LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNMEE'S 'RIGHTSIZING'

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: LESSONS LEARNED FROM UNMEE'S 'RIGHTSIZING'

REF: A. 05/31/2006 BRUNO-DEPARTMENT E-MAIL


B. USUN NEW YORK 1017

Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOHN R. BOLTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On May 31, after almost seven hours of
continuous, mostly ambassadorial-level negotiations, the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted as
a Presidential text resolution 1681, which reduced the
military component of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
(UNMEE) to 2,300 from 3,404 (text contained in ref A). The
passage of this resolution marks an important milestone in
mandate reform, as we lead the way in 'rightsizing'
peacekeeping missions which have been dormant, inactive or
unable to fulfill their mandates yet remain costly. Adoption
of 1681 also revealed mixed messages in USUN's guidance that
contributed to the obstacles USUN fought to overcome in
playing the 'numbers game' to get agreement on our optimal
force size for UNMEE. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Since the end in 2000 of the conflict between Ethiopia
and Eritrea, the UNSC has been debating ways of addressing
one of the primary root causes of the conflict: unresolved
border demarcation. However, since the end in 2000 of the
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the UNSC has been
unable to effect meaningful progress on this problem, opting
instead to continually roll over UNMEE's mandate in the hopes
that the very presence of this force would be enough to stave
off any possible resumption of conflict. In essence, the
UNSC contributed to the stalemate through its own willingness
to accept that stalemate. By failing to take effective
action, the UNSC has contributed to the predicament in which
UNMEE has found itself: a hostage of the stalled political
process between the two sides. The U.S. led the way on
attempts to compel Ethiopia and Eritrea to implement fully
the final and binding decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission (EEBC),as they have agreed to do, and to
remove restrictions on UNMEE operations, but these attempts
have gone as far as they feasibly can. Since the parties
refuse to acknowledge that they themselves bear the primary
responsibility for implementation of the Algiers Agreements,
it is up to the Council to hold them accountable for their
failure, rather than to assume the responsibility to
implement the agreements itself.


3. (C) In this sense, adoption of UNSCR 1681 was a genuine
achievement. We led the effort to scale back UNMEE's force
strength to send the unequivocal message to the parties that
disregard for internationally mandated rules of procedure
would not be rewarded, either politically or financially.
The situation in Ethiopia and Eritrea is not like that in
Cote D'Ivoire, for example, where nascent political progress
led by Prime Minister Banny merits a temporary increase of UN
troops to safeguard the process. Ethiopia and Eritrea are
not the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where a UN request
for additional peacekeepers had been originally refused but
where subsequent electoral progress demonstrated a commitment
on the part of the transitional government to live up to its
promises and accordingly earned a plus-up of troops to keep
this process on track. Ethiopia and Eritrea are not Liberia,
where a country formerly in chaos not only lived up to the
expectations of convening democratic elections but did so in
the expected timeframe and successfully, justifying the
international community's investment in the UN's forces.


4. (C) African countries are not the only culprits, and
Greece is right to be concerned about the implications our
'rightsizing' policy would have for the similarly stagnant UN
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. The simple truth of UN
peacekeeping from a mandate reform perspective is that if
parties to an agreement carry out their responsibilities
(including the implicit agreement with the UNSC resulting in
UN support) with the Security Council to honor its promises
on peace and security, then we will honor our commitment to
protect that country accordingly. This reality still escapes
Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Council took a significant step in
the right direction with UNSCR 1681, which we intend to use
as the first of many subsequent manifestations of strong,
substantive Council reprobations for parties' intransigence.
There is simply no doubt that the UN is overstretched and
overextended, both in tems of the total number of
peacekeeping operations and in terms of the total number of
deployed forces. This situation will onyl become more acute

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as we expand the UN presence in the DRC and the Sudan, absent
compensating reductions in other PKOs. Failure to exert more
control and oversight risks a bebacle in one or more
operations, with all the attendant risks.


5. (C) Despite the progess we achieved in 'rightsizing' UNMEE
with UNSCR 1681, we suffered throughout the negotiation
process as a direct result of the communications gaps and
mixed messages within our chain of command that contributed
to our struggles to get agreement on the optimal level of
UNMEE personnel. We were able to identify our opposition
long before the negotiating process started: the UK has never
agreed with us on Ethiopia/Eritrea policy in the Council and
solidified its power base on this resolution to include not
only Slovakia and Tanzania, but also the Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO),whose representatives were
present at every one of the three meetings among Experts (May
25, 26, 30) and at the final round of consultations (May 31)
to refute every detail of our military analysis. Demarches
to embassies in Washington and in capitals to counter
support for the UK's resistance proved too little, too late.
By the time we called for a vote on the text after seven
hours of back-and-forth, UKUN PermRep Jones Parry smugly but
correctly reminded us that the vote count around the table
favored his (and DPKO's) 2,500 number, rather than our
grudgingly conceded 2,200. In the end, UK's insistence on
2,500 did not prevail and the flexibility that USUN was
provided by the Department was critical in closing the
negotiations at the final, lower figure.


6. (C) We were aware of and had reported on divisions within
DPKO regarding its positions in New York and in theater about
numbers for a downsized UNMEE. When we were finally
instructed in the third day of negotiations to cite UNMEE
Force Commander Taisir's 'endorsement' of our 1,800 figure to
the Council, inter-bureau divisions on the accuracy of this
quotation rendered its effect on Members useless and our
credibility on the effectiveness of that figure virtually
nil. Lack of a bottom line and of clear voting instructions
in the absence of such a bottom line similarly weakened our
bargaining position, especially when it appeared that the
mere possibility that we might veto an unacceptable number or
a bid to roll over for a week might be enough to sway some
Members (for example, Japan) in our favor. Greece, despite
its accommodation of our diplomatic leadership on this issue,
was more concerned with securing consensus on the resolution
than it was with the particulars of the text's content and
was thus only a fair-weather friend throughout the process.


7. (C) In the end, allies did emerge: Peru has been a
consistent and unquestioning supporter of our
Ethiopia/Eritrea policy; Denmark had told us repeatedly that
it would back us on a low number, despite its concerns over
our changing of UNMEE's mandate (NOTE. Such changes, which
would have included a new mandate element for in extremis
extraction of peacekeepers in case of emergency, were
ultimately deleted, much to Russia's relief. END NOTE);
France, primarily interested in maintaining our commitment to
support its Cote D'Ivoire troop increase proposal, was
content throughout negotiations to let us battle the UK and
DPKO alone, but finally rose to the challenge of supporting
our stance, though only in the last hour of negotiations and
after we called them on their weak expressions of support;
and, as it had done in negotiations on UNSCR 1679 on Sudan
(ref B),China sought to enhance 'bilateral interests' by
unexpectedly throwing its support to our position, despite
the opposition of its Council bedfellows Russia and Qatar.
For future resolutions our demarches and outreach should aim
not simply to isolate our opponents but rather to consolidate
our allies as well. As UNSCR 1681 showed, opposition comes
not from a handful but rather from a tableful, and we need as
many in our corner as possible.
BOLTON