A RUSSIAN TAKE ON OSCE ELECTIONS/OTHER ISSUES

C O N F I D E N T I A L USOSCE 000142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2016
TAGS: OSCE PINR PREL RS
SUBJECT: A RUSSIAN TAKE ON OSCE ELECTIONS/OTHER ISSUES


Classified By: CDA Kyle Scott, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d)


1. (C) Russian OSCE Mission DCM Vladimir Voronkov (protect)
told USOSCE PolCouns March 31 to expect a "very difficult"
second half of 2006 in OSCE with respect to elections
observation issues. Voronkov said that while he doubts there
is any written instruction, he is convinced that the MFA has
been tasked by the Kremlin with ensuring that OSCE's Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
especially its elections monitoring functions, will be
thoroughly discredited in the eyes of the Russian public well
before 2008 Russian Presidential election. He envisages
either of two outcomes as the Kremlin's policy goal:

-- To build up such a substantial drumbeat of criticism of
ODIHR and its practices that its observation of the Russian
election will already be considered completely suspect by the
Russian public before it even takes it place, so as to negate
any effect of a critical ODIHR report; or

-- To provide a pretext for Russia simply not to invite ODIHR
observation of the election in the first place, irrespective
of Russia's OSCE Copenhagen commitments.

Voronkov pointed to Russia's recent strident attacks on
ODIHR's observation of the Belarus Presidential election as
explicitly part of this strategy. He expressed considerable
concern that Russia's campaign against ODIHR will have
serious negative consequences for the atmosphere and for
cooperation in OSCE in general, as the year progresses.


2. (C) Speaking personally on broader issues, Voronkov
expressed disquiet over what he views as the complete
inability of Russia's leadership to understand that Russia
can gain, rather than lose, by having stable, prosperous
independent states around its borders. The leadership, he
said, cannot see that neighbors can be good friends without
necessarily being subservient clients, and Russia will pay a
price down the road for tying its fortunes to the Lukashenkos
and Karimovs of the region. He lamented Russia's approach to
the separatist problems in Moldova and Georgia, emphatically
agreeing with PolCouns that Russia's policy is to preserve
the current status quo and to foster instability in those
countries. In an aside, he said that Russia's leadership
seems to think it can adopt the Chinese model of development,
but does not understand that Russia and China are completely
different. Russia's leaders, in Voronkov's view, think that
Russia is the main force in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization: in reality, he said, it is China, and Russia is
simply deluding itself.


3. (C) Finally, looking at Russia's internal situation,
Voronkov described the country's leaders as the "third tier"
remenants of the Soviet period, concerned almost solely with
enriching themselves. "I was more optimistic a year ago," he
concluded, about Russia's possibilities, but now sees most
trends as being negative for the next few years, at least.
SCOTT