DPKO BRIEFS A/S HILLEN ON EXPANDED UNIFIL FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USUN NEW YORK 001550

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL KPKO UNSC IS LE
SUBJECT: DPKO BRIEFS A/S HILLEN ON EXPANDED UNIFIL FORCE
GENERATION EFFORTS


Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a meeting with PM A/S Hillen on August
16 in New York, UN DPKO A/SYG Hedi Annabi expressed deep
concern that potential unwillingness by France to commit
substantial forces to an expanded UNIFIL might have a
"chilling effect" on other potential troop contributing
countries (TCCs) and imperil the broader force generation
effort. Annabi warned of serious problems unless France
commits to a "major contribution that would constitute the
backbone of the force," and urged the USG to weigh in with
French President Chirac, as SYG Annan was currently doing, at
the highest possible level to secure this commitment. Annabi
emphasized that France must make such an announcement either
before or during an August 17 meeting with over 50 current
and potential TCCs, during which D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown
plans to preview the Secretariat's concept of operations,
rules of engagement, and force requirements. Outlining
DPKO's plans for an initial advance force of 3,500 to 4,000
troops that would supplement the existing UNIFIL contingent
and help the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) deploy to the south,
Annabi suggested that Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and
possibly Spain would be willing to contribute troops to such
a force. He said other TCCs such as Turkey and Morocco
remain noncommittal, while possible Muslim contributors like
Indonesia and Malaysia may be dissuaded by Israel's announced
refusal to countenance soldiers from countries with which it
does not have diplomatic relations. Annabi said SYG Annan
had asked Israeli FM for greater flexibility on this point.


2. (C) Summary, cont,d. Annabi presented A/S Hillen with a
comprehensive "shopping list" of USG assistance to support
the training and equipping of the LAF as well as UNIFIL
deployment logistics, and asked that the USG provide as much
of this assistance as possible on a voluntary
(non-reimbursable) basis. Recounting USG efforts to support
DPKO's force generation work, A/S Hillen conveyed a message
from Secretary Rice that the Secretariat ought to move as
rapidly as possible to set up the new force and define its
concept of operations and rules of engagement in accordance
with the spirit of UNSCR 1701. This would mean ensuring the
rules of engagement (ROE) are sufficiently strong and
muscular to permit the force to operate in a semi-permissive
environment and help ensure the LAF deployment is a success.
The USG, A/S Hillen underscored, wanted to ensure that the
expanded UNIFIL force helps implements all the provisions of
UNSCR 1701 -- including the arms embargo, humanitarian
reconstruction, and a buffer zone in south Lebanon free from
unauthorized armed elements. End Summary.


3. (U) Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs
John Hillen met UN Department of Peackeeping Operations
(DPKO) Assistant Secretary-General Hedi Annabi on August 16
to review force generation efforts for the expanded UNIFIL
mission. Annabi was accompanied by DPKO Military Advisor
Lieutenant General Randhir Kumar Mehta, DPKO Asia Director
Lisa Buttenheim, as well as several other DPKO officials.
USUN Ambassador Wolff and IO DAS Gerry Anderson accompanied
A/S Hillen, as did representatives from NEA/IPA, IO/PSC,
L/PM, and PM.

UNIFIL-IDF-LAF Meetings Going Well
--------------


4. (C) Annabi expressed "guarded optimism" that the current
cessation of hostilities would continue to hold and described
recent meetings between UNIFIL, LAF, and IDF representatives
as "historic" and highly positive developments. He noted
that the August 12 trilateral meeting at Naqoura had helped
operationalize the cessation of hostilities and had set a
constructive and professional tone for future discussions.
The second trilateral meeting, held on August 16, focused on
planning for IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon. According to
Annabi, the LAF argued on August 18 for a plan for full IDF
withdrawal from Lebanon, whereas the IDF instead offered a
blueprint for staged Israeli withdrawals that would be
conditioned on UNIFIL/LAF deployments. The two sides
reportedly agreed ultimately that Israel would start
withdrawing from its positions in stages.

General Force Generation Efforts
--------------


5. (C) Annabi noted that the Secretariat had been actively
engaging current and potential TCCs on contributions to the

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expanded UNIFIL force since August 12, one day after UNSCR
1701 was adopted. The UN, he said, has emphasized the need
for firm commitments and fixed dates by which deployments to
the region would begin -- he added that DPKO has cautioned
TCCs that this is no time for mere expressions of interest.
Annabi confirmed that Deputy Secretary-General Mark Malloch
Brown would chair a meeting with more than 50 current and
potential TCCs on August 17 to underscore the urgency of the
UN's appeal. During this meeting, Malloch Brown would
preview the UN's thoughts on the mission's concept of
operations, rules of engagement, and force requirements.


6. (C) Outlining the UN's current thoughts on force
requirements, Annabi said DPKO wanted to send an initial
advance force of 3,500 to 4,000 troops -- consisting of three
mechanized battalions and one infantry battalion -- to
Lebanon within 10-15 days. This force would link up with the
2,000 existing UNIFIL troops on the ground and position
themselves in the zone a few kilometers deep along the Blue
Line. As the initial UN force is deploying, the LAF would
position itself in three large Assembly Areas just north of
the Litani River. Then, as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
move back over the Blue Line, the LAF would cross the Litani
and fill in between the river and the Blue Line. These
movements would all be orchestrated by UNIFIL.


7. (C) Annabi said DPKO had called on TCCs to self-deploy and
self-sustain their forces for up to 60 days, after which the
UN would reimburse them for expenses previously incurred at
standard UN rates. Annabi said the UN is asking European
TCCs to cover the difference between UN rates and the full
cost of self-deployment. Annabi confirmed that DPKO had
received approval from the Under Secretary-General for
Management to waive many standard UN budgetary regulations in
order to deploy the expanded force as quickly as possible.
Mehta said movements into the sector could come via air into
Beirut and Tel Aviv. Port landings could come through Tyre
and Haifa. Additionally, DPKO plans to utilize a site on
Cyprus as a &Forward Mounting Base8 from which units and
supplies may be moved into Lebanon. Forces and equipment
could be flown with strategic lift to Cyprus and then via air
or sea into the Area of Operations.

Preliminary French Reaction Worrying
--------------


8. (C) Annabi reported "intensive" Secretariat efforts to
urge the French to announce a major commitment to the
expanded force, but cautioned that preliminary indications
from French military planners currently in New York had been
worrying. Asking that the USG protect this information and
its source, he said the French delegation had told DPKO on
August 16 that France would be willing to commit staff
officers, an engineering company, and a quick-reaction force
to south Lebanon -- but that these forces would operate
outside of UNIFIL. The French were reportedly planned to
make an announcement along these lines on August 16, which
Annabi said would have had a "chilling effect" on other TCCs,
but after Secretariat intervention they instead released a
general statement noting their intention to continue to lead
UNIFIL until February 2007.


9. (C) Annabi warned of a serious problem unless France
announces on August 17 "a major contribution that would
constitute the backbone of the force." He reported that SYG
Annan was calling French President Chirac at 1700 New York
time on August 16 to emphasize this point. But Annabi
emphasized that intervention by the USG at the highest level
-- he specifically suggested a POTUS to Chirac call -- would
also be crucial to persuade the French to "stop dancing" and
commit. Annabi characterized the August 17 TCC meeting as a
"key moment" for France that would either lead other TCCs to
support the force or to walk away. In addition to the
contributions the French had previewed for DPKO on August 16,
Annabi said Paris would need to provide at least a strong
battalion that would lead the initial 3,500 to 4,000-strong
advance force.

Good Signs from Italians and Other Europeans
--------------


10. (C) Annabi confirmed that Italian Prime Minister Prodi
had told SYG Annan that Italy would provide a "strong
contingent" to the expanded UNIFIL force. Noting media
reports in which the Italian FM had suggested the force might

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consist of up to 3,000 troops, Annabi said the exact nature
of Italy's contribution remains to be discussed. He asked
for USG help in countering a "strange" Italian proposal to
create a second line of command, similar to NATO's geographic
commands, between the UNIFIL Force Commander and UNHQ. While
the Italians believe this arrangement might help ensure the
mission has sufficient authority to use force, etc., Annabi
said he had assured the Italians that the Force Commander
would have all the flexibility he needs. Annabi
categorically rejected comments in the press by an Italian
General that UN peacekeeping operations require approval
everyday from UNHQ to use force to carry out their mission.
Emphasizing that "this is not the old DPKO," he added that
"even if we wanted to micromanage this operation, we would
not be able to" because of the difficult challenges involved
and the fast-moving nature of the mission.


11. (C) Scandinavian countries, Annabi reported, had showed
"a lot of interest" in contributing to the force and had even
made some "quasi-commitments" of support. He said the
Norwegian State Secretary for Defense, in particular, had
told DPKO that Norway would most likely be able to provide
maritime patrol units to help guard Lebanon's coast against
arms smuggling operations. Annabi predicted that Norway,
together with Denmark and Sweden, might agree to provide all
four of the initial maritime patrols required for the advance
force and eventually provide the 12 maritime patrols needed
for the expanded force. He added that EU Foreign Policy
Chief Javier Solana, whom he described as being very active
and helpful in the force generation process, thought that
Spain might also come forward with a contribution to an
expanded UNIFIL.

Few Commitments from Other TCCs and
Concerns About Israeli Preconditions
--------------


12. (C) While acknowledging arguments that the force should
strike a balance between European and Arab/Muslim soldiers,
Annabi said he was not sure if that was an important
principle or if it would even be possible to obtain such a
balance of contributions. He reported that Egypt had flatly
rejected participating in an expanded UNIFIL, whereas Morocco
had only put forward expressions of interest. Annabi
described Turkey as interested in possibly contributing to
the force but thusfar unwilling to make a commitment.
Indonesia had made a formal commitment to supply a mechanized
infantry battalion of 850 troops, but it would need strategic
lift to deploy this force to the region.


13. (C) Part of the problem in obtaining broad-based
contributions, Annabi averred, was Israel's press statement
that it would not agree to forces from countries with which
it did not have diplomatic relations. Given potential
contributions from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan, Annabi
argued that Israel should show flexibility and warned against
a blanket "no" to Muslim contributions. He said Israeli FM
Livni had agreed to reconsider the GOI's position on this
issue and provide DPKO by August 17 a list of those countries
from which Israel could not accept troops and those countries
which it would prefer to keep out of UNIFIL but would
ultimately accept.

Request for Assistance from USG
--------------


14. (C) Annabi and Mehta provided A/S Hillen with a
comprehensive "shopping list" of USG assistance to help
deploy the force and train and equip the LAF. (Note: Copies
of the UN's request have been faxed to PM. End Note.)
Focusing specifically on the request for strategic airlift
assistance from the USG, Annabi urged the USG to provide this
aid as a voluntary contribution. If, as in the past, the USG
offered this assistance at its cost -- which he said is 3.5
to 4 times the commercial rate -- Annabi predicted the UN
would have to decline the offer. If it is not possible to
provide this assistance on a voluntary basis, he encouraged
the USG to consider providing it at the UN reimbursement rate
instead of the traditional USG rate.

Hillen Briefs on USG Efforts
--------------


15. (C) A/S Hillen briefed Annabi on USG efforts to support
the Secretariat's force generation work, including a demarche

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cable encouraging potential TCCs to consider contributions
and engage DPKO quickly as well as an August 16 meeting
hosted by A/S Hillen and NEA A/S Welch with Washington-based
Ambassadors of potential TCCs to relay the same message. A/S
Hillen noted positive signals as a result of these meetings
from the Italians and Germans and predicted Malaysia and
other TCCs might announce commitments as soon as they become
comfortable with the UN's concept of operations and rules of
engagement. He also confirmed that the USG is looking for
ways to train, equip, and modernize the LAF and to consider
what kind of assistance it could provide in terms of force
enablers, including lift capabilities and planning and
intelligence efforts.


16. (C) Noting that Secretary Rice had asked him to convey
this message to the Secretariat, A/S Hillen emphasized the
need to move rapidly to set up the new force and to define
the concept of operations and the mandate of the mission in
accordance with the spirit of UNSCR 1701. This would mean
ensuring the rules of engagement (ROE) were sufficiently
strong and muscular to permit the force to operate in a
semi-permissive environment and that the force ultimately
reaches its authorized ceiling. While acknowledging that the
force would not engage in offensive military operations such
as disarming Hizballah, A/S Hillen argued that strong and
muscular ROE would help ensure that the LAF deployment is a
success. He noted that the USG would work with other UNSC
members to ensure UNSCR 1701's provisions on the arms
embargo, humanitarian reconstruction in south Lebanon, and
the buffer zone free from unauthorized armed elements are
implemented. The USG, A/S Hillen assured Annabi, stands
ready to help the Secretariat in this regard.

Timing of IDF Withdrawal / UNIFIL-LAF Deployment
-------------- ---


17. (C) Annabi said Israeli FM Livni had served notice that
the IDF plans to begin withdrawals from certain parts of
south Lebanon on August 16 and complete most of the
withdrawal by August 24. However, Livni also reportedly told
DPKO that the IDF would hold onto a band of territory along
the Blue Line until it sees a credible UNIFIL-LAF deployment
in these areas. As the withdrawal process continues, General
Mehta (please protect) asked the USG to urge Israel -- in
accordance with customary military practice -- to remove all
its booby traps and mines in south Lebanon and destroy all
underground tunnels and weapons caches controlled by
Hizballah that the IDF has identified. Mehta asked that the
USG treat with extreme care the UN,s request that the IDF
destroy Hizballah facilities, lest Hizballah retaliate
against UNIFIL if word of the request leaks.


18. (C) Mehta also emphasized that the UN and other
interested parties should urge the LAF to deploy tactically
to south Lebanon rather than deploy to military camp sites.
Deploying tactically throughout the area of operations, he
said, would help sanitize the territory and ensure the LAF
could monitor Hizballah movements and possible arms
shipments. Mehta also underscored that Hizballah must never
again be allowed to establish positions near UNIFIL
positions, as had happened in the past.

Details of Force Structure
--------------


19. (C) Annabi and Mehta presented DPKO,s current view of
UNIFIL force requirements based on their &troops-to-task8
assessment derived from UNSCR 1701 (battalions consist of
650-850 soldiers each and companies typically consist of 125
personnel)

-8x Mechanized Infantry battalions;
-3x Light Armored Cavalry battalions;
-2x Combat Engineer battalions (or as much as they can get);
-1x Engineer battalion for reconstruction;
1x Logistics/transportation battalion (light/medium trucks);
-4x Signal companies;
-1 Aviation unit consisting of 5 helicopters for both Search
and Rescue (SAR) and aerial reconnaissance;
-2x Military Police companies;
-1x Level II Hospital;
1-Cartography section;
-3x Headquarter Companies (1 to bolster the existing HQ at
Naqoura, and 1 each for the two operating sectors.


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(Note: This list totals approximately 15,000 personnel,
including the existing 2,000-man UNIFIL contingent. End
Note.)


20. (C) Mehta said the UNIFIL HQ in Naqoura would initially
serve as the principal in-country logistical hub, but that
DPKO would at some point plan to establish a base at the port
of Tyre as well as another base near the boundary of the two
sectors around Qabrikha. Supplies may also be brought into
Cyprus via strategic lift and then brought into Lebanon by
sea or air.
BOLTON