UN OVERSIGHT: JIU LACUNAE REPORT (A/60/860)

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KUNR ASIG UNGA
SUBJECT: UN OVERSIGHT: JIU LACUNAE REPORT (A/60/860)


1. This is an action request. USUN seeks Department guidance
on the JIU Report on "Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations
System" summarized below in time for imminent discussions in
the Fifth Committee on UN oversight and accountability.


2. SUMMARY: The UN Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has released
a report assessing UN oversight mechanisms intended to
identify gaps, shortcomings and inconsistencies in UN
oversight capabilities (A/60/860). The JIU report originally
was proposed to the General Assembly in October 2005
(A/60/34) as part of JIU's intended work program for 2005.
In light of the Outcome Document's request for an external
review of UN oversight and the JIU's own role in UN system
oversight, the U.S. and some other delegations were against
the proposal, but JIU conducted the assessment anyway. The
JIU defined its primary objective in preparing the report as
establishing whether internal mechanisms were in place to
review allegations of wrongdoing against senior UN officials,
assessing the adequacy of existing mechanisms, and
determining where final responsibility for the outcome of
such cases should lie. The report underscored that Members
States have primary responsibility for oversight of the UN
system. States delegate some oversight authority to the
secretariats of various organizations within the UN, and some

SIPDIS
to external oversight bodies. END SUMMARY


3. The JIU report notes there are two sets of oversight
mechanisms: external and internal. Both can be subdivided
into different offices or agencies that focus on various
aspects of monitoring. Externally, two system-wide oversight
mechanisms exist: operational and policy/review. The
operational mechanisms include the UN Board of Auditors
(BOA),a panel of external auditors of specialized agencies
and IAEA, and the JIU. The policy and review mechanisms are
the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC),and the
International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). The UN's
internal oversight responsibilities are largely fulfilled by
the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS),which
provides internal auditing, investigation, program
monitoring, and consulting.


4. The success of UN oversight mechanisms is contingent on
how well these external and internal mechanisms coordinate.
The JIU report maintains duplication among the oversight
bodies can be avoided while still ensuring effective
oversight, provided there is healthy coordination and
cooperation among them. There are numerous formal and
informal forums in which such coordination occurs (JIU Report
- Paragraph 17).


5. The JIU report concludes that, "there is nothing
intrinsically deficient with either the design or the
mandates of the overall system of oversight in the United
Nations System" (JIU Report - Paragraph 18). However, JIU
inspectors recommended that Member States take stock of the
UN oversight system as a whole and work collectively to
address problems across the system that may arise. JIU
recommends the establishment of Oversight Boards to help
structure coordination between external and internal
mechanisms on a system-wide basis. Ideally, this will help
reduce conflicts of interest, duplication, and lack of
representation.
DEFICIENCIES
--------------


6. The JIU report identified external oversight deficiencies
in the following areas:

a. no individual or collective accountability - External
oversight bodies should be subject to peer-review;
b. lack of financial independence - The external oversight
bodies should not be subject to scrutiny by the entities
which are the object of their oversight;
c. lack of investigative capacity in respect to executive
heads and internal oversight heads; and,
d. potential overlap in the scope of the external and
internal audits.


7. Among internal oversight deficiencies, the JIU identified:

a. fragmentation of internal oversight functions;
b. lack of provision for investigation functions;
c. lack of mechanisms to encourage reporting of wrongdoing;
d. insufficient independence of oversight bodies;
e. unsatisfactory procedures for appointing the head of
internal oversight;
f. inadequate reporting modalities;
g. inadequate follow-up to internal oversight
recommendations;
h. lack of review of the performance of most internal
oversight functions; and,
i. insufficient resources.

JIU RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------


8. The JIU report offers a number of specific recommendations
(17 Total) to correct oversight deficiencies, including:

-- the Legislative bodies of the UN system should establish
an independent external oversight board composed of five to
seven members, elected by Member States;

-- the General Assembly should decide that ACABQ, ICSC and
JIU should be subject to peer review at least every five
years;

-- the General Assembly should decide that ICSC and JIU
create their own budgets and that ACABQ should create its own
budget;

-- members of ACABQ, ICSC and JIU and other similar bodies
within the UN should not be allowed to serve in any
organization which they have had oversight responsibilities
during their tenure and for three years following the
cessation of their oversight responsibility;

-- Term limits should be established for external auditors of
the UN and staff;

-- executive heads should review the structure of their
respective oversight organizations;

-- audit, inspection, investigation and evaluation should be
consolidated into one position that reports directly to the
executive head of each department/program;

-- anything beyond these 4 areas should be positioned
elsewhere in the secretariat and not in the internal
oversight unit;

-- the executive heads should:
a. Review capacity of organization;
b. Ensure minimal investigative capacity is
sufficient;
c. Ensure investigation are not interfered with by
senior management;
d. Ensure independent reporting is established;

-- safeguards from retaliation should be established to
protect those who report wrongdoing and misconduct;

-- the legislative bodies of each organization should decide
all budgets to be drawn up by the internal oversight entity.

-- concerning the appointment to heads of internal oversight:
a. Announcements should be widely publicized;
b. Appointment should be subject to consultation;
c. Termination should be for just cause - subject to
review;
d. Non-renewable 5-7 year tenure should be
established;

-- executive heads should place minimum standards on:
a. Internal oversight reports;
b. Annual internal oversight summary;
c. Individual internal audit, inspection and
evaluation reports;
d. Individual investigation reports.

-- with respect to follow-up oversight, the legislative
bodies in each organization should direct their respective
heads to ensure:
a. A database is created to monitor follow-ups.
b. The annual internal oversight summary report
contains a summary of oversight recommendations not fully
implemented;

-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct
their respective executive heads to ensure independent
quality assessment (e.g. peer review) at least once every
five years;

-- the legislative bodies in each organization should adopt
the following standards:
a. If biennial resources are greater than USD 250
million, internal oversight unit is justified.
b. If biennial resources are less than USD 250
million, Internal oversight should be in-sourced to any other
organization in UN.

-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct
their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for
the:
a. Establishment of ethics function with clear terms
of reference.


b. Establishment of post of ethics officer at
D-1/P-5 level.
c. Mandatory integrity and ethics training for
all staff
-- the legislative bodies in each organization should direct
their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for
the:
a. Establishment of confidential financial
disclosure requirements for all elected officials and all
staff at D-1 level and above;
b. Annual filing of the financial disclosure
statements to the ethics officer for review; and,

-- the legislative bodies in each UN system organization
should direct their respective executive heads to establish
an effective mechanism for coordination among external and
internal oversight bodies on a system-wide basis.


9. In short, the JIU report underscores the important role
played by individual Member States in exercising oversight
responsibilities. The JIU report suggested that annual
meetings of the chairpersons of the external oversight boards
would serve to enhance the coordination and cooperation while
helping to determine best practices for achieving efficiency
and effectiveness in the oversight functions.
BOLTON