Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1039
2006-05-23 13:03:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
USUN New York
Cable title:  

COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME

Tags:  ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001039 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME
MEMBERS URGE CAUTION

REF: 05/2202006 SCHOFIELD-BRUNO E-MAIL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 001039

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ER ET PGOV PREL UNSC KPKO
SUBJECT: COUNCIL APPEARS READY TO DOWNSIZE UNMEE, BUT SOME
MEMBERS URGE CAUTION

REF: 05/2202006 SCHOFIELD-BRUNO E-MAIL


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Acknowledging the failure of the May 17
meeting of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) to
produce a breakthrough in the border standoff between
Ethiopia and Eritrea, United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
members finally expressed their readiness to downsize the UN
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). Members were not
fooled by the last-minute ploy by the Government of the State
of Eritrea (GSE) to stave off the prospect of downsizing by
submitting a letter of its intention to lift restrictions
imposed on UNMEE (refmail). The Greek delegation will
circulate a draft resolution reflecting the views expressed
by Members, with an Experts Meeting on the text scheduled for
May 25. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Under-Secretary-General (U/SYG) Guehenno reported that UNMEE
observed no major developments since May 8, with both
Ethiopian and Eritrean troops deployed in defensive postures
and engaged in training exercises where deployed around the
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ). Guehenno's read-out of the
May 17 EEBC meeting (which he said would be followed by
another on June 15) highlighted the Government of Ethiopia's
(GOE) imposing of four preconditions on its commitment to
implement the delimitation decision: one, that the GSE
renounce the use of force; two, that the GSE respect the
integrity of the TSZ; three, that the GSE reinstate the full
capacity of UNMEE; and four, that the GSE agree to direct
negotiation on disputed border areas - all of which,
according to Guehenno, the GSE dismissed as further pretext
for delay by the Ethiopians. Demarcation could resume,
Guehenno declared, when UNMEE force size reached a sufficient
level; when both parties could ensure security for the
process (noting that Ethiopia had missed its May 19 deadline
for submission of a security plan); when surveys were
completed; and when both parties cooperated with
commissioners in the field. Guehenno noted that funds were
also in short supply, with only $3.3 million of the requisite
$10 million currently in the UN Trust Fund. Guehenno added

that even if expedited, the process of identifying and
deploying surveying contractors would take 12 weeks and would
be further hindered by the lack of funds.


3. (SBU) Noting the 'interesting timing' of its dispatch,
U/SYG Guehenno went on to describe a letter he had received
less than an hour before the commencement of consultations
from EEBC Commissioner Sir Elihu Lauterpacht, informing that
the GSE, through a letter from its U.S. attorney, had
indicated it was prepared to lift restrictions on UNMEE on
two conditions: one, if the Government of Ethiopia (GOE)
unambiguously accepted the 13 April 2002 decision and two, if
the GOE 'did what was required of it to facilitate
demarcation in accordance with the Algiers Agreement and the
Commission's orders.' Guehenno added that Sir Elihu thought
demarcation was foreseeable if UNMEE's mandate were extended
and if its force size were not reduced. Guehenno advised
that if the UNSC were to proceed with downsizing, it should
take care not to undermine the Algiers Agreements or to
impair UNMEE's ability to carry out its other mandated tasks,
as well as to maintain the basic principles of peacekeeping,
including assurance of peacekeepers' freedom of movement.
Guehenno would not offer specific information on what a
downsized UNMEE would look like, saying only that it was the
dilemma of the Council to determine how to reconfigure UNMEE
to provide for monitoring of the TSZ while simultaneously
supporting demarcation.


4. (SBU) In a nearly complete reversal in tone from past UNSC
discussions of UNMEE's mandate, Members were almost unanimous
in their determination to downsize UNMEE, with some urging
caution to avoid jeopardizing the ongoing peace process.
Ambassador Bolton explained that in our estimation, the
diplomatic initiative currently underway to resolve the
border impasse would not be affected by downsizing UNMEE, and
he stressed, given the lack of progress on May 17, the
importance of Council recognition of the reality that UNMEE
had become part of the problem. We would be prepared,
Ambassador Bolton added, to support a force of 1,500 but not

USUN NEW Y 00001039 002 OF 002


to maintain the current UNMEE level. Most other P-5 members
followed suit. In a stark departure from his May 8
intervention, UK Permanent Representative (PR) Jones Parry
expressed openness to the idea of downsizing and inquired
about the minimum number of troops needed to monitor the TSZ
and to conduct demarcation-related tasks. He also asked if a
revised SOFA with Ethiopia would be required in such a case,
which Guehenno did not see as necessary. Agreeing that a
reconfigured UNMEE must nonetheless retain capacities to
monitor the TSZ and to assist the EEBC, the Chinese
representative said his delegation would be open to
discussions of options for a reduced force. The French
representative played down the GSE's letter, charging that it
incorrectly tried to divert attention away from the
responsibilities of the parties for resolution of the border
crisis. Other delegations that added their voices to the
need to downsize included Japan and Denmark.


5. (SBU) Those delegations more guarded in their support for
downsizing (Argentina, Greece, Peru, Ghana) pointed to the
need to study the letter just submitted by the GSE and urged
caution in balancing troop level reduction against the
ongoing peace initiative/EEBC process. The Ghanaian rep
called for bilateral measures to accompany any downsizing,
and the Peruvian rep recommended a gradual process of
disengagement and downsizing. The Tanzanian rep reminded of
the need for UNMEE to retain a capacity to respond to changes
to the situation on the ground. Russian PR Churkin urged
that in contemplating downsizing UNMEE, the UNSC must
consider the potential impact on UNMEE's effectiveness,
particularly in the area of command; the warning from Sir
Elihu that the time might not be right to reduce force
strength; and the implication that the Council was opting for
a non-political solution to the stand-off. Greek PR
Vassilakis announced the intention of his delegation to
circulate a draft resolution to renew UNMEE's mandate that
would incorporate Members' comments and to convene the first
Experts Meeting on the text on May 25.


6. (SBU) COMMENT. While the May 17 EEBC meeting may have
failed to move the demarcation process forward, it succeeded
in illustrating the UN's 'hostage' status in the crisis and
accordingly in turning the tide of Members' opinions toward
reducing UNMEE's force size, even in the absence of explicit
endorsement by DPKO. Further, the GSE's transparent ploy
with the timing of its letter seemed only to add to Members'
stalemate weariness and embolden them to consider taking a
stronger stance on countering the impasse. END COMMENT.
BOLTON