Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1018
2006-05-18 21:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR BOLTON'S MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUCNDT #1018/01 1382108
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 182108Z MAY 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0927
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 6164
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE 0042
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0574
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9082
C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001018 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR BOLTON'S MEETING WITH
PETER VAN WALSUM, SRSG BASTAGLI

Classified By: Amb. John Bolton. E.O. 12958. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001018

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC AG MO WI
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA: AMBASSADOR BOLTON'S MEETING WITH
PETER VAN WALSUM, SRSG BASTAGLI

Classified By: Amb. John Bolton. E.O. 12958. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: In a May 8 joint call with SRSG for Western
Sahara Francesco Bastagli, Personal Envoy for Western Sahara
Peter van Walsum, noted the Security Council's April rollover
of the MINURSO mandate and its failure to take action on the
Secretary General's recommendation of direct talks between

SIPDIS
the key parties. He implied that there was so little for him
to do now except submit his resignation. He inquired as to
the current U.S. position on the Western Sahara, whether and
when it might take a strong position and what U.S. views were
on the future role of the Personal Envoy. Ambassador Bolton
replied that the Security Council's "culture of inaction" on
Western Sahara and the comfort the parties have regarding the
status quo suggest that change would come only if forced by
something like the possible termination of MINURSO.
Ambassador Bolton said that given other priorities in the
Middle East at this time, the U.S. is unprepared to take a
diferent position on Western Sahara. Ambassador Bolton said
we would wait to see what Morocco might offer by way of an
autonomy proposal in six to nine months and, suggested that
van Walsum travel to Paris, London and Madrid to urge those
capitals to take decisive positions on the future of MINURSO.
End Summary.


2. (C) The Secretary General's Personal Envoy (PE) for
Western Sahara Peter van Walsum and the Secretary-General's
Special Representative for Western Sahara (SRSG) Francesco
Bastagli made a May 8 joint call on Ambassador Bolton. Van
Walsum noted that in its April rollover of the MINURSO
mandate, the Security Council had not acted on the
Secretary-General's call for negotiations between the

SIPDIS
parties, and that important members of the Security Council
had indicated in their explanations of vote (EOVs) that this
would be the last such technical rollover.


3. (C) But, Van Walsum wondered, if political influence has
enabled Morocco to obstruct progress on the issue, could the

Security Council force Morocco to do anything they do not
want to do? Moreover, van Walsum added, the difficulties of
forcing the Moroccans to come up with a reasonable proposal
aside, whenever he has raised the issue with Algeria and the
Polisario, he has been told that UNGA resolution 1514 (which
asserted the right of self-determination for colonial
peoples) and the 1975 International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinion (ICJ AO) on Western Sahara (which supported
applicability of UNGA 1514) are the basis of the
international legality governing the Western Sahara.
Expanding on the SYG's recommendation for direct negotiations
grounded on "realpolitik," van Walsum noted that both UNGA
1514 and the ICJ AO are more than thirty years old and that
the Security Council,s requirement for a chapter six
(consensual) solution to the problem of Western Sahara in
place since 2002, must now be considered a part of the
international legal framework as well.

Security Council Inaction, Politics, the Rollover
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that heavy lobbying by Morocco,
which does not want any constraints imposed on it, was a key
factor in the rollover decision. Moreover, Ambassador Bolton
added, given what Paul Volker has referred to as the "culture
of inaction" at the Security Council, it is unlikely that
anything will be seriously addressed until we are at a
precipice. Such inaction, Ambassador Bolton recalled, was
the reason he had suggested that MINURSO should be
terminated. Ambassador Bolton said that having failed to
start sufficiently in advance of the past rollover to force
anything to happen, we will have to go through another
six-month cycle. In the future, we need to establish some
kind of structure that lays out consequences, in particular
the termination of MINURSO, should Morocco not do something.


5. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that politics as well as
international legality are at work in Western Sahara and
change will occur only if we are willing to shake things up.
In 1991 we established MINURSO and thought we could finish
everything by the end of that year, but the Moroccans shot it
down. In 1997 we established a referendum, and Moroccans
shot that down. And in 2004, Baker developed the Baker Plan
and the Moroccans shot that down. Thus, Ambassador Bolton
said, the way to get to a decision might be to suggest that
MINURSO will be terminated. You know something should be
terminated when everyone claims to want it, but no one uses
it to achieve a solution. MINURSO has become merely a
security blanket for the parties.



6. (C) Ambassador Bolton said that Morocco had indicated it
would have a substantial autonomy plan by March, but now
asserts it will require an additional six to nine months
because it needs to hold domestic political consultations and
to pass a constitutional amendment to authorize such a plan.
And in six months, the Moroccans might well say they are
still not quite ready. Should this happen, Ambassador Bolton
said, he would prefer to say to the U.S. taxpayer that we are
not going to continue to pay for MINURSO and that it would be
best to terminate MINURSO. At that point, we could tell the
Western Saharans that they can return to Western Sahara, or
they can return to war. Ambassador Bolton said his guess
would be that the Sahrawi would remain in the camps in
Algeria until the Algerians tired of contributing money to
preserve the fiction.

Removing the Security Blanket
--------------


7. (C) Commenting on Ambassador Bolton's argument that the
termination of MINURSO might be the only way to spur action
on the Western Sahara, SRSG Bastagli noted that if the U.S.
were serious about terminating MINURSO, it should make its
position known as soon as possible. Van Walsum said that the
U.S. has cried wolf too often about termination. Ambassador
Bolton replied that he has been the only one even to suggest
closure and only after fifteen years of inaction. Now,
unless you do something dramatic, you won't get any action.
He noted that in English law, possession is nine points of
the law, Morocco controls the territory, and the Moroccans
have no incentive to change. In fact, Ambassador Bolton
said, the Moroccans have been upset every time the prospect
of MINURSO termination is raised. MINURSO is their security
blanket. But if there is no incentive for Morocco to change
and no pressure on them to change, then it is difficult to
understand why the UN should continue to participate,
Ambassador Bolton said.


8. (C) Van Walsum asked whether Ambassador Bolton agreed with
Algeria and the Polisario, who say that there will be a new
political reality after Chirac departs, offering the
possibility of pressure on Morocco. Ambassador Bolton said
that there is always the possibility that a key actor might
change its position. The Spanish have been calling for a
combined Spanish, French, U.S. initiative.


9. (C) In response to van Walsum's query regarding when the
U.S. might take a strong position on Western Sahara and,
specifically, whether the U.S. might pressure Morocco to
accept a referendum, Ambassador Bolton noted a number of
factors at play, including democratization in the Middle East
and Congressional unhappiness with yet another rollover.
Things to Do
--------------


10. (C) Asked by van Walsum how the U.S. thought his efforts
might be best directed, Ambassador Bolton said that the key
goal should be that we avoid doing in six months what we did
a few weeks ago and that the major players should not be
allowed to wait until the last moment before discussing the
way forward. Ambassador Bolton suggested that the Personal
Envoy travel to Paris, London and Madrid to say that these
capitals need to decide soon what should be done.


11. (C) SRSG Bastagli volunteered that MINURSO could
contribute to "shaking things up" and therefore moving the
process forward by providing human rights and political
reporting that it has not done in the past. He said that
such reporting could be accomplished without any increase in
staffing. Moreover, he said, increasing the confidence
building measures, and supplementing them with seminars might
be additional activities that might energize dialogue between
the two sides.
BOLTON