not limited to al
Qa'ida, the Taliban, and their associates and it does not
empower the CTC to name persons and entities for sanctions.
The Committee has three sub-committees, which review
assessments of states' implementation of resolution 1373
(2001) prepared by the Counter-Terrorism Committee's
Executive Directorate (CTED).

-- SC Resolution 1535 (2004) - Established CTED to enhance
the CTC's ability to monitor the implementation of resolution
1373 (2001) and effectively continue its work to build
states' capacity to implement resolution 1373 (2001). In
creating CTED, the Council intended to allow the CTC to
transition from a process that relied on analyzing and
responding to states' written reports to one that includes
identifying best practices, conducting visits to selected
countries to review compliance, and facilitating the delivery
of technical assistance to states that need it. That
progress has begun. CTED has 32 members, 29 of which are
professional staff. Its mandate extends until December 31,

2007. The CTED Executive Director's current contract expires
December 31, 2006. The Council performed a comprehensive
review of CTED last December and will conduct another review
by December 31, 2006.

-- SC Resolution 1624 (2005) - Tasked the CTC to include in
its dialogue with states their efforts to implement the
resolution, work with states to build capacity, and report
back to the Council by September 2006 on implementation of
the resolution. Resolution 1624 (2005) calls upon states to
adopt such measures as may be necessary and appropriate and
in accordance with their obligations under international law
to prohibit by law incitement to commit a terrorist act or
acts, prevent such contact, and deny safe haven to any
persons with respect to whom there is credible and relevant
information giving serious reasons for considering that they
have been guilty of such conduct.

-- SC Resolution 1540 (2004) - Set up the 1540 Committee,
which is mandated to promote states' full implementation of
that resolution. The resolution requires states to develop


and enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery, including to terrorists and other
non-state actors. It also requests states to submit a report
on their implementation of resolution 1540; 58 states have
not yet reported. During the Committee's initial two-year
mandate, an eight-member experts, team evaluated states'
reports and prepares matrices reflecting its assessment of
states' implementation, which the Committee's three
sub-committees then review and approve. The experts also
prepared a legislative database, containing the texts of laws
and other measures states have taken to implement resolution

1540. Although the Chairman and the experts travel to attend
international conferences relevant to resolution 1540, they
have not engaged regularly in state visits.

-- SC Resolution 1673 (2006) ) Extended the 1540 Committee's
mandate for two years and tasked the Committee, among other
things, to intensify its efforts to promote the full
implementation of resolution 1540. Five experts currently
assist the Committee, which might need to hire additional
experts to help the Committee fulfill its mandate. The
contracts for four of the experts expire December 31, 2006;
the fifth is on a month-to-month contract.

-- SC Resolution 1566 (2004) ) Established the 1566 Working
Group, with a mandate to submit recommendations to the
Council on (1) what practical measures could be applied to
individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated
with terrorist activities beyond those designated by the 1267
Committee, and (2) the possibility of establishing an
international fund to compensate victims of terrorism. The
Working Group reported to the Council in December 2005,
noting that it had not reached agreement on the establishment
of a UN list of terrorists beyond the 1267 Committee's list.
The Group also noted that the resolution of questions about
the establishment of an international compensation fund was
premature. The Working Group has met once in 2006, and aside
from Russia and China, few delegations have shown interest in
continuing its discussions.

--------------
UNSC's CT Efforts Make Progress
--------------


6. The 1267 Committee is working to strengthen sanctions
against al-Qa'ida and its associates, including by focusing
more on the travel ban and addressing non-compliance. The
Committee (at USUN's request) has tasked the MT to prepare a
paper specifying cases of non-compliance. The case studies
will likely show various reasons behind instances of
non-compliance, such as confusion over entries on the
sanctions list, ignorance among some states about sanctions
enforcement obligations, and, in some cases, lack of
political will. USUN plans to press the Committee to deal
with all the reasons identified in the upcoming paper,
including the more sensitive issue of lack of political will.
The Committee is also working to improve the quality and
accuracy of the sanctions list.




7. Since it became fully staffed in September 2005, CTED has
begun to make the transition from focusing on analyzing and
responding to states' reports to working more proactively.
CTED faced internal operational challenges during the
start-up period, but has begun to make progress. For
example, it has conducted five state visits since September,
bringing the total number of these trips to nine since 2005.
Its Executive Director also recently visited Paraguay to
press government leaders to fulfill Paraguay's obligations
under resolution 1373. A team also traveled with one of the
1540 experts to meet with the CARICOM Secretariat to assist
CARICOM members, many of which have had trouble submitting
reports to the three SC committees, in meeting their
obligations under resolution 1373. CTED is planning up to
seven additional trips this year, including a trip to the
Philippines, which it will conduct jointly with the 1267
Monitoring Team. CTED has developed a new tool, the
Preliminary Implementation Assessment (PIA),which will
improve its evaluations of states' compliance by providing a
standardized template for analyzing all states'
implementation and thus helping the CTC and CTED focus on
states encountering the greatest difficulties. CTED also has
prepared a directory of best practices relevant to resolution
1373 (2001).


8. Since the Security Council renewed the 1540 Committee's
mandate in April 2006, the Committee has been unable to reach
consensus on its work program but has participated in several
successful outreach programs to promote states,
implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) (ref A). The
Russian and Chinese delegations oppose including explicit


language to task the Committee to analyze and assess states'
implementation of resolution 1540, develop standards for
measuring states' compliance with resolution 1540, or set
regional- or state-specific assistance priorities for
stemming proliferation activity - all key U.S. objectives.

--------------
The Future Path
--------------


9. Going forward, the U.S. has a two-fold task - to improve
the current UN system and use it more effectively as a weapon
in the war on terrorism. To succeed in this effort, the
United States needs to be able to articulate consistent,
clear objectives and operate with agility. The recently
adopted G-8 Statement on Strengthening the UN's
Counterterrorism Program should provide a blueprint for
enhancing the work of the organization. U.S.
counter-terrorism efforts at the UN should press states to do
more to counter terrorism while also using multilateral
mechanisms to help build states' capacity to counter
terrorism and to aggregate efforts of individual donor
states.



10. The 1267 Committee, the CTC, and the 1540 Committee have
made significant strides but they could be more effective.
While the three committees have distinct mandates, some of
their working methods ) visiting states requesting
information from states, or, coordinating with international
and regional organizations, - are often the same, and the
committees encounter many similar issues and problems.
Because the committees were created as reactions to threats
and events rather than as part of a planned program, there is
some overlap and lack of cohesion. The Secretary General's
Report on Mandates (A/60/733, para 122) makes a series of
suggestions for the committees, including undertaking joint
missions, consolidating reporting, and establishing a common
norm for dealing with non-compliance. The Report concludes
that, "In the long run, it would be a good idea to look at
the possibility of creating a single subsidiary body that
covers all the expertise of the current three." Similarly,
the Gingrich-Mitchell report recommended that the United
States "take the lead in the council to rationalize the work
of the three Security Council committees responsible for
terrorism and proliferation under three separate resolutions
(1267, 1373, and 1540)."


11. Despite the overlaps between the mandates of the 1267
Committee and the CTC, USUN does not view consolidating the
three committees as feasible at this stage. (We should also
be careful about taking any action that would jeopardize the
unique mandate of 1267 and its operations). Doing so would
require a new Security Council resolution, which would be
difficult to achieve in the near term and might not reap the
kind of returns that would make it politically cost
effective. While the committees have not discussed the issue
openly, a number of states made it clear (including during
the Council's discussions on the Secretary-General's Report
on Mandates) that they do not favor consolidation. One
exception is Japan, which has not taken a public position but
might support consolidation to reduce costs and improve
efficiency. Instead, the U.S. should focus its efforts on
steps the Committees can take to improve their efficiency.

--------------
Steps To Improve the SC CT System
--------------


12. First, the committees should, whenever possible, combine
requests for reports in the same letter or envelope. Doing
so would ensure that the committees do not send similar or
identical questions at separate times during the year, which
they have done in the past.


13. Second, the three committees should take a coordinated
approach to the 31 states that have not reported or are late
in reporting to all three committees. The expert bodies are
already working together to prepare such an approach. The
committees should also ask the experts to prepare one set of
questions that the three committees could send to the
relevant states, taking care to ensure that the
proliferation-related elements of resolution 1540 are
addressed sufficiently.


14. Third, the 1267 MT and CTED should be encouraged to make
joint visits, if appropriate. Apart from easing the burden
that hosting visits places on states, joint visits would help
enhance follow up with states, allowing the MT and CTED to
devise joint approaches to help states fulfill their
obligations. Joint trips will also reduce the paperwork the
two committees must address because the experts could prepare
one trip report the two committees could discuss. The MT has


invited CTED to participate in all of the trips it hopes to
make between July and December 2006, and the two groups hope
to make five joint visits in that period.


15. Fourth, the committees and their experts should
coordinate their efforts relating to capacity building more
effectively. (NOTE: The 1267 Committee does not work on
capacity building. END NOTE.) The U.S. should encourage
CTED to expand upon some new initiatives it is pursuing in
this area and press the 1540 Committee and its experts to
coordinate with the CTC and CTED. The U.S. should also
encourage the CTC/CTED to increase efforts to bring donors
together with recipients to exchange views about key needs
and coordinate strategies to address them. The July 21
meeting the CTC convened in New York with representatives of
potential donors and the Pacific Island States (ref B) is the
type of proactive, results-oriented approach that the CTC and
CTED should replicate with other states and regions.

--------------
Other Key Objectives
--------------


16. We also should continue to focus the 1267 Committee and
the CTC on promoting states' efforts to deny terrorists safe
haven. In response to USUN's lead, the CTC/CTED is beginning
to shift its focus from the provisions of resolution 1373
related to terrorism finance, to provisions concerning denial
of safe haven, including through improved border security.
CTED has introduced a new emphasis on border security to its
state visits and is devoting its fifth special meeting with
international, regional, and sub-regional organizations to
border security and preventing terrorists from traveling.
CTED is working with the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO),Interpol, the World Customs Organization
(WCO),the International Maritime Organization (IMO),and the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to
prepare for the meeting, now scheduled for early 2007. USUN
also is encouraging CTED to place priority on border security
in its efforts to facilitate technical assistance.


17. Promoting states' compliance with the relevant
resolutions should remain another key objective. The 1267
Committee is effectively addressing issues of non-compliance.
Because of the nature of sanctions, the 1267 Committee can
easily identify violations of the regime when the information
is uncovered and "named and shamed" some violators. The CTC
and 1540 committees should also be more proactive in
promoting states' compliance with their obligations under the
relevant resolutions. Both resolutions are useful tools for
heightening awareness of the threats of terrorism and
proliferation, but non-compliance remains a significant
problem. Many states remain unclear about how to fulfill
the obligations the Council has established and want the
committees to provide direction. Establishing and publicizing
standards also would meet that need but setting such
standards in Committees that work by consensus is
challenging. Furthermore, the current regime is not
enforceable without further SC action to impose sanctions- a
highly unlikely move. In addition, for many developing
states, it may be unreasonable to expect full compliance in
the immediate future. The CTC has only recently begun to
play a more active role in working to facilitate the delivery
of technical assistance, and it has not yet achieved concrete
results. Without first ensuring that states that are willing
to implement their obligations get the assistance they need,
it will be difficult to reach consensus on any effort to
label states as non-compliant.


18. A more realistic strategy in the short term is to focus
the committees on identifying and promoting best practices
that states can use as a model in implementing their
obligations. The CTC is poised to adopt a directory of best
practices for implementing resolution 1373 that includes the
FATF standards, as well as recommendations developed by ICAO,
the IMO, and the WCO (ref C). USUN will press the 1540
Committee to prepare a similar directory of practices
relevant to resolution 1540. That directory should refer to
the international standards such as the International Atomic
Energy Agency's recommendations or key national practices the
Committee and its experts have identified.


19. Another way of contributing is by lending U.S. expertise
to CTED, the MT, the 1540 experts, and the committees and by
providing U.S. resources as appropriate to support key
initiatives. The U.S. has provided workshops for the three
experts' groups on terrorism financing and preventing
terrorists from traveling. The Coast Guard briefed CTED and
MT members on maritime security measures at the Coast Guard's
command center for the ports of New York and New Jersey, and
USUN is working with the Department to arrange for CTED and
MT members to tour JFK Airport in September. These
initiatives have signaled the U.S. commitment to enhancing


the effectiveness of the experts' teams. To assist the 1540
Committee in focusing on proliferation financing, the U.S.
should provide a session on that topic for the Committee and
its experts. The US should also expend more energy on
publicizing its CT assistance activities.

--------------
CTED and Ruperez
--------------


20. Javier Ruperez, former Spanish Ambassador to the United
States, serves as CTED Executive Director. His current term
expires in December. Ruperez,s tenure has been marred by
constant conflict with CTC Chairman, Danish Perm Rep Ellen
Margrethe Loj, whose tenure as Chairman also ends on December
31, 2006. Despite this clash in management style, both have
been responsive to US concerns and consulted with us on the
work of the Committee.

On the positive side, Ruperez,s experience as a senior
Spanish diplomat serves him well in representing CTED in
discussions with other governments. He works closely and
readily co-operates with the United States. For example, he
coordinated closely with USUN in making a successful trip in
July to press Paraguay to fulfill its obligations under
resolution 1373 ) another U.S. objective. Before December
31, 2006, the CTC must consider whether to recommend that the
Secretary-General renew the contract. Ruperez shares US

SIPDIS
counter terrorism objectives and has been unfailingly
responsive. In view of the progress that CTED has made and
Ruperez,s excellent cooperation with us, the U.S. should
support the extension of his contract.



BOLTON