Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1378
2006-07-18 02:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

SPECIAL ENVOY AHTISAARI BRIEFS UNSC ON KOSOVO

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNMIK YI 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1378/01 1990200
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180200Z JUL 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9628
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0109
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0591
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001378 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY AHTISAARI BRIEFS UNSC ON KOSOVO
FUTURE STATUS TALKS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001378

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY AHTISAARI BRIEFS UNSC ON KOSOVO
FUTURE STATUS TALKS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)



1. (C) Summary: On July 13, the Security Council met for a
briefing by Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari on his progress on
overseeing the Kosovo Future Status Talks. The unusual
format for the day involved three separate events: a private
meeting of the Security Council, closed consultations in
which Ahtisaari briefed on his progress and the road ahead
and lastly an "Arria-formula" meeting at which President
Sejdiu spoke and listened to statements by some Security
Council members. In the Private Meeting, Serbian Prime
Minister Kostunica delivered a highly legalistic message
pointing successively to UNSCR 1244, the Helsinki Final Act
and the UN Charter as legal arguments for why Kosovo could
not be separated from Serbia. Kostunica also asserted that
the Contact Group statement from London in January did not
allow for a rushed and imposed solution and stated in a final
comment at the end of the session that the Albanians had
"already gotten their state in the previous century, so, they
do not deserve another one now." In consultations Ahtisaari
read from prepared comments and noted that he planned to
convene a session on the larger status issues later this
month, but positions were far apart so it would be difficult
to come to an agreed solution. Russian PermRep Vitaly
Churkin said the international community should "get over
Milosevic" and stop blaming the current democratic government
in Belgrade for his actions. Churkin also said the
international community would have no right at all to impose
a solution and that Kosovo was not a unique case and would,
to the contrary, have an impact around the globe. In the
afternoon Arria-formula meeting, President Sejdiu delivered a
well-balanced and temperate speech. The U.S., UK, France,
Greece and Italy made comments. Russia was represented at
the expert level and made no comments. End summary.

Private Meeting
--------------

2. (C) In the private meeting, Prime Minister Kostunica
(statement also faxed to Washington) delivered a highly
legalistic message focused on Serbia's territorial integrity

saying that Kosovo was incontestably part of Serbia and
nobody had managed to call into question this fundamental
fact by means of legal arguments. Kostunica stated that
Albanians who were the clear majority in Kosovo demanded to
be given independence and full sovereignty of territory that
belongs to Serbia and continued that these arguments for
Kosovo's independence "amounted to violence and persistent
threats to use force." Kostunica further argued that the
standards "were really about fundamental human rights", but
thinking had slipped from "standards before status" to a
consecutive approach and finally to the current situation of
"almost forgetting about the standards all together."
Kostunica concluded that "the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of democratic states should be sacrosanct." He
further stated that "the Parliament of Serbia would, without
a shadow of a doubt, reject any imposed solution and declare
it legally void, and Serbia would continue to consider the
territory of Kosovo as part of its sovereignty."


3. (C) In national statements, UK Deputy Permrep Karen
Pierce welcomed Kostunica's offer to move the process
forward, but stated that the January Contact Group Statement
and Guiding Principles along with 1244 must be adhered to
firmly. Pierce also stated that Kosovo was a very unique
case because of the history of the region. Pierce, welcomed
Kostunica's willingness to engage Ahtisaari, but said the UK
was concerned by "attempts to undermine him." Countering an
argument by Kostunica, she said "no one would be trying to
change the borders of the Balkans by force and with 7000 NATO
troops there, no one would allow Kosovo to become a threat to
its neighbors." The fact was that Kosovars did not want to
be ruled by Belgrade, however, was a fact that Ahtisaari
would have to take into account, Pierce stated. In its
statement, Greece stressed that any solution needed to be
negotiated and Belgrade should encourage Serbs to participate
in Kosovo institutions. There should be no inflexible
deadlines, but also "no dragging out of the process."
Denmark underscored that Ahtisaari's approach was realistic
and his process was "the only game in town, so we all needed
to support him." In addition, parallel structures were not
helpful.


4. (C) Slovakia said its principal for the Kosovo Future
Status Process was "impartiality and transparency." It also
argued that the international community should not "give the
impression that the outcome of the status talks had been
prejudged." Slovakia also called on Belgrade to allow Serb
participation in Kosovar institutions. The French Permrep


said France fully supported Ahtisaari and that Serbs needed
to be involved in Kosovo institutions. France hoped a
negotiated settlement could be reached, but, in any case, one
needed to be found within the timeline previously determined
by the Contact Group. France supported the Guiding
Principles and we could not accept a return to the status quo
before 1999, nor could we accept the attachment of Kosovo to
any another state.


5. (C) Kostunica, who asked to speak again at the end of the
Private meeting, said that the London Contact Group statement
had stated we should listen to the will of the majority, but
had also addressed the need for compromise and "negotiated
settlement", so we needed to find a solution without a change
in borders. Kostunica also asserted that despite calls for
self-determination in the Security Council meeting that day,
"the Albanians had in fact already gotten their state in the
early 20th Century and did not need another one now."

Consultations With Ahtisaari
--------------

6. (C) In consultations, Ahtisaari spoke and read a prepared
statement (same text as advance copy received by Washington).
Delivering a strong statement, Russian Permrep Vitaly
Churkin said we should not over-dramatize the modest results
achieved in status talks thus far. There should not be any
imposed timelines or any prejudgment of the outcome and
continued dialogue would be the only way we would come up
with a solution. Some claimed that a solution to the problem
of Kosovo's status could be reached without action by the
Security Council, but that would set a negative precedent,
said Churkin. The argument that the Kosovo case was is
unique is false and could set a dangerous double standard in
international relations. In reality in many unsettled regions
of the world, people were watching the outcome for Kosovo and
it could affect their actions. Churkin continued, averring
that we should "get over Milosevic" and stop blaming the
current democratic government in Belgrade for his past sins.
He also said the international community would have no right
at all to impose a solution. In an open exchange at the end
of the meeting Ahtisaari countered Churkin's argument, saying
there had been considerable violence against Kosovars by the
Milosevic regime and that the period from 1989 to 1999 could
not simply be forgotten. Churkin rebutted that Ahtisaari had
misunderstood his point, which was that while the repression
of the Milosevic regime might be true it was to be sorted out
in the Hague and not in the future status process for Kosovo.
Ahtisaari responded that we could not just separate the
status process from the actual history of the region.


7. (C) In addition to the talking points in STATE 114589,
the U.S. also responded to Churkin's comment about the
non-uniqueness of Kosovo pointing out that the events since
1989 had indeed made it sui generis. Greece stated that
standards implementation had come a long way in the past
year, but more still needed to be done. Above all, we needed
to find an outcome that would ensure peaceful coexistence
with the Serbs and stability in the region. China stated
that it was important to respect sovereignty and
international territory under international law and
negotiations needed to take place within the framework of
relevant Security Council resolutions. UK Deputy Permrep
Karen Pierce stated that there was no alternative to
Ahtisaari and we needed to offer him our full support.
Pierce also argued that Ahtisaari had misinterpreted the
Contact Group statement from January when he said that it
dictated that a negotiated settlement was the only option.
Slovakia stated that we needed a balanced and negotiated
settlement and to lay the ground for a modern multi-ethnic
society in Kosovo, which would be measured by returns on the
ground and, ultimately, by what happens the day after status
is decided.

Arria-formula Session With President Sejdiu
--------------


8. (C) In the afternoon Arria-formula meeting, President
Sejdiu delivered a well-balanced and temperate speech (text
faxed to the Department). The U.S., UK, France, Greece and
Italy made comments. The U.S., UK and French comments all
offered support for Sejdiu, but stressed that he had much
more to do to forge compromises and push standards
implementation. Russia was represented at the expert level
and did not exercise its right to make a statement. (Note:
Russia had expressed reservations to this meeting format in
the first place, saying Sejdiu should be offered only a lunch
outside of the UN Secretariat building.)


BOLTON