INDIA REJECTS UNSC BRIEFING ON NEPAL AS WELL AS UN

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN NEW YORK 001016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV UNSC NP
SUBJECT: INDIA REJECTS UNSC BRIEFING ON NEPAL AS WELL AS UN
ROLE IN MONITORING CEASE-FIRE

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3382


B. KATHMANDU 1263

C. KATHMANDU 1202

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff, per 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. During a May 16 meeting on Nepal hosted by
UK PermRep to the UN Sir Emyr Jones Parry and attended by
Special Adviser to SYG Annan Vijay Nambiar and USUN Deputy
PermRep Wolff -- but not Indian PermRep Nirupam Sen, who
decided at the last minute not to attend -- the UK pushed for
an expanded role for the United Nations to monitor the
cease-fire between the Maoists and the Government of Nepal
(GON),supervise Maoist disarmament, and provide assistance
to the upcoming Nepalese constituent assembly. Observing
that the UN Secretariat might need authorization for such an
enlarged role, Jones Parry proposed that the UN Security
Council receive a briefing on Nepal under "other matters" in
about two weeks' time. Nambiar agreed with Ambassador Wolff
that the GON should first request UN assistance before any
further action is taken, although he averred that "there
should be external monitoring of the cease-fire" and that in
this regard there "may be a role for the UN." After briefing
Indian Mission to the UN PolMinCounselor Harsh Shringla on
the May 16 meeting, Poloff heard back from Shringla on May 17
-- who had spoken overnight with New Delhi -- that India
believed UN monitoring of the cease-fire in Nepal was
"completely unnecessary." Ruling out any UN mediation effort
in Nepal, Shringla averred that the UN should focus on fully
supporting the political parties and on mobilizing
international economic assistance to the GON. While he said
India could envisage a possible future UN role in supporting
Nepal's elections, Shringla said such a decision now would be
premature. Accordingly, Shringla confirmed that India would
oppose any UNSC discussion of Nepal. Praising U.S.-India
cooperation on Nepal, Shringla called for continued
coordination on this issue in New York and in capitals. End
Summary.

Ill-Fated Follow-Up to December Meeting
--------------


2. (SBU) Jones Parry described the May 16 meeting as a
follow-up to a December 2005 discussion between himself,
Indian PR Sen, UN Special Adviser Brahimi, and Ambassador
Bolton on the situation in Nepal. Since Brahimi retired at
the end of 2005, Special Adviser to SYG Annan (and former
Indian Deputy National Security Advisor) Vijay Nambiar
attended for the UN Secretariat and Ambassador Wolff
represented USUN. Noting that Sen had been reluctant to
attend the first meeting, Jones Parry speculated that the
Indian PR only agreed to attend the second session because he
was asked at the same time as Nambiar and could not refuse in
the presence of his fellow Indian (and now UN) colleague.
The Indian PR, however, ultimately did not attend the meeting
due to difficulties gaining access to the UK Mission.
Despite Sen's absence, the meeting continued with Nambiar in
the awkward position of effectively having to represent the
views of both the UN Secretariat and India on the situation
in Nepal.

UK: UNSC Briefing in Two Weeks
--------------


3. (SBU) Jones Parry outlined three broad challenges facing
Nepal: to "get its politics right," focus on economic
development, and ensure security. Noting that India had
rejected any outside mediation in Nepal's political process,
Jones Parry agreed with Nambiar that the international
community should allow Nepalis to pursue their political
dialogue on their own. The British PR therefore suggested
that the international community could focus its efforts in
Nepal on monitoring the cease-fire between the Maoists and
the GON, on Maoist disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration (DDR),and on assistance to the upcoming
Nepalese constituent assembly. Recognizing that the degree
to which the international community becomes involved "should
depend on what the Nepalis want," Jones Parry nonetheless
implied throughout the discussion that the international
community -- and particularly the UN -- should play a role in
Nepal's transition. He wondered whether the UN Secretariat
could expand its role in Nepal upon the decision of SYG Annan
or if consultations with the Security Council would be
necessary. Recalling that SYG Annan had agreed during a
lunch with UNSC members on May 10 to provide a report on

Nepal to the Council under the "other matters" agenda item,
Jones Parry said he expected such a UNSC briefing in about
two weeks' time, at which point he hoped it would be clear
whether the GON had requested UN assistance.

Nambiar Puts on His Indian Hat...
--------------


4. (SBU) Cautioning that he had left the GOI several months
ago and disclaiming any expertise on Nepal, Nambiar
nevertheless offered an assessment of recent developments
there based in part on his discussions with Indian Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran several weeks ago. Noting how much

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public support for the King had shrunk recently, Nambiar
opined that the Maoists would try to maximize their political
influence due to their conviction that there was more now
"give" in the political situation than before. The SYG's
Special Adviser nevertheless predicted the Maoists would
adhere to their alliance with the political parties, but he
underscored the importance of preventing them from
intimidating their political counterparts or ordinary
Nepalese citizens. Nambiar averred that the Royal Nepalese
Army (RNA) would have little choice but to report to the
cabinet rather than the King. Asked about possible external
support for the Maoists, Nambiar characterized connections
with the Indian Naxalite movement as "tenuous" due to the
more tribal-based politics of rural India. While he
acknowledged that certain Indian political parties had
offered "ideological" support to the Nepalese Maoists, he
discounted the possibility of any material support. As for
China, Nambiar observed that the PRC had been "almost
critical" of the movement to which it refers -- as a
self-protecting euphemism -- as "Nepalese anti-government
forces."

...And Then His Blue Helmet
--------------


5. (SBU) Speaking on behalf of the UN Secretariat, Nambiar
agreed that "there should be external monitoring of the
cease-fire" and that in this regard there "may be a role for
the UN." He predicted that India would "be hesitant" about
UNSC discussion of Nepal, but agreed that the UN would "need
some angle" in order to expand its role in the country.
Dodging Jones Parry's question about why India would oppose
such a briefing, Nambiar agreed with Ambassador Wolff that
the GON should first make a clear, public request for UN
assistance. The SYG's Special Adviser did argue, perhaps in
defense of India's reluctance to consider UNSC action on
Nepal, that the "balance of opinion" in the UN was more
critical of the RNA than the Maoists -- and that this "should
now be corrected." Nambiar outlined three obstacles to the
country's successful political transition: disagreements
between the seven main political parties, a lack of trust in
Maoist intentions, and Maoist disarmament. Based on this
analysis, he concluded that there could be a role for the
international community in supporting "security arrangements"
between the GON and the Maoists, supervising disarmament, and
in providing electoral assistance. If Nepal requested UN
assistance, Nambiar opined the UN would likely adopt a phased
approach focused initially on monitoring the cease-fire with
other possible tasks to follow, rather than attempt to
undertake all of aforementioned functions at once.


6. (SBU) Nambiar noted that Department of Political Affairs
(DPA) Under Secretary-General (U/SYG) Gambari looked forward
to hearing the results of DPA official Tamrat Samuel's visit
to Nepal and India, during which Samuel was supposed to gauge
interest in an expanded UN role, upon Samuel's return to New
York on May 22. In response to a question from Jones Parry
about possible follow-up UN visits to the region, Nambiar
said he was not sure if Gambari wanted to visit Nepal at the
end of his current trip to Burma. If Gambari could not visit
Kathmandu soon, Nambiar suggested that DPA Asia Division
Director Michael Williams might make a stop there en route to
his planned visit to Beijing in the next few weeks.

India (Belatedly) Rejects a UN Role
--------------


7. (SBU) Following the May 16 meeting at the UK Mission,
Poloff gave Indian Mission to the UN Political MinCounselor
Harsh Shringla a quick briefing on the discussion the Indians
had just missed. After speaking overnight with Indian
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Joint Secretary Pankaj

Saran, Shringla met Poloff on May 17 to explain India's
reaction. Describing a UN role in monitoring a cease-fire
between the Maoists and the GON as "completely unnecessary,"
Shringla averred that the UN should focus its efforts in
Nepal on expressing full support for the political parties
and in mobilizing international economic assistance to the
GON. (Note: Poloff referred to reftel discussions in New
Delhi to clarify if India opposed even a UN role in
monitoring the cease-fire, but Shringla said Saran was clear
on this point. End Note.) The UN, Shringla observed, could
assist the political process by helping to "maintain unity
among the parties" -- but without taking on any sort of
mediation role. The Indian diplomat argued that the UN
serving as a mediator would imply "parity" between the GON
and the Maoists, which he said both India and the USG reject.
Shringla further observed that the UN should tell the
Maoists in no uncertain terms that they must renounce
violence and accept whatever results emerge from the
constituent assembly. While India could "envisage" a
possible UN role in supporting Nepal's elections, Shringla
cautioned that such a decision was now "premature" because
elections were at least 10-12 months away. Accordingly,
Shringla said India thought any UNSC discussion of Nepal
would be unnecessary. Throughout the discussion, Shringla
emphasized that the GON should decide what kind of role the
international community should play in Nepal.


8. (C) Expressing appreciation for Poloff's briefing on the
May 16 session at the UK Mission, Shringla noted that British
PR Jones Parry -- in his conversation with Indian PR Sen
after the ill-fated meeting -- had only discussed a possible
role for the UN in Nepal without any mention of a UNSC
briefing. Shringla privately complained that the British
were repeating their earlier tactic of trying to pressure
India into accepting a greater UN role in Nepal, but he
warned that the UK would not be able to force such a decision
over Indian objections. Noting that Saran had just met with
SCA PDAS Donald Camp in New Delhi, Shringla said the MEA
believed the U.S. and India shared similar views on Nepal and
appealed for continued coordination in New York.
BOLTON