Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TUNIS2970
2006-12-27 15:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

EXXONMOBIL STIFLED BY EXCESSIVE GOT REGULATION,

Tags:  EINV EPET ETRD BEXP TS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTU #2970/01 3611503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 271503Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2394
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI PRIORITY 0829
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 7377
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1225
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0816
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1682
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 8287
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0021
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 4034
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 002970 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS) AND EB/CBA (WINSTEAD AND BEHRENS)
STATE PASS USTR (BELL),USPTO (ADLIN AND ADAMS),USAID
(MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON),ADVOCACY CTR (JAMES),
AND CLDP (TEJTEL)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: EINV EPET ETRD BEXP TS
SUBJECT: EXXONMOBIL STIFLED BY EXCESSIVE GOT REGULATION,
MAY GIVE UP ON TUNISIA


Classified By: Classified by CDA David Ballard for Reasons 1.4b and d.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TUNIS 002970

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS) AND EB/CBA (WINSTEAD AND BEHRENS)
STATE PASS USTR (BELL),USPTO (ADLIN AND ADAMS),USAID
(MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON),ADVOCACY CTR (JAMES),
AND CLDP (TEJTEL)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2016
TAGS: EINV EPET ETRD BEXP TS
SUBJECT: EXXONMOBIL STIFLED BY EXCESSIVE GOT REGULATION,
MAY GIVE UP ON TUNISIA


Classified By: Classified by CDA David Ballard for Reasons 1.4b and d.


1. (C) Summary: In a December 20 meeting with EconOff,
ExxonMobil Tunisia Director General Arnaud Blouin lamented
the difficulty of doing business in Tunisia and questioned
whether ExxonMobil has a future in Tunisia. Blouin presented
a laundry list of complaints ranging from Central Bank
currency transfer regulations to restrictions on franchises,
all of which have kept ExxonMobil Tunisia in the red since

2003. In light of the slow pace of reform and GOT inaction,
Blouin pondered whether ExxonMobil Tunisia would join the
nearly 20 other African countries where ExxonMobil has
divested its holdings. End Summary.


2. (C) In a December 20 meeting with EconOff, ExxonMobil
Tunisia Chairman Arnaud Blouin provided an overview of the
company's current lackluster performance in Tunisia and
expressed frustration with the excessive GOT regulation that
prevented the company from returning to profitability.
Blouin, a French national, confided that ExxonMobil Tunisia
has not been profitable since 2003. In Tunisia, declining
fuel demand combined with the highly regulated price
structure keeps margins low and prevents fuel sales from
being profitable for ExxonMobil. Currently, oil must be
purchased from the state-owned refinery near Bizerte at a
fixed price, transport costs are fixed, and the price at the
pump is also set by the GOT. In addition, for security
purposes, ExxonMobil is required by the GOT to maintain a two
month stock of fuel, excess inventory which serves as yet an
another impediment to profitability. Blouin also noted that
while ExxonMobil Tunisia has not appeared profitable to its
corporate headquarters, in Tunisia, the company's books show

a small profit. The Central Bank restricts payment for labor
performed elsewhere, preventing ExxonMobil Tunisia from
paying corporate charges for services, such as accounting or
other back office operations, provided by ExxonMobil's
Houston headquarters. Due to this restriction ExxonMobil
Tunisia can only pay dividends, which keeps it in the red
according to the corporate balance sheets. Blouin lamented
that this accounting problem may jeopardize the company's
future in Tunisia as corporate shareholders view successive
years of negative performance.


3. (C) Due to the limited profitability of fuel sales
worldwide, ExxonMobil has developed a successful chain of gas
station convenience stores, which operate under the moniker
"On the Run." In 2004, seeking an opportunity to return to
profitability, ExxonMobil Tunisia proposed making a 30
million USD investment in eight "On the Run" convenience
stores. While at first the Ministry of Commerce was eager to
support the project, the enthusiasm cooled once the Ministry
realized that the investment would run counter to the GOT's
restriction on franchising operations. Although ExxonMobil
Tunisia's study projected that 500 workers would be directly
employed by this investment, the Ministry of Commerce has
thus far refused to grant the necessary permission. Blouin
noted, however, that the Ministry of Commerce proposed
finding a Tunisian partner to take a 51 percent share, after
which the project could proceed.


4. (C) Blouin expressed frustration not just with the
regulations themselves, but with the GOT decision-making
process in general. Blouin recounted meeting with numerous
GOT officials, none of whom could take the final decision or
even point him towards the person with the ultimate authority
to take action on any of ExxonMobil's concerns. Not
surprisingly, ExxonMobil has received no response from the
GOT on these proposals. While Blouin surmised that at this
point no response is better than a negative response, after
more than two years of meetings Exxon believes it is no
closer to receiving the necessary permissions.


5. (C) Comment: ExxonMobil's complaints echo those of many

TUNIS 00002970 002 OF 002


investors and illustrate the difficulty of doing business in
Tunisia. Price controls, foreign ownership restrictions,
restrictions on franchising, and Central Bank currency
controls all inhibit private enterprise and prevent companies
such as ExxonMobil from operating effectively. Despite
encouraging GOT statements about liberalization and reform,
Tunisia has been slow to lift the excessive regulation that
creates these types of barriers to private investment.
Moreover, arbitrary application of restrictions on
franchising continues to frustrate American businesses, who
have been loathe to accept the requisite partnership with a
well-connected Tunisian in order to receive GOT permission.
The slow pace of economic reform represents a deliberate
choice on the part of the GOT; however, Tunisia will pay the
price for the failure to quickly address the concerns of the
foreign business community if companies such as ExxonMobil
are unable to justify their continued presence in the country.


6. (C) Comment (cont'd): Yet, frustration with the GOT
extends beyond just the excessive burden of regulations. GOT
decision-making processes continue to be shrouded in mystery,
with little insight into how decisions are made or who makes
them. This lack of transparency exists not only in the
Ministry of Commerce, but is mirrored throughout every level
of the government. While a serious threat to leave Tunisia
could be enough to force GOT acquiescence to ExxonMobil
demands, history demonstrates that at times the GOT will act
against its overall economic self-interest. Examples such as
the firm refusal to allow McDonald's entry unless it accepted
a partnership with the GOT's preferred Tunisian businessman
or the failure to prevent the departure of a short-lived
Pizza Hut franchise are not encouraging to US businesses.
The lack of transparency surrounding these decisions makes it
difficult, if not impossible, to extrapolate the ultimate
decision of this government. End Comment.
BALLARD