Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06USNATO731
2006-12-19 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

RFG: QATAR CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION STATUS OF NATO

Tags:  NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF QA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0500
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000731 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FWD FOR CAOC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF QA
SUBJECT: RFG: QATAR CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION STATUS OF NATO
PERSONNEL AT AL UDEID

REF: A. A. OLSON/RATNEY EMAIL 12/18


B. B. COCKRELL/MULTIPLE ADDRESS 12/18

Classified By: DCM Richard Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 USNATO 000731

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD, CENTCOM FWD FOR CAOC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2016
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS MARR AF QA
SUBJECT: RFG: QATAR CHALLENGING IMMIGRATION STATUS OF NATO
PERSONNEL AT AL UDEID

REF: A. A. OLSON/RATNEY EMAIL 12/18


B. B. COCKRELL/MULTIPLE ADDRESS 12/18

Classified By: DCM Richard Olson, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) This is a request for guidance; see para 5.


2. (C) SUMMARY. The Qatari government has informed NATO
that fourteen ISAF personnel at the CAOC at al Udeid airbase
are in illegal immigration status, working ISAF issues in the
absence of a NATO-Qatar SOFA. Qatar has asked NATO to
declare formally the presence of these personnel in Qatar, so
that the GOQ may grant them an as-yet undefined interim
status, and begin formal negotiations on a SOFA. Prospects
for a satisfactory NATO-Qatar SOFA are dim at present, based
on several months of inconclusive legal expert exchanges.
Qatar has stated these personnel are not/not presently
covered by respective bilateral SOFAs, either. SYG de Hoop
Scheffer intends to satisfy the Qatari request via a letter.
We request guidance on whether we can concur with this way
ahead. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) NATO IS officials informed the NATO Political
Committee on 12/18 that the Alliance had received a letter
from the Qatari government (ref A) on 12/6 identifying 14
NATO military personnel (US/UK/CA/NL) which the GoQ
considered to be working at the al-Udeid air base combined
air operations center (CAOC) under an "illegal" immigration
status. The Qataris state that the fourteen are performing
NATO Afghanistan mission-related tasks yet hold immigration
status linked to tourist visas or bilateral arrangements
which the GoQ considered inconsistent with their actual CAOC
tasks. They asked that NATO immediately confirm in writing
to the GoQ whether the fourteen identified in the letter were
performing NATO tasks and, if so, that NATO begin an
immediate negotiation process to determine a legal SOFA
status for the NATO personnel. They specifically told NATO
authorities that while they would consider the reported
fourteen personnel to be covered by an unspecified "interim

status" once reported by NATO, they s
pecifically would not be covered by their respective
bilateral SOFA arrangements -- and are not currently covered
by respective bilateral SOFA arrangements. Their cover
letter says that "it is imperative at this stage that the
Embassy (of Qatar in Belgium) receives as soon as possible a
request whereby NATO provides clarification about the NATO
procedures, in addition to an application to rectify their
status, in order that this situation will not lead to any
further implications."


4. (C) NATO IS officials further explained that, since
receiving the letter on 12/6, senior NATO officials,
including the Deputy Secretary General Minuto Rizzo on the
margins of a regional NATO seminar in Kuwait on 12/12-13 and
Supreme Allied Commander Europe General John Craddock in an
otherwise previously scheduled 12/18 visit to Qatar, have
engaged the GoQ. They have encountered a strong resolve by
the GoQ to have a NATO SOFA negotiated with
Qatar immediately, as well as work on a further elaboration
of NATO ties to Qatar, such as defense and security training
and military education. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop
Scheffer wants to send a reply to Qatar no
later than 12/20 confirming the status of the fourteen
personnel identified by the Qatari letter and addressing the
request from the GoQ on NATO's stance about their "urgent
request" for a NATO-Qatar SOFA negotiation (comment: which
we, and NATO legal officials, based on several months of
inconclusive initial legal expert exchanges and the stated
Qatari position, estimate is unlikely to produce a privileges
and immunity set at the level we receive in U.S.-Qatari legal
arrangements. End Comment.)


5. (C) RFG: SYG de Hoop Scheffer is seeking Allied opinions
on this course of action. We seek U.S. stance on whether we
would support NATO sending this letter, thus putting the 14
into a formal undefined "interim" status -- more than the
"illegal" status they currently hold, according to the

USNATO 00000731 002 OF 002


December 6 Qatari note to NATO in Brussels -- and starting a
negotiation with Qatar on a NATO SOFA. This could mean that
if NATO is unable to negotiate a SOFA that provides equal
protections to personnel as does the U.S. bilateral SOFA,
future U.S. personnel perform missions for ISAF at the CAOC
in a NATO SOFA status would be less protected than those
performing Coalition tasks, who would be covered by bilateral
SOFA arrangements. End request.


6. (C) Ref B forwarded a copy of the letter to NATO and U.S.
military authorities, as well as Embassy Doha, to seek to
verify the status and identity of the reported American
military members in the Qatari letter. SHAPE contacts stated
that a portion of the CAOC at al-Udeid is dedicated to NATO
ISAF support, but we have not yet been able to confirm
whether the NATO personnel identified by Qatar, are in fact
working there currently. (Comment: we spoke with the head of
the ISAF staff at the CAOC, who stated that the list attached
to the December 6 Qatari letter is now OBE, as some staff
have already rotated out. Nevertheless, the underlying
issues remain valid, and some staff may still be in an
unclear immigration status, as outlined above. End comment.)


OPTIONS LOOKING AHEAD
--------------


7. (C) We believe that the most direct solution, absent a
NATO-GOQ SOFA at present, would be for the GOQ to permit
foreign military personnel to work both NATO and Coalition
issues within the CAOC, under the protection of respective
bilateral agreements. While Qatar has firmly stated it will
not agree to this, it may be worth readdressing the issue
from both an Alliance and bilateral perspective, given
significant U.S. equities in the success of ISAF. We do not
know whether Qatar would seek to expel the fourteen possible
NATO personnel whom they have identified, but such a risk
exists. In any event, if these NATO military personnel
perceive that they are covered by bilateral SOFA status now,
Qatar expressly considers them not to be protected by those
arrangements. We do not exclude that there is at least a
risk that short-term ISAF-related air operations could be
degraded and disrupted if Qatar forces these personnel to
leave, or prohibits replacements from entering the country.
If NATO can reach a NATO
-wide applicable SOFA arrangement with Qatar, we may well
face a situation wherein U.S. personnel assigned to the
NATO-related portion of CAOC duties are asked to serve under
protections less generous than our current bilateral SOFA.
NULAND