Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TUNIS80
2006-01-17 15:32:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

SECULARIST-ISLAMIST DIVIDE IN NEW DEMOCRACY

Tags:  KDEM PHUM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3479
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHTU #0080/01 0171532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171532Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9534
INFO RUEHMEP/THE MIDDLE EAST PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0306
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1097
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1506
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 3919
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL PRIORITY 0047
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 1098
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000080 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SECULARIST-ISLAMIST DIVIDE IN NEW DEMOCRACY
NETWORK

Classified By: Peter Mulrean, Director, MEPI Regional Office, Reasons 1
.4 b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TUNIS 000080

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/17/2016
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PREL
SUBJECT: SECULARIST-ISLAMIST DIVIDE IN NEW DEMOCRACY
NETWORK

Classified By: Peter Mulrean, Director, MEPI Regional Office, Reasons 1
.4 b and d.


1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Network of Democrats in
the Arab World was officially launched in Casablanca on
December 17, 2005. Funded by DRL, the network brings
together democracy activists of both "secular" and "Islamist"
leanings. While differences between those two camps emerged
quickly around the details of the network,s organization,
charter, etc., participants also found significant common
ground on the importance of promoting democracy in the face
of challenges from both authoritarian regimes and Islamic
extremists. They have formed working groups to hash out the
details of the network,s founding documents and work plans,
which will be adopted when they meet again in Istanbul in
April. The conference exposed the difficulties secularists
and Islamists face in attempts to collaborate on promoting
democratic reform, given disagreement on significant
underlying philosophical issues. At the same time,
participants demonstrated a determination to overcome
differences in order to build moderate alternatives in the
middle of the political spectrum. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.


2. (U) Note: This cable uses the term "Islamist" with some
hesitation, but for lack of a better word. Individual
participants in the Casablanca conference who are described
as Islamist have views ranging from full commitment to an
open, democratic system, which they believe is compatible
with a personal pursuit of Islam; to those who are seeking a
democratic system that can accommodate Islamic practices more
formally; to a couple, who seem interested in finding a
hybrid that includes democratic practices, but is consistent
with Sharia law.

--------------
LAUNCHING A NETWORK
--------------


3. (SBU) On December 16-17, 62 Arab democracy activists and
four observers, including representatives from DRL and the
MEPI Regional Office in Tunis, attended a conference in
Casablanca to discuss the formal constitution of the "Network
of Democrats in the Arab World" (NDAW). Creation of the
network is the objective of a DRL-funded project being
implemented by U.S.-based NGOs Partners for Democratic Change

(PDC) and the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy
(CSID). While never stated explicitly, the objective is also
to bridge differences between secularists and Islamists who
are committed to democracy. The hope is that they can make
common cause in a pan-Arab network that will expand from
conference participants to include other NGOs and individuals
concerned with the promotion of democracy in the Arab World.
Discussions included development of a network charter and
statutes, as well as a short-term work plan to include
training, reports and publications and future meetings.


4. (U) The Casablanca meeting was an expansion of a September
gathering arranged by CSID, when 15 Arab activists in the
fields of democracy and human rights -- including both
leading secularist and Islamists -- met in Amman to discuss
development of the network. While the Casablanca conference
was the official launch of the new network, there was no
agreement on the charter, statutes and other key issues.

--------------
SHAKY ON THE LAUNCHING PAD
--------------


5. (SBU) Several procedural differences among participants
were related to the role of CSID. One major point of
contention had to do with the structure of the proposed
network. As initially conceived in the agreement with DRL,
the Network was to be led by CSID, as the organizing body,
and to include a Coordination Committee of 15 members, in
addition to several working groups (e.g., Membership, Parties
and Associations, Training and Capacity Building, Advocacy,
Constitutional Reform, Funding). Two offices are to be
created, in Jordan and Morocco. While there was general
agreement on the need for such a network, an overwhelming
majority at the conference opposed the idea of CSID
controlling this new entity.


6. (SBU) Participants suggested instead that a General
Committee be formed, with controlling members elected once

TUNIS 00000080 002 OF 003


the charter and statutes were approved. Participants
agreed to split into the several working groups to outline
activities and develop a common schedule. Subcommittees were
constituted to design the charter and statutes, to promote
the network among Arab NGO,s active in the field of
democracy and human rights, and to conduct a public advocacy
campaign to attract donor attention and funds. The next
meeting will take place in Istanbul in April, when working
groups will submit their reports and the charter and statutes
are expected to be adopted. The immediate objective is to
register the network legally and start collecting membership
requests and fees from participants to reach a membership
base of 1,000 within one year.


7. (C) During the conference, it was clear that for many
secularist participants, some of the concern about CSID had
to do with its views on Islam. They wondered whether CSID
could accurately reflect the full range of views of the
proposed network, since they view CSID as having Islamist
leanings, however moderate. Interestingly, at the same time,
a number of the Islamists expressed wariness about CSID,
which they felt had made too many "concessions" to secularism
in its approach.

--------------
COMMON GROUND NONETHELESS
--------------


8. (SBU) In spite of the differences, the network,s
initiators were able to identify essential common ground
around a set of objectives, including a variety of ways to
move forward in the face of authoritarian regimes and to
support persecuted democrats and human rights activists
across the Arab World. Throughout the conference,
interactions between the Islamist and secularist
representatives were seen as extremely positive and
productive, not only during the official sessions, but also
during breaks and after working hours. While Islamists
represented about two-thirds of the participants, the
discussions were balanced, with everyone participating
including critical comments by each group of the other --
aided in large part by the skills of the moderators -- until
a consensus could be reached.


9. (SBU) The key theme for the gathering emerged from
remarks by opening speakers: it is essential for all Arab
democrats to move beyond their differences regarding the role
of religion and work together to face authoritarian regimes.
Participants stressed that present regimes have been taking
advantage of weak opposition, which is scattered in a
multitude of parties and entities, resulting in the waste of
resources and competences. There was strong consensus that
Arab activists should focus on three major areas:
-- countering misrepresentations about Islam inside and
outside the region;
-- engaging the West where its interests overlapped with the
interests of the Arab world; and
-- encouraging youth to become more active in public life.


10. (SBU) A lively, but collegial, Islamist-secularist
debate permeated the sessions. When some speakers preached
the democratic values of Islam and the virtues of Muslim
theories, they were immediately countered by "secular" ideas,
especially regarding freedom of thought and choice.
Participants agreed that democracy can in no way be imposed
from outside, although learning from others, experiences
should be recommended. Apart from one Moroccan, Mohamed
Yatim, MP for the Islamist Party for Justice and Development,
all expressed appreciation for DRL funding of the conference.
Participants even selected the MEPI RO representative to
moderate the working session on financing. MEPI information
packets were distributed to all participants, and 10
individual meetings were held to further describe MEPI,s
goals and programs.

--------------
Key Players
--------------


11. (C) Due to CSID,s role in launching the network, Radwan
Masmoudi, CSID President, was the main actor prior to the
conference in designing the list of participants,
coordinating the program, and ensuring logistical support.
Masmoudi contends that democracy and Islam are not only

TUNIS 00000080 003 OF 003


compatible, but that Islam in fact requires democratic
practices by its faithful. The key is finding a way to
promote these democratic values inspired by Islam in the face
of both authoritarian governments and Islamic extremists.
During the conference, three other figures emerged as key
actors during debates:
-- Dr. Fayez Al Rabeh, former Jordanian Ambassador and
currently Secretary General of the Amman-based Moderation
Assembly for Thought and Culture, an NGO trying to build up
an international moderate Islamists, network, including
activists from South-East Asia, Sudan and the Middle East.
Dr. Al Rabeh was lobbying to place Jordanian activists from
the pro-Islamic and centrist Al Ghad party in the different
sub-committees.
-- Amel Aouidha, an Egyptian woman journalist and researcher,
working for the Cairo Al Ahram, active in the Nationalist
movement, espousing pan-Arab views and support for a clear
separation of church and state. Amel,s role in the Network
will focus on coordinating advocacy and research
-- Mohsen Marzouk, a Tunisian activist working for Freedom
House, with strong secularist views, completely opposed to
the use of religion in politics.
Other key players included the Tunisian moderate Islamist
Slaheddine Jourchi (the Network,s spokesperson),the
Jordanian secularist Samir Al Jarrah (coordinating the
Charter subcommittee),and the Algerian Islamist Abderrazzak
Kassoum, Member of Parliament on behalf of the Algerian party
Hamas.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The Casablanca meeting laid bare the challenges
facing attempts by Islamist and secularist camps to
collaborate, even when they can agree on priority areas for
common action. Despite all the collegiality, there is no
denying underlying wariness by each side of the other. At
the same time, the participants demonstrated a determination
to try to focus on the common ground and find a modus
operandi that will allow them to support each other,s
efforts. They realize that the political spectrum across
most of the region has had the middle excised, excluding
moderates of all stripes. This often leaves people with a
"false choice" between the extremes of maintaining an
authoritarian regime or turning to a radical Islamist
alternative. While many participants with whom we spoke are
sanguine that this experiment could fail if their
philosophical differences are insurmountable, they believe it
is a potentially important step in the fight to create the
moderate "middle band" with broad appeal. Most previous
attempts to forge democratic forces in the center have not
enjoyed cooperation between secularists and Islamists, nor
have they attempted to directly address how Islam and
democracy are compatible.


13. (C) The network will certainly last as long as the
current funding brings it together. Its ultimate success and
sustainability, however, will depend on a combination of
getting some of the details right early on and managing the
secularist/Islamist differences in a way that keeps the
network,s eye on the longer-term democratic goal. In the
short term, the efforts by the working groups on the charter,
statutes, financing, and action plan will be essential. If
the April meeting in Istanbul can demonstrate strong
consensus on both the founding principles and road ahead, the
network will be able to move beyond internal debate to the
real work of promoting the democratic midle.
HUDSON