Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USNATO734
2006-12-20 13:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS MEETS WITH NATO SECRETARY

Tags:  PREL MASS NATO AU SU UN 
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VZCZCXRO9995
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNO #0734/01 3541330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201330Z DEC 06
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0338
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0129
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0103
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0319
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000734 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS NATO AU SU UN
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS MEETS WITH NATO SECRETARY
GENERAL

REF: A) KHARTOUM 2845 B) ADDIS ABABA 3243

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000734

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2016
TAGS: PREL MASS NATO AU SU UN
SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY NATSIOS MEETS WITH NATO SECRETARY
GENERAL

REF: A) KHARTOUM 2845 B) ADDIS ABABA 3243

Classified By: Ambassador Victoria Nuland for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Special Envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios met
December 15 with NATO Secretary General (SYG) de Hoop
Scheffer to discuss the situation in Darfur, relations
between NATO and the African Union (AU),and the spread of
instability into Chad and the Central African Republic.
Natsios said diplomatic means are needed to persuade the
Sudanese government to change its policies; if not, tougher
coercive measures will be the next step. De Hoop Scheffer
noted NATO had recently extended its support for the AU
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to June 2007, and said he would be
receptive to any request to NATO to help transport UN forces
into Chad, should such a mission take place. End Summary.


2. (C) Natsios recounted his recent meeting with Sudanese
President Bashir (Ref. A),including a discussion on allowing
UN "blue hatted" troops into Darfur. The SYG described NATO
assistance to AMIS, noting this support is being carried out
with a "low profile," in part due to African political
sensitivities.


3. (C) Natsios said it is necessary to persuade the Sudanese
to voluntarily change their policies in Darfur. Diplomatic
efforts must be made to engage China, Arab nations, and the
Arab League to pressure the Sudanese to cease attacks against
non-combatants. He noted the Sudanese have "walked back" the
agreement reached November 16 in Addis Ababa on UN assistance
to AMIS. In turn, the AU Peace and Security Council meeting
held November 30 in Abuja had adopted a weaker version of the
agreement (Ref. B). If Bashir cannot proceed with the Addis
agreement, said Natsios, there may be a need to take coercive
steps, beginning with targeted economic and financial
sanctions. Responding to a discussion of miliary steps that
could be taken against the Sudanee, de Hoop Scheffer
commented that these steps miht be better taken by a
coalition of countries wlling to act, rather than by NATO.


4. (C) Natsos observed that the Darfur crisis was spreadinginstability into Chad and the Central African Repulic,

adding this had led the French to become mor aggressive
militarily in the area. He discusse the possibility of a UN
force being located in had along the border with Darfur.
The SYG said h would be "receptive to any request" to help
puta force into Chad. De Hoop Scheffer wondered wherethe
UN would find the troops to man such a force adding that
drawing any UN troops out of southen Sudan would be a
mistake.


5. (C) The SYG tld Natsios that NATO had recently committed
to cntinue assistance to AMIS through June of 2007. He
described increasing levels of confidence betwee NATO and
the AU, and said there is much more NAO could do in the
provision of "enablers." He ten reiterated the idea that
NATO could provide smilar assistance in other parts of the
region, agin mentioning potential support for any UN mission
to Chad. He said NATO can also do more trainingof AU
forces, including the African Standby Forc, while cautioning
that there are "political hurles" to clear first. (Comment:
France opposes anytraining role for NATO in Africa. End
Comment.)


6. (C) Natsios said the AU appears somewhat "torn" regarding
NATO assistance - they appreciate and need the assistance,
but still see NATO as representing former colonial powers.
However, there is a growing perception in Africa that the
situation in Darfur is bad and getting worse, and that more
action is needed. The SYG opined that the citizens of Darfur
can only be protected if there are adequate peacekeeping
forces on the ground, coupled with a political settlement.
Natsios suggested the need for additional protocols to the
Darfur Peace Agreement to bring more rebel groups into the
peace process.


7. (C) Natsios described high levels of corruption within
AMIS, including looting of equipment, material and fuel
provided by international donors. The SYG said that, despite
these problems, the AU is the only interlocutor NATO
currently has, and therefore will need to continue providing
support. Natsios said he had recently called AU PSC
Commissioner Djinnit, recommending the removal of AMIS Force
Commander Major General Aprezi (a Nigerian). NATO DASG for

USNATO 00000734 002 OF 002


Operations Jochems suggested that, given the recent extension
of AMIS, the weight of Nigeria within the AU, and the fact
that Aprezi was only recently appointed, now was not the best
time to replace the commander.


8. (C) Comment: De Hoop Scheffer emphasized to Natsios his
interest and ties to Africa (he was posted to Ghana early in
his career),and is personally troubled by the situation in
Darfur. During this meeting, he was actively looking for
ways to increase NATO involvement in Africa. End Comment.


9. (U) SE Natsios' staff has cleared this cable.
NULAND