LORD CARLILE SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON DEFINING TERRORISM

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001441

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV UNSC KTFN UNGA UK
SUBJECT: LORD CARLILE SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON DEFINING TERRORISM


1. This is an action request; please see para 9.


2. In a videoteleconference with USUN LegalOff, Department
attorneys, and UKUN legal advisers on July 31, Lord Alex
Carlile of Berriew Q.C., the UK,s independent reviewer of
the Terrorist Act, sought U.S. views on the negotiations of
the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism
(CCIT),whether U.S. law treats as terrorists domestic groups
that use violence to achieve political ends, and the efficacy
and scope of the UN Security Council,s al Qa,ida/Taliban
sanctions. Carlile is visiting New York to gather
information for a report he is preparing on the definition of
terrorism in UK law. Through meetings with legal advisers
from UN missions and others, he said he hoped to discern
whether the UN could achieve progress in reaching an
internationally acceptable definition of terrorism.


3. As the independent reviewer of the UK,s terrorism
legislation, Carlile provides annual reports on the &working
and functionality8 of the UK,s counterterrorism law, and he
is preparing a special report on how UK law defines
terrorism. The UK has a broad definition of terrorism in
section 1 of the Terrorist Act of 2000, as amended in 2006,
and its law includes other definitions relating to terrorism
financing and to the international counterterrorism
conventions and protocols to which the UK is a party. He
noted that he thought the reference to "criminal acts" from
UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) might help the OIC
to overcome concerns about the perceived overbreadth of the
CCIT provisions.


4. Carlile questioned whether language in UNSCR 1566 might
provide the basis for the UN to define terrorism and thus
conclude the negotiations of the CCIT. (Note: Operative
paragraph 3 of UNSCR 1566 &(r)ecalls that criminal acts,
including against civilians, committed with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages,
with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general
public or in a group of persons or particular persons,
intimidate a population or compel a government or an
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any
act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as
defined in the international conventions and protocols
relating to terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable
by considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological,
racial, ethnic, religious or other similar nature (8 End
Note.) Citing his earlier meeting with the Pakistan
Mission,s legal adviser, Carlile said he thought the key
obstacle to concluding negotiations of the CCIT was the
difference in how the OIC countries and others wanted to
address self-determination.


5. Department lawyers responded that resolution 1566 had
been negotiated in a different context, that Article 2 of the
draft CCIT already referred to acts that are &unlawful and
intentional,8 and that Article 18 of the draft CCIT
reflected language the OIC had accepted in the Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, the amendments to the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,
and the Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism.
Department lawyers cautioned against proposing new language
on self-determination that would have the effect of
undermining the object and purpose of the treaty. Carlile
seemed to understand the point, but expressed skepticism
that, on this view, there was any chance of concluding the
CCIT negotiations.


6. Carlile also asked whether the United States had concerns
about using U.S. terrorism laws to prosecute domestic groups
that use violence for political ends. In the UK, some are
concerned that using anti-terrorism laws to prosecute violent
animal rights activists lends those groups credibility.
Department lawyers explained that the State Department's
principal focus in terrorism is international terrorism
rather than domestic environmental terrorism, indicating that
the relevant legal regimes are largely separate.


7. Carlile then expressed some skepticism about the 1267
sanctions regime, asking why the 1267 Committee's sanctions
list was not broader and asking for statistics to quantify
the impact of freezing terrorists, assets. He questioned
whether concerns about sharing intelligence prevented the
United States or other states from proposing more names for
designation. Department lawyers explained U.S. domestic
procedures for designating terrorists, stressing the U.S. aim
to add as many individuals and entities designated under U.S.
procedures to the 1267 Committee's sanctions list as
possible, notwithstanding information sharing issues that
arise from time to time. Carlile also argued that because
terrorist acts required little financing, freezing assets
would not counter terrorism.


8. Department lawyers stressed the importance of having a

legal regime that worked to prevent terrorist acts before
they happened, and pointed out the preventive value of
financial and other sanctions. On the margins of the meeting
USUN agreed to try to provide relevant data, including a copy
of the Treasury Department Office of Foreign Assets Control's
annual report to Congress on assets freezes, if available,
and noted that because freezing assets and bank accounts
helps prevent terrorists from transferring funds, focusing on
amounts frozen does not necessarily illustrate the impact of
such sanctions. Citing high rates of remittances from the UK
to Bangladesh, Carlile expressed skepticism, arguing that the
energy expended on freezing assets could be better sent
tracking remittances to ensure that they are not provided to
front companies or others who finance terrorists.


9. USUN requests that Department provide any additional data
that USUN or EmbLondon could provide to Carlile.
BOLTON