Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1255
2006-06-21 22:21:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA LEGWAILA: 'UN CAN'T

Tags:  PGOV PREL UNSC XW ZF KPKO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001255 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC XW ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA LEGWAILA: 'UN CAN'T
BABY-SIT SOVEREIGN STATES INDEFINITELY'


USUN NEW Y 00001255 001.2 OF 002


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001255

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC XW ZF KPKO
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA LEGWAILA: 'UN CAN'T
BABY-SIT SOVEREIGN STATES INDEFINITELY'


USUN NEW Y 00001255 001.2 OF 002



1. (SBU) SUMMARY. In a June 14 courtesy call,
Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa
Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (formerly Special Representative of
the SYG for the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) shared
his 'professional peacekeeper' views with Ambassador Bolton
on the proliferation of conflicts on the African continent
and the 'dependency syndrome' suffered by some of the
countries that host them, in particular Ethiopia/Eritrea and
Somalia, making reference as well to East Timor. Legwaila
was clearly looking for a way to apply his prior SRSG
experience to his new position and was receptive to
Ambassador Bolton's mention of the Peacebuilding Commission.
END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In a June 14 courtesy call, U/SYG and Special
Adviser on Africa Legwaila solicited Ambassador Bolton's
support for the efforts of his office in dealing with the
African Union and the New Partnership for African Development
to address crises on the African continent but was quick to
point out that he was 'professionally a peacekeeper,' most
recently having spent the past several years as SRSG for
UNMEE. Legwaila acknowledged USG diplomatic efforts to
resolve the stalemate and said he had been hopeful for
progress on the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea
after the first two meetings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary
Commission (EEBC). Now, however, Legwaila considered that
any window of opportunity which previously existed to have
shut, with Eritrea's refusal to lift restrictions on UNMEE
having backfired and instead resulted in the unintended
consequence of serving as a precondition for Ethiopia's
participation in border talks. The biggest tragedy in the
situation, according to Legwaila, was not so much the $186
million annual price tag, but rather the fact that neither
country could afford to sustain such a stalemate.


3. (SBU) Ambassador Bolton agreed with Legwaila's assessment,
noting that the situation illustrated what can happen when a
peacekeeping operation becomes part of the underlying problem
between countries. The Security Council, Ambassador Bolton
contended, must remain politically involved in the missions
it sets up, rather than deciding a mandate and deferring
subsequent responsibility to the SRSG. Ambassador Bolton
observed that the profusion of peacekeeping operations,
political missions and SRSGs hindered the ability of the
international community to resolve the underlying issues in
African internal political conflicts, making it all the more
difficult to determine when the situation might be
sufficiently stable for the UN presence to withdraw and for
the national government to assume responsibility.


4. (SBU) In this context, Ambassador Bolton disagreed with
SYG Annan's assessment that the withdrawal of UNMISET from
East Timor contributed to the subsequent unrest in that
country. Legwaila concurred with this analysis, noting that
the resurgence seen in East Timor could be attributed to the
incompetence of the government, which, unlike the governments
of Namibia and Mozambique when the time came for the UN to
disengage, was unable to measure the 'probability of success'
in the absence of an international presence. Legwaila noted
that some countries suffer from a 'dependency syndrome' on UN
peacekeeping, hoping the UN would stay forever to prevent
fighting. However, Legwaila declared, 'the UN can't baby-sit
sovereign states indefinitely,' especially when to do so
might jeopardize development and foreign investment in such
states.


5. (SBU) Legwaila was not optimistic in assessing the AU's
prospects for success in handling African conflicts. Using
Somalia as an example, Legwaila doubted the AU could play a
role in the current crisis, despite the fact that the crisis
was brewing 'in its own backyard.' He anticipated the AU to
deal with Somalia as it had Ethiopia/Eritrea: to go 'on
leave' for the duration of the conflict and to re-surface
when there were credit to be taken. Ambassador Bolton
suggested that the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could
eventually play such a role, provided that it focused its
efforts on the ground rather than in New York. Legwaila was
very receptive to this idea and expressed a readiness to

USUN NEW Y 00001255 002.2 OF 002


contribute, adding that he had spoken with ONUB SRSG McAskie
about the PBC in a meeting during the week of June 5.
BOLTON