Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USUNNEWYORK1008
2006-05-18 09:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
USUN New York
Cable title:  

UN/IRAQ: S/I AMBASSADOR JEFFREY ON AN IRAQ COMPACT

Tags:  PREL UNSC PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001008 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: S/I AMBASSADOR JEFFREY ON AN IRAQ COMPACT


Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 001008

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL UNSC PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: UN/IRAQ: S/I AMBASSADOR JEFFREY ON AN IRAQ COMPACT


Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Begin Summary. S/I Ambassador Jim Jeffrey briefed UN
U/SYG Gambari and SRSG for Iraq Qazi May 9 on the proposal to
develop an "Iraq Compact," whereby UNAMI would work closely
with the newly elected Iraqi government to help al-Maliki's
cabinet expand Iraq's partnership with the international
community. The Compact would be somewhat similar to the
Afghan model; it would focus particularly on foreign
assistance, but cover other general subjects of international
engagement. Gambari promised consideration of this
"important initiative," but cautioned that there are
substantial differences between Iraq and Afghanistan and
opined that any new process must be tailored to the realities
of Iraq. Qazi asked if we envisioned the UN playing a role
in the formation of the "first 100 days" agenda contemplated
by the new government. Gambari committed to a UN review of
this "complicated endeavor" and promised to provide a
follow-up contact. In a subsequent conversation with USUN
May 11, Gambari special assistant Siqueira said the U.S.
proposal signals a "new policy direction" for the U.S. and
the UN, requiring the UN to "step back and think about it."


2. (C) Amb Jeffrey and Qazi also discussed Qazi's proposed
peace initiative, which Qazi described as a "bottom-up
process" requested by the Iraqis and supported by factions as
diverse as Muqtada al-Sadr and Tawafuq. While welcoming any
initiative that would reduce sectarian strife, Amb Jeffrey
made clear that UNAMI should guard against activity that
would undermine the formal Iraqi political process. In our
view, the major reconciliation effort was the set up of a
democratically-elected parliament and the establishment of a
broad-based inclusive Iraqi government that would start
addressing underlying national needs. The UN reported that
visiting Egyptian Foreign Minister Abul Gheit had said the
Arab League was unlikely to host the meeting on Iraq
notionally scheduled for June 22. (Comment: Subsequently we
have heard that this meeting might in fact be on at that
date.) Qazi said he had frozen his efforts to convoke a

regional Baghdad-based contact group until after the Iraqi
government formation. End Summary.

New UNAMI Role
--------------


3. (C) Amb Jeffrey, joined by Treasury DAS for Africa and
the Middle East Ahmed Saeed, NEA/I/ECON Laird Treiber, and
USUN deputy polcouns Molly Phee, met May 9 with UN U/SYG for
Political Affairs Ibrahim Gambari and SRSG for Iraq Ashraf
Qazi. Gambari and Qazi were joined by Gambari's special
assistant Steven Siqueria (who spent the previous year in
Iraq as Qazi's special assistant),UNAMI staffer Alan
Fellows, direction of the Asia and Pacific division for the
UN's department of political affairs (DPA) Michael Williams,
and DPA Iraq desk officer Jehangir Khan. Gambari has served
as the UN's interlocutor for the U.S.-UN strategic dialogue
on Iraq led by Amb Jeffrey.


4. (C) Recalling discussions last fall between the UN and
the U.S. about the appropriate role for UNAMI once the Iraqi
political transition was complete, Amb Jeffrey explained that
in the wake of the remarkable political progress in Iraq
since al-Maliki's selection as Prime Minister, the President
and the Secretary now see a new opportunity for a stronger
international effort to support the new GOI. Expressing
appreciation for the vital role played to date by Qazi and
UNAMI, Amb Jeffrey said it was time to further engage the
international community. He said the USG had reviewed
various models, and concluded that the Afghanistan Compact,
which is facilitating a conditioned flow of international
assistance based on specific, measurable performance
standards, deserves consideration.


5. (C) Citing the leading role of former UN envoy to
Afghanistan Jean Arnault in forging a set of interconnecting
commitments between Afghanistan's National Development
Strategy and states and parties from the international
community, Amb Jeffrey solicited the views of Gambari and
Qazi on the prospects of a similar effort for Iraq.
Acknowledging that last summer's Brussels conference was not

USUN NEW Y 00001008 002 OF 003


tied to an institutional process, Amb Jeffrey said we
envisioned the development of an Iraq Compact to take place
over the next few months. He said the
political-economic-security triad that governed the Iraq
UNSCRs and the coalition effort should be carried forward in
any compact, although there would be special emphasis on the
economic and assistance portfolios. Saeed addressed the
economic component, clarifying that it would be important for
the UN to clearly delineate its role, including the
contributions of UN agencies such as UNDP, and that of the
World Bank and the IMF.

Fleshing Out the Details
--------------


6. (C) Gambari said the UN had been conducting an internal
review of its role in Iraq, as the UN shares the U.S.
assessment that the formation of the new government creates
new opportunities. The UN review, however, had been tied to
the language in the Iraq UNSCRs, particularly the core
functions of human rights, reconstruction and development,
the constitutional review process, provincial elections,
etc.; Amb Jeffrey noted this language was perfectly
compatible with the concept of a compact. Offering what he
characterized as a preliminary reaction, Gambari acknowledged
the UN's comparative advantage in facilitating engagement
between developing governments and the international
community. He said he saw some similarities between
Afghanistan and Iraq, but saw more substantial differences,
and opined that any new process must be tailored to the
realities of Iraq. He said the Brussels effort lacked a
follow-up mechanism and this lesson should be incorporated
into any new effort. Gambari told Amb Jeffrey that the
compact is a "very important initiative" and he would reflect
further.


7. (C) Qazi raised the prospect of a "first 100 days" agenda
to be developed by al-Maliki's government, and asked whether
the USG envisioned holding a conference to secure additional
pledges. Amb Jeffrey explained that we had held preliminary
consultations about the compact proposal with the Iraqis and
the British, as well as the Canadians, who had so ably led
the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq, or
IRFFI). He said we were considering a steering group, and a
kick-off conference would be appropriate. Qazi wondered
whether the name "compact" would be ideal, observing that
Iraqis considered their country more advanced than
Afghanistan and that the use of the term might also confuse
matters in the international community. Qazi said he
recalled the Secretary's personal support for a strong UN
role in Iraq and affirmed his commitment to achieving that
end.


8. (C) Williams informed the group that visiting Egyptian
Foreign Minister Abul Gheit (in New York for Quartet
meetings) had said that the proposal for the Arab League to
meet on Iraq June 22 is "too ambitious." While lauding the
Canadian example (a government that had not supported the
2003 decision but subsequently played a helpful role in
Iraq's stabilization),Williams observed ruefully that most
governments in the region and in the international community
at large were "far too passive" and thus far unwilling to act
with "real engagement."


9. (C) Amb Jeffrey agreed that expectations about a surge in
international interest in Iraq were unfulfilled, and
attributed this situation in part to the lengthy time
required for government formation. He proposed that once the
new GOI was stood up, the UN should engage with the new
government to ascertain its views. Presuming continued GOI
interest in the project, the UN could then activate its ties
in Europe and elsewhere, while the USG was prepared to use
its influence with Gulf Arab states, particularly with regard
to disbursement of earlier pledges, new pledges, and debt
forgiveness. Within Iraq, Amb Jeffrey noted, the new GOI
intended to focus on electricity and infrastructure in
Baghdad, as well as housing and agriculture throughout the
country. Subsidies needed to be tackled in line with IMF
commitments. In addition to the economic aspects discussed,
there is a set of "hard security issues," such as detainees,

USUN NEW Y 00001008 003 OF 003


military operations, militias, DDR, and amnesty. As a general
organizing principle of the compact, the international
community would demand, and should demand, said Amb Jeffrey,
conditionality -- a set of measurable benchmarks in exchange
for assistance.

Iraq Peace Initiative
--------------


10. (C) Qazi explained to Amb Jeffrey the origins of his
proposed Peace Initiative. He recounted the UN-sponsored
travel of key Iraqi political and civic figures abroad for
training and exchanges, and said those that had been to South
Africa had been inspired by that country's experience with
reconciliation and transitional justice. Admitting that
South Africa's experience is "completely different," Qazi
said nonetheless there was real interest by Iraqis in a grass
roots, civil society based process to address Iraq's brutal
past and current sectarian strife. The idea of a peace
initiative included a charter or accord that would be agreed
to by Iraq's communities. This charter might include codes
of conduct for various Iraqi institutions. It would be
bottom-up, conducted at the neighborhood level. The
initiative, originally conceived by Iraqis, would be an Iraqi
process, and the UN would merely play a supportive or
facilitator role.


11. (C) Qazi said he had raised the idea with Muqtada
al-Sadr, who had given a "qualified" positive response,
pleased with the comparison to Sadr's code of honor proposal.
(Sadr said, is this a U.S. idea? If so, I oppose. If not,
the U.S. will obstruct.) Qazi had also discussed it with
Ayatollah al-Sistani, who was "very positive," as well as the
Prime Minister, the Tawafuq party and other political
leaders, all of whom were supportive, going so far as to
propose preparatory and drafting committees. Harith al-Dari
of the Muslim Ulemma Council was out of the country so they
had not spoken. Qazi said the UN had some security concerns,
and some questions as to how this initiative would affect
other UN activities, and that these matters were under review.


12. (C) Amb Jeffrey urged Qazi to ensure this effort
maintains an Iraqi face and is implemented through Iraqi
processes. He recalled that Iraq's historic political
transition had resulted in an inclusive democracy, and we
hope an inclusive, broad-based government able to deal with
the nation's problems -- the best antidote to sectarian
strife. Thus no step should be taken that inadvertently
fosters an alternative political process. He also advised
Qazi to ensure that UNAMI deconflicts and coordinate this
initiative with other related efforts.


13. (C) Qazi concluded the meeting by providing an update on
his proposed Baghdad-based regional contact group, which he
said would include all of Iraq's neighbors, including Iran
and Syria, as well as Cairo, the Arab League, and possibly
Bahrain. He said Foreign Minister Zebari had initially been
cool to the idea, and they had agreed to revisit the subject
after the government was formed.

Comment
--------------


14. (C) Despite real progress, including the UN's role in
Iraq's election transition cycle, the political and security
scars of 2002-2003 still occasionally throb at the UN's
headquarters in New York. Gambari and his team are generally
sympathetic to the U.S. desire for a stronger UN role in
Iraq. But they will have to sell the proposed new U.S.
initiative to a Secretary-General in the last months of his
last year, a man who is focused on a legacy dominated by UN
reform and may be reluctant to launch new initiatives.
BOLTON