AMBASSADOR WISNER'S MEETING WITH UNMIK SRSG SOREN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR DAS ROSEMARY DICARLO, EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNSC UNMIK YI
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR WISNER'S MEETING WITH UNMIK SRSG SOREN
JESSEN-PETERSEN


Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Molly Phee, Reasons 1.4 (b) a
nd (d).


1. (C) During a May 19 meeting at the Brook Club in New
York, Ambassador Wisner and UNMIK SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen
discussed recent developments in the Kosovo status process
and progress towards standards implementation. (Note: As the
Brook Club does not allow note taking on its premises, this
telegram was drafted only to provide a sense of the meeting.
End note.) Ambassador Wisner began the meeting by handing
Jessen-Petersen a copy of a letter to Secretary Rice signed
by Prime Minister Kostunica and President Tadic that
criticized the current status talks. Wisner called the
letter, and the way it was delivered, "a crude but nasty
dilatory tactic to try to isolate Special Envoy Ahtisaari."
Jessen-Petersen concurred with that assessment, noting he had
just come from Washington where he heard concerns regarding
weakening European resolve to deal firmly with Belgrade.
Jessen-Petersen stated that he shared those concerns about a
rising European chorus of anxiety arguing for more attention
to the fragility of democracy in Belgrade. He also agreed
about the lack of "available levers" at the moment,
especially since EU accession talks were on hold and NATO PFP
was also off the table without Mladic in the Hague.
Jessen-Petersen assessed that this weakening European resolve
and the challenge it presented for managing Belgrade's
cooperation with the status process was surmountable, but
argued that a display of strong US commitment would be
essential.


2. (C) Turning to the issue of standards implementation in
Kosovo, Jessen-Petersen said overall developments were moving
along well in Kosovo with Prime Minister Ceku at the helm
steering reforms. Jessen-Petersen's recently completed --
but not yet officially released -- assessment was positive in
tone overall because Ceku had accomplished much in the last
few months. Jessen-Petersen handed Wisner a list of thirteen
further reforms he thought were needed in the coming months
as well as a "U.S. Non-paper" that analyzed the list of
recommendations and pointed out which of them were the most
feasible and necessary. Jessen-Petersen said "because of the
strong stance Belgrade is taking it is all the more necessary
for the Kosovar Albanians to go the extra mile, even the
extra two miles." "I delivered this message in Pristina this
week telling the Kosovar Albanian leadership that when they
meet with Rohan they will need to seem ready to offer more
and that it will be very problematic if they do not,"
Jessen-Petersen continued. "The problem is with the unity
team," Jessen-Petersen asserted, "because each member does
not want show all of his cards."


3. (C) Raising the problem of North Mitrovica, Wisner asked
Jessen-Petersen how he thought it ought to be handled.
Jessen-Petersen said he wanted to take a number of steps
including: 1) creating a more robust security presence in the
form of KFOR, increased UN police (which was already being
implemented as 40 officers had been transferred to North
Mitrovica recently) and the Kosovo Protection Corps; 2) a
better communications approach to counter Belgrade's
propaganda ; 3) and immediate efforts to fund and implement
quick projects that could be put into place now (e.g.,
building a small community center, etc.) and that would also
disprove Belgrade's propaganda. Wisner said he saw
Belgrade's manipulation of salaries as a potentially serious
problem because it might precipitate Serb departures from
Kosovo by the end of the year. Jessen-Petersen agreed,
saying there were even signs that exodus could start this
summer. Jessen-Petersen noted that Ceku's policy of keeping
the salaries in escrow was a wise move.


4. (C) Continuing their discussion on North Mitrovica, Wisner
asked Jessen-Petersen how he envisioned dealing with the
problem. Jessen-Petersen replied that he hoped for an
arrangement that would employ the best points of Eastern
Slavonia in Croatia as well as some of Brcko in Bosnia.
Responding to a further clarifying question from Wisner,
Jessen-Petersen said Mitrovica would need an international
administrator for some time, but that person's powers should
not go beyond those of the international representative in
Pristina. The Pristina international representative would
not be a double-hatted UN official, but an EU representative;
he foresaw following a model similar to the Office of the
High Representative in Bosnia, where the representative is
sent from the EU but reports to the Security Council several
times a year because the position would be created by a UNSC
mandate.



5. (C) Bringing the meeting to a close, Ambassador Wisner
noted that he would reinforce Jessen-Petersen's message to
the Kosovar Albanian leadership that strong action was needed
during his visit to Pristina over the weekend. Wisner
promised to draw on the points that Jessen-Petersen had given
him.
BOLTON