FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR ADVICE ON POSSIBLE DALAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L ULAANBAATAR 000608

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL SOCI PHUM KIRF MG CH
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER ASKS FOR ADVICE ON POSSIBLE DALAI
LAMA VISIT

REF: A. ULAANBAAATAR 385


B. 2002 ULAANBAATAR 818 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Acting DCM Patrick J. Freeman, for reasons 1.5(B) and (D
)


1. (U) This is an action request -- please see para 4.


2. (C) After an August 9 meeting on another matter, Foreign
Minister Enkhbold asked to meet the Ambassador one-on-one.
Enkhbold said that Gandan monastery had told the government
it wishes to invite the Dalai Lama to Mongolia for a visit
this year (ref a). Enkhbold said that the Prime Minister had
asked him to make the decision on whether Mongolia should
approve the visa -- for a visit by the Dalai Lama in his
capacity as a religious leader, not a political leader.
Enkhbold said that no date had yet been set for the Dalai
Lama's visit, other than it would be this year. He stated
that, if a visa were granted, Mongolia hoped the Dalai Lama
could transit to Mongolia through Tokyo, as he had in 2002.
(Note: In 2002, both Russia and South Korea declined to allow
the Dalai Lama to transit. Mongolia's direct connection with
Japan is seasonal and ends in September, after which the MIAT
flight from Tokyo stops en route in Seoul. Moscow permitted
the Dalai Lama to visit the Republic of Kalmikya earlier this
year, but he was not permitted to transit Moscow -- or to
travel on to Ulaanbaatar.)


3. (C) Before he made the decision, the Foreign Minister
continued, he hoped to gain a U.S. assessment of the state of
China's relations with the Dalai Lama, and any USG views on
how Beijing might react to such a visit. He added that he
hoped the Chinese would not "over react," as they had to the
Dalai Lama's 2002 visit (ref b). (Note: In 2002, the Chinese
stopped for "technical reasons" Mongolian freight trains from
entering China for two days -- while allowing other
international trains to continue crossing.) Enkhbold said his
impression is that there had been an easing of tensions this
year between the Beijing Government and the Dalai Lama, and
some efforts at reconciliation. He wondered how sincere this
effort was and whether Beijing and the Dalai Lama had reached
any tacit understanding that might mitigate a harsh reaction
from the Chinese to a Dalai Lama visit to Mongolia.


3. (C) Comment: From our perspective, the Chinese might
find it harder today to apply pressure on Mongolia in the
event of a visit. While the single north-south rail line is
important to Mongolia as its link to goods from and through
China, keeping that line open is increasingly vital for the
Chinese, as it has become more dependent on raw materials
from Russia (e.g., logs). Too, China is aggressively seeking
to obtain access to major coal and other mining concessions
in Mongolia, but given Mongolian distrust and dislike of the
Chinese, this is an uphill battle. Beijing has also become a
major source of capital and loans for infrastructure
projects, employiing Chinese workers and materials. All in
all, Beijing may be reluctant to jeopardize its economic
relationship with Mongolia.


4. (C) Action request: Embassy asks for information the U.S.
is willing share with the Mongolian government regarding our
assessment of the recent state of relations between China and
the Dalai Lama, and particularly how the Chinese have reacted
to possible Dalai Lama visits elsewhere and how they might
react to one to Mongolia.
SLUTZ