SIGNS OF INCREASED PRESS FREEDOM, BUT TUNISIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 000227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO (GRAY),NEA/MAG (GERMAINE,LAWRENCE),
NEA/PPD (FERNANDEZ, SMITH, AGNEW),NEA/PI (MULENEX, KIRBY),
NEA/PA, NEA/IPA, I/GNA, DRL, CWG-PD
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM KPAO EAID PHUM KMPI TS
SUBJECT: SIGNS OF INCREASED PRESS FREEDOM, BUT TUNISIAN
JOURNALISTS ARE SKEPTICAL

REF: A) TUNIS 2450 (2005) B) TUNIS 2395 (2005)

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Hudson; reasons 1.4 (b) & (d)

1.(C) Summary: Over the past three months, the GOT has taken
small, but public steps to improve the situation of the
media. The steps include the legislative removal of depot
legal (prior review) for Tunisian print media (Ref A),a
highly publicized campaign on the part of newly-appointed
Minister of Communications Rafaa Dekhil to reach out to
Tunisian journalists, the announcement of the creation of a
new Journalists' Union, an increase in funding for opposition
papers, and an increase in financial assistance for
journalists. These steps were greeted, however, with
skepticism on the part of Tunisian journalists who were
hesitant to believe that the GOT was really easing
restrictions on press freedom in the country. The January 18
GOT seizure of two Tunisian newspapers from the newsstands
further convinced an already skeptical media corps that the
GOT has no real intention to relinquish its control over the
press. Embassy officials have noted what appears to be
reduced laudatory coverage of Presidential activities (a
subject that has traditionally dominated the front pages) and
the apparent testing -- however tentative -- of expanded red
lines for reporting that has resulted in increased critical
coverage of social and economic issues. Tunisian
journalists, however, are quick to assure us that
self-censorship on the part of both writers and editors is
still pervasive and that the GOT continues to dictate what
can and cannot be written in the local press. End Summary.

What Appear to Be Positive Signs
--------------
2.(U) In his speech on November 7, 2005, President Ben Ali
announced several measures to "promote pluralism in the
media." These steps included the creation of a new cultural
radio station, an increase in financial assistance available
for Tunisian journalists, and an increase in government
funding for opposition newspapers. The most significant of
these measures, however, was the start of the legislative
process to lift prior review (depot legal) for Tunisian print
media. (NB: Ben Ali had originally announced the end of depot
legal for the print media in May 2005. Depot legal continues
to remain in force for books and foreign press). The
Tunisian media closely followed the legislative process
involved in removing the depot legal requirement from the
law, giving front page coverage to the bill's examination in
Parliament and its subsequent signing into law by President
Ben Ali on January 12, 2006.


3. (SBU) The past three months also witnessed several other
developments on the media scene. Rafaa Dekhil, Minister of
Communications and Relations with the Chamber of Deputies and
the Chamber of Advisors (a ministry that was created in
August 2005),engaged in almost weekly meetings with a wide
range of Tunisian journalists, newspapers, and media
organizations, all advertised as aimed at improving the
situation of journalists and the press in Tunisia. On
January 4, newspapers reported that the Secretary General of
the Tunisian Labor Union (UGTT) had announced the creation of
a Journalists' Union in 2006. (NB: Such a union has been in
discussion for close to ten years, but had never been
formally announced.) The clear message for the public was
that the GOT was seriously engaging with the fourth estate to
find ways to improve the situation of the press in Tunisia.

4.(C) Since November, Embassy staff also observed reporting
in the Tunisian press on previously-taboo subjects. The
first private television station in Tunisia, TV Hannibal,
crossed redlines in its Ramadan programming, without any
apparent repercussions. These redlines included taking
cameras into the homes of poor Tunisians to observe how they
celebrated Ramadan and airing a miniseries that referred (via
subtle innuendo) to previously untouchable topics as the
influence of the Trabelsi family (the First Lady's family)
and the failure of the GOT to provide assistance to the
public during the 2003 floods. TV Hannibal and the Tunisian
written press also recently covered previously taboo social
issues such as family violence, poor public hospital
conditions and unwanted pregnancies. Also, in December and
early January, we noted that newspaper coverage of President
Ben Ali's daily activities was no longer dominating all of
Tunisian media and that his photo was not in its regular
place above the fold in every newspaper. Newspapers openly
debated the issue of rising olive oil prices and some
editorials began to address sensitive issues such as

democracy in the Arab world, the poor state of the Tunisian
media and the need for reform in the press. In December, we
counted at least three editorials in the mainstream press
that directly criticized the current state of the press and
civil society in Tunisia, all without repercussions. The
December Parliamentary meetings received wide coverage and
included the views of the opposition parties, and "Al Mawqif"
and "Attariq Attajdid" regularly published newspapers full of
pointed criticism of the GOT.

Journalists Skeptical
--------------
5.(C) Tunisian journalists, however, remain cynical about
these apparent signs of improvement. All of them dismiss the
end of depot legal as having little effect on their work, and
most argue that Minister Dekhil will never have the influence
or power to reverse what is perceived to be President Ben
Ali's intention to control the media. Many of our contacts
argue that the public is not watching TV Hannibal and that,
in any case, due to his relation by marriage to the First
Lady, TV Hannibal's owner will never take the lead on
challenging the regime. Contacts tend to agree that social
issues were being more openly treated but caution that such
coverage will cease if it ever touches GOT interest in
preserving its image in the eyes of the public. Journalists
dismiss those editorials that we found daring, arguing that
they were allowed to run in newspapers with poor circulation
and that the courage of one or two editors could in no way be
viewed as a change in self-censorship. Finally, journalists
tell us that the President's photo had been absent from the
front page simply because he had few public engagements
during the period in question. (Comment: In the past,
presidential inactivity has never stopped Tunisian newspapers
from daily publication of the President's portrait or other
stock presidential photos. End comment.)

6.(C) Journalists have told us that the GOT continues to
directly and indirectly control the coverage of domestic
events. Examples are abundant. A journalist at the most
widely-read Tunisian newspaper, privately owned Arabic
language "Ash Shourouq" told the IO that most of his articles
on the December Parliamentary meetings were censored. (Note:
"Ash Shourouq" is supposedly read by around 800,000 Tunisians
each day. This takes into account the daily circulation of
80,000 and the fact that each paper is believed to be read by
10 people. Given its wide public influence, it is tightly
controlled by the GOT despite being privately-owned.) Good
contacts at both "Ash Shourouq" and its sister
French-language daily "Le Quotidien" reported that
recently-published editorials attacking opposition figures
were drafted and sent to the newspapers by the GOT.
Journalists also recalled that important domestic issues such
as the continued activity of the October 18 movement (Ref B)
and a recent debate on the use of the hijab by Tunisian women
were absent from the Tunisian press. (Comment: The GOT
position on the hijab was presented and defended, but the
opposing view was not provided. End Comment.)

Worst Fears Confirmed
--------------
7.(C) On January 18, the GOT seized all of the copies of two
Tunisian newspapers (mainstream weekly "Al Akhbar Al
Joumhouriya" and opposition weekly "Al Mawqif") from the
newsstands apparently based on their articles on the possible
rise in bread prices in the coming months. Rumor has it that
the GOT found these articles, which were published close to
the anniversary of the 1984 bread riots, to have been too
provocative. These seizures have served to transform
skepticism on the part of Tunisian journalists to a complete
conviction that the GOT will never release its grip on the
Tunisian press. Contacts note that seizures send two
important messages: the GOT is closely monitoring the press
and the GOT is unafraid of publicly demonstrating its tight
control of the media. These two messages serve to reinforce
other fears (based on existing precedents) that plague
Tunisian journalists, such as the possibility of losing their
jobs, negative repercussions on family members, and possible
imprisonment.


Journalists Unwilling to Mobilize
--------------
8.(C) Despite a palpable sense of frustration, Tunisian
journalists appear resigned to their fate, at least, as some
note, until Ben Ali departs office. During a January
gathering of 15 journalists, the newsstand seizures dominated

the discussion. When the IO asked what action the Tunisian
Journalists Association (AJT) would take in response to the
seizures, an AJT board member who was present replied that
there would be no reaction. The question was raised whether
the journalists could present their concerns to Minister
Dekhil, but this idea was quickly dismissed. Journalists
simply repeated the same refrain: "This is the situation in
which we live. It is never going to change."

Glimmer of Hope Remains
--------------
9.(C) In conversations with close to 20 journalists over the
past months, only one note of optimism was expressed. Jamel
Arfaoui, a journalist at a government-owned newspaper and a
member of AJT, informed the IO that, since the WSIS,
journalists were beginning to debate among themselves issues
that used to be untouchable. Arfaoui felt that fear was
dissipating and that, given time, these private debates might
become more public.

Comment
--------------
10.(C) The GOT's recent engagement on press freedom is likely
a result of both USG pressure and a post-WSIS realization on
the part of the GOT that they can no longer control every
aspect of news coverage of Tunisia. Recent news coverage of
previously censored domestic issues such as a sudden spike in
consumer olive oil prices and scandalous hospital conditions
indicates that the GOT has moved its redlines back to allow
Tunisian press coverage of certain social and economic
subjects. The remaining (unspoken but widely known)
redlines, however, remain and continue to encompass coverage
of opposition movements, debate on government policy, and
mention of the First Lady's family. The recent GOT seizures
of newspapers in order to limit information on news that the
government deems potentially destabilizing and the continuing
manipulation of private newspapers to discredit opposition
movements are clear signs of the GOT intention to continue to
control the media when it comes to politically-sensitive
issues.

11.(C) It is unfortunate that most local journalists continue
to play their customary role of self-censorship and
resignation to a situation which, in their eyes, cannot be
changed by anyone but the President. While this reaction, or
lack of reaction, on the part of journalists is the natural
legacy of over fifteen years of tight and heavy-handed GOT
control of the media and civil society, the situation of the
press in Tunisia cannot evolve if the journalists themselves
are unwilling to acknowledge movement on the part of the GOT,
miss small windows of opportunity to push the redlines that
exist, and refuse to publicly react to GOT actions such as
the seizure of newspapers. The challenge for the USG is to
continue to find ways to further engage both the GOT and
Tunisian journalists on the need for a free and responsible
press.
HUDSON