IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000572

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/26/2021
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR START-UP UNLIKELY UNTIL AT
LEAST 2009


Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 (c)

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Summary
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1. (S) The IAEA's Russ Clark, during a July 18 meeting with
Msnoff, said that the Iranians would be "lucky" to commission
the first power reactor at Bushehr (BNPP-1) by 2009 because
the Russians are "dragging their feet." Key equipment
required to finish the plant, such as valves and cables, has
not been delivered, and there are only about 3000 workers on
site (or about half of what we might expect for power plant
construction). The Russians will not deliver fuel for BNPP-1
until six months before commissioning; however, they
undoubtedly will complete the project to enhance marketing
efforts to Iran and other possible clients. The BNPP-1 is a
"bastardized" VVER reactor model resulting from extensive
redesigns of the original Siemens design. He said the
Russians are "not so big" on quality, but did not mention any
specific problems, particularly pertaining to safety issues.
He dismissed possible concerns about locating the plant in a
seismically active area, indicating that the Russians had
conducted reviews and then "beefed up" unspecified areas.
Clark lobbied for continued IAEA technical cooperation,
noting it would be dangerous for the Iranians to try to go it
alone. End Summary.

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Iranians Will "Be Lucky" To Go By 2009
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2. (S) Clark, noting that BNPP-1 was supposed to have been
completed two years ago, said the Iranians would "be lucky"
to begin preoperational testing of the reactor by 2009,
assuming that the Russians deliver the fuel and they
encounter no serious technical glitches. He said that, even
though the Iranians are pressing hard to complete the
project, the Russians are obviously "dragging their feet,"
citing the fact that they are only operating one shift and
have about 3000 workers (nationality breakdown not specified)
on site--or about half of what you would expect based on
plant construction in other countries. He said that the
Iranians are growing increasingly frustrated with these
delays, indicating the project managers are under a lot of
political pressure to complete it. Iran's parliament,
according to Clark, had recently authorized an additional
$250 million to the project. As a technical guy who has
worked in the field, Clark quipped that he almost feels sorry
for the Iranians because of the way the
Russians are "jerking them around."


3. (S) Clark provided us with copies of a presentation that
the Iranians had presented to the IAEA circa mid-July titled
the "Status and Progress of BNPP-Project." (Note: UNVIE will
fax copies to ISN/RA. End note.) It includes a chart on
Iran's expected completion of various phases of construction
and equipment installation, which projects completion of most
of this work by late 2006. The presentation includes many
pictures showing progress of various civil works at the site,
including physical protection measures, a meteorological lab,
installation of steam and water pipes, views of the inside of
the turbine plant (including equipment),transformers, and
water demineralization equipment. There is also a chart
titled "summary status" on how much of this equipment has
been installed and expected completion dates. Regarding
Iran's future plans for nuclear power, there is a chart
outlining Tehran's plans to eventually develop 20000 MW of
nuclear energy (unspecified timeline),with 7000 MW online by

2021. It indicates that the Iranians have completed a
feasibility study for a second reactor at Bushehr (designated
BNNP-2),and has developed a tender for this project.

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No Fuel Until Six Months Prior To Startup
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4. (S) Regarding fuel delivery dates, the Russians,
apparently at very high political levels, have made it clear
that they will not provide fuel until six months prior to
startup. Clark said that the Russians are obviously delaying
fuel shipments because of "political considerations" and
concerns that, once they deliver the fuel, they would lose

leverage over Iran, which could attempt to start the reactor
without Russian assistance. Despite these concerns, he was
almost certain that Russia would complete the plant, even
with a UNSC resolution, owing to concerns about the negative
impact on other foreign reactor marketing efforts. The
Iranians have also informed the Russians of their plans to
develop 7 additional 1000 MW reactors by 2021, at a cost
Clark estimated at about $3 billion per plant.


5. (S) Clark said that once the Russians ship the fuel,
normal safeguards measures would be in place to verify its
non-diversion, and that the Safeguard Dept would monitor
BNPP-1 operations with the "same" (but unspecified) equipment
that would be used in any other plant. Regarding physical
security, he noted that the TC work plan includes projects
with the IAEA's Physical protection experts to bolster
internal security. He indicated that the Iranians had
initially had a lax attitude about this, but seem to
understand the importance of this issue.

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Key Equipment Not Delivered
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6. (S) Clark also noted that BNPP-1 completion requires about
250 additional valves of an unspecified type, as well as
extensive cabling. The Russians have intimated that they
might allow the Iranians to produce some of the cables in
Iran, but even if this were to occur, extensive delays would
occur due to the time required to develop those capabilities.
He indicated that these shortages were largely attributable
to malfeasance on the part of the Russian general contractor,
who apparently bilked vendors that had been providing the
equipment.

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Bushehr a "Bastardized" VVER
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7. (S) Asked about Russian work to redesign Bushehr,
originally a 1970s Siemens design, Clark referred to BNPP-1
as a "bastardized" VVER that required extensive technical
modifications. When asked, he said he was not aware of any
other instances where a country had done such a redesign of
an existing plan. The Iranians were not involved in the
redesign work. He did not provide further details on the
types of modifications, but we plan to follow-up to get
additional information on the design characteristics as
compared to the standard VVER. When asked about the quality
of the construction, he quipped that the Russians are "not so
big" on quality, but did not cite any specific safety-related
concerns that his might pose.

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Iranian Technicians "Fairly Competent"
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8. (S) Clark said that the Iranian technicians are pretty
competent, with most having graduate degrees from western
institutions. The Russians, who view Iran as a "developing
country," often look down on the Iranians, which he noted is
pretty common in these circumstances. Overall, the Iranians
and Russians seem to work fairly well together. One of the
biggest hurdles, according to Clark, is the language barrier.
Many of the Iranians have trained in Russia and have learned
the language, but others have not. Clark emphasized that
this is not a big issue during construction of the plant, but
this could present problems post-startup if some of the
operators were using Russian terminology while others did not.

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Dismisses Seismic Concerns
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9. (S) Asked whether Bushehr's location in an active seismic
area posed problems, Clark seemed dismissive, noting that the
Russians had conducted a seismic review and did not
anticipate any problems, although he claimed they had
reinforced some (unspecified) parts of the reactor area to
"beef things up." He said that the IAEA had also conducted
such reviews, indicating that they had not discerned any
problems.

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Lobbies For Continued IAEA Technical Cooperation
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10. (S) Clark said that an extension of Iran's TC agreement
is pending and emphasized that he hoped the U.S. would not
veto it. Most of these projects, which were approved "years
ago" and are largely Iranian funded, are intended to
strengthen Iranian understanding of nuclear reactor
operations and enhance safety. In his view, it would be
better to have the Iranians receive training on reactor
operations from the IAEA instead of venturing out on their
own. Clark conveyed that the Iranians have said that if the
Russians were to halt cooperation on the BNPP-1, they would
try to fabricate the fuel and operate the plant on their own.
In his view, assuming the fuel were delivered, he thought
the Iranians would be capable of starting up the BNPP-1 on
their own, but not operate it safely. He also noted that it
is in the U.S. interest for the Agency to maintain this
cooperation because their access to the site is a valuable
source of information.


11. (S) Clark provided us with a list of active TC projects
related to Bushehr extending out to 2008, which we will also
fax to ISN/RA. This list contains projects identified under
the headings of: overall project management, support in the
development of training systems and human performance,
quality assurance and quality management, commissioning,
operations and technical support, and nuclear safety related
activities.


12. (S) Clark expressed similar concerns about Iran's
construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak, noting
that Safeguards was monitoring its construction, but
emphasized that the Safety department is not involved. On
that point, he expressed concern that, with the design work
about 96 percent completed, the Iranians might try to operate
the reactor on their own-something he said he did not even
want to contemplate because there could be a major accident.
In his view, the U.S. at some point may want to re-evaluate
its position concerning this project. Msnoff recalled that
the Board has repeatedly called on Iran to reconsider
construction of the reactor and that the UNSC would likely
mandate a halt to this work. Clark acknowledged these points
and clarified that this type of assistance could only occur
via Board-approved TC contracts.
SCHULTE