Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1075
2006-05-26 13:07:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UN SECRETARIAT SAYS NEPALIS SUPPORT EXPANDED UN

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO NP IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1075/01 1461307
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 261307Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9162
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1343
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU IMMEDIATE 0119
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO IMMEDIATE 0134
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 0170
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 1145
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 2168
UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001075 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO NP IN
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARIAT SAYS NEPALIS SUPPORT EXPANDED UN
ROLE

REF: RICHELSOPH-KUMAR E-MAIL

UNCLAS USUN NEW YORK 001075

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KPKO NP IN
SUBJECT: UN SECRETARIAT SAYS NEPALIS SUPPORT EXPANDED UN
ROLE

REF: RICHELSOPH-KUMAR E-MAIL


1. (SBU) Summary. During a May 23 meeting with visiting
IO/UNP Deskoff and USUN Poloff, UN Department of Political
Affairs (DPA) officer Tamrat Samuel briefed on his
recently-completed visit to Nepal and India and outlined his
views of a possible expanded role for the UN in Nepal.
Samuel said nearly all GON officials he met had asked that
the UN help monitor the cease-fire between the GON and the
Maoists, supervise Maoist DDR, and provide electoral
assistance. He also mentioned GON Prime Minister's request
for a UN "witness" to peace talks as well as his own view
that the international community should consider feeding
Maoist supporters, but implied that neither request had
consensus support within the GON. If Nepal were to request
UN assistance, Samuel observed that monitoring could take
place under a "national mechanism supported by a strong UN
structure" that would be largely civilian in nature with a
"small" military observer force. Although he could not yet
say what authorization the UN would need to mount such an
operation, Samuel opined that either a UNSC or a GA
resolution could do the trick. He did not rule out expanding
the mandate of the UN Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal to take on these new functions,
but argued that OHCHR in Geneva would be hard-pressed to
organize the logistics necessary for a quick deployment of
monitors. Ruefully acknowledging Indian objections to an
expanded UN role in Nepal, Samuel reported that no senior UN
officials plan to visit the region until it becomes clear
whether the Nepalis will submit a formal request for UN
assistance. Samuel appeared to take on board suggestions
that the Nepalese Mission to the UN be involved in future
consultations on Nepal. End Summary.

GON Wants an Expanded UN Role
--------------


2. (SBU) Samuel averred that the UN would determine its role
in Nepal entirely based on the request of the GON. Although
he said that Nepali officials had privately expressed a
desire for the UN to mediate between the GON and the Maoists,
Samuel acknowledged that the GON was unlikely to make such a

request formally due to Indian sensitivities -- and he added
that in any case, SYG Annan preferred that the Nepalis
conduct their dialogue "on their own." Assuming the UN does
not take on a mediation role, Samuel outlined several other
possible areas of assistance: monitoring of the cease-fire
between the GON and the Maoists, some role in supervising or
observing Maoist DDR, and support for the Nepali electoral
process. He emphasized that during his consultations in
Kathmandu, GON officials had voiced near-universal support
for a UN role in all three areas. Speaking personally,
Samuel suggested that the international community might also
want to consider feeding Maoist supporters, provided that the
guerillas abandon their tactic of extortion and forced
taxation. While he acknowledged that the World Food Program
(WFP) could not feed combatants, Samuel argued that the WFP
could feed former combatants who had successfully undergone a
DDR program. Although he mentioned GON Prime Minister
Koirala's informal request that the UN serve as a "witness"
to GON-Maoist negotiations, Samuel implied that there was not
yet consensus within the GON on this issue.

Authorizing the UN to
Monitor the Cease-Fire
--------------


3. (SBU) In order for the UN to monitor the cease-fire
between the GON and the Maoists, Samuel argued that the
parties would first need to decide on a detailed code of
conduct agreement that would define which acts would be
considered "provocative." Monitoring would take place under
a "national mechanism supported by a strong UN structure"
that would report on respect for human rights, incidents of
abductions and extortion, as well as conditions for elections
(including an end to intimidation). Monitors would also have
to report on military action in breach of the cease-fire,
Samuel argued, which could possibly include decommissioning
of weapons. Samuel observed that the monitoring structure
should be largely civilian, with a "small military observer
force." Asked how the UN would seek authorization for such a
mission provided that the GON made a formal request, Samuel
said he was still investigating this issue. He opined that
either the UNSC or the GA could potentially authorize such a
mission, but he did not rule out expanding the mandate of the
present Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR) in Nepal -- although he cautioned that pursuing this
option might constrict the UN's ability to respond quickly.
Samuel suggested the if the GON made a formal request for
cease-fire monitors only a short time before they are needed,
for example, UN OHCHR in Geneva would be unable to handle the
logistics involved in such a deployment. He suggested that
the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) would be
better-placed to respond to such a fast-breaking situation,
but even DPKO would need adequate time to prepare.

Managing Indian and
Nepali Sensitivities
--------------


4. (SBU) While reporting that Indian officials he met in New
Delhi did not seem opposed to UN monitoring of a cease-fire
between the GON and the Maoists, Samuel agreed that the GOI
appeared to have backtracked on this issue. Despite India's
views on UN cease-fire monitors, Samuel said he thought the
GOI would still support a future role for the UN in providing
electoral assistance and in supervising Maoist DDR -- but he
acknowledged that even on these issues he had no clarity on
exactly what type of UN role India backed or at what point it
would offer its support. Asked about any future trips to the
region by senior UN officials -- Special Adviser to the SYG
Vijay Nambiar had previously suggested DPA U/SYG Gambari or
DPA Asia Division Director Michael Williams could visit
Kathmandu after Samuel's return -- Samuel reported that talk
of future visits had been suspended until it became clear
whether Nepal would request UN assistance. Per reftel,
Poloff urged Samuel to include the Nepali Mission to the UN
in his consultations in New York and to ensure they were
included in any broader discussions on Nepal involving the
Secretariat and other missions. While initially suggesting

SIPDIS
that the GON could be brought into the discussions over time,
Samuel seemed to take the point about involving the Nepalis
now when he realized their participation could help manage
Indian sensitivities about an expanded UN role.
BOLTON