MODERATE ISLAMISTS SEEK DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 002155

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG (HARRIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TS
SUBJECT: MODERATE ISLAMISTS SEEK DIALOGUE WITH U.S. ON
DEMOCRATIC REFORM

REF: TUNIS 2144

Classified By: CDA David Ballard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In a meeting hosted in Tunis by
Washington-based Center for Islam and Democracy President
Radwan Masmoudi, several self-described "moderate Islamists",
including a founding member of the banned Tunisian Islamist
party An-Nahdha, sought out Embassy officials to "reopen a
dialogue" they claimed had been disrupted after the GOT
persecution of An-Nahdha in the early 1990s. While
recognizing "great differences" between the USG and Tunisian
Islamists, particularly with regard to the recent fighting in
Lebanon and the war in Iraq, the Tunisian participants
emphasized areas of common interests, zeroing in on the
promotion of democracy and human rights in Tunisia. The
group gave Emboffs their assurances that they and the
organizations they represent are all opposed to the use of
violence. End Summary.

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Moderate Islamists' Pitch for Dialogue
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2. (C/NF) On August 15, Pol/EconCouns and Poloff met with
self-described "moderate Tunisian Islamists," including Saida
Akremi, of the International Association for the Support of
Political Prisoners; Slaheddine Jourchi, a journalist and
civil society leader who, while once a member of an-Nahdha,
said he had broken with the party due to a number of
ideological differences and had become a member of the now
defunct Progressive Islamist Party; and Zied Doulatli, a
founding member of An-Nahdha who in 2004 was released from
prison after serving 15 years, more than half of which were
in solitary confinement. The meeting was arranged by Radwan
Masmoudi, a Tunisian-American who lives in the U.S. and heads
the Washington, D.C.-based Center for the Study of Islam and
Democracy. Masmoudi is a long-time Embassy contact and MEPI
grantee.


3. (C) The moderate Islamists who came together for this
meeting made clear that they were seeking out Embassy
officials to "reopen a dialogue," with an emphasis on areas
of common interest. They expressed that they were pursuing
this dialogue, "despite great differences" over U.S. policy
in the region, particularly with regard to the recent
fighting in Lebanon and the war in Iraq, but also vis-a-vis
perceived U.S. support for repressive regimes in the Middle
East. They claimed that their previously robust relations
with the Embassy, which in the mid-1980s had included
dialogues with visiting Members of Congress, had been
disrupted after the GOT persecution of An-Nahdha in the early
1990s. They gave their assurances that they, along with the
groups that they represent, are all opposed to the use of
violence.

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Tunisia as Model for Democracy
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4. (C/NF) Reprising many of our own arguments, Zied Doulatli
made the case that Tunisia could serve as a model for
democratic reform in the Middle East. As a result of its
homogenous nature, he argued, the environment in Tunis was
more receptive to democracy than any other Arab country.
Acknowledging that he was pointing out the obvious, he noted
that Tunisia is not a monarchy, and that it does not have
different sects: "We are all Sunni, and all of the Maliki
school." Moreover, he said, there are not great differences
between the country's intellectual elites, be they secular or
Islamist: "We are all graduates of the Bourgiba school,
grounded in European values of democracy and human rights."
Finally, he said, the fact that Tunisia, unlike other Arab
countries, is "ninety percent secular," is an "encouraging
factor" with respect to the prospects for the development of
genuine democracy. (Comment: The irony of this last
statement, coming from an Islamist, was not lost on Emboffs,
but if it registered with our interlocutors, they did not let
it show. It was all the more so when Doulatli later claimed
that, although an-Nahdha did not currently exist as a
functional organization in Tunisia, it still enjoyed broad
support throughout the country and had won 60 percent of the
vote when it ran in the 1989 national election. Most
observers estimate the true percentage to be somewhere
between 15 and 30 percent. End Comment.)

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What's in it for the U.S?
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5.(C/NF) Turning to their perceptions of U.S. interests in
the region, the Tunisian meeting participants stated their
view that the U.S. needs to re-establish trust and
credibility in the Middle East, especially following its
perceived acquiescence to Israeli attacks on Lebanese
civilians. "For those of us who believe in democracy,
watching the events unfold in Lebanon over the last month has
been synonymous with torture." Given what they called the
damage to the U.S. image in the region, they made the case
that the USG "needs" a successful model of democracy in the
Middle East.


6. (C/NF) Positing that the USG had initially intended that
Iraq would serve this purpose, Zied Doulatli reasoned that
Tunisia would be a more appropriate model, given that the
Arab world tends to equate America's campaign for democracy
with the violence and instability that exist in Iraq, which
does not make it an enticing proposition on the Arab street.
Moreover, he argued, it is in all of our interests to have an
alternative to Bin Ladenism. In the absence of democratic
space that would allow any kind of alternative, the younger
generation is increasingly drawn to jihadist groups, such as
al-Qaeda he said, "even in Tunisia. "


7. (C) Beyond seeking to re-establish dialogue with the
Embassy, the group asked for USG support in the following
areas:

-- Supporting human rights defenders. (In this context, they
expressed appreciation that the United States had been the
first country to speak out on behalf of the October 18 hunger
strikers.)
-- Advocating the release of political prisoners.
-- Advocating freedom of movement of several specific
moderate Islamist leaders who have been denied passports
and/or confined to specific governors. (In some cases family
members are penalized, as well.)
-- Visiting one such moderate Islamist who is prevented from
traveling outside of Sousse.
-- Inclusion of moderate Islamists on Embassy guest lists and
U.S. visits.

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Comment
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8. (C/NF) As we conveyed to our interlocutors in this
meeting, we were pleased that they took the initiative to
reach out to us. Although this was the first formalized
approach to the U.S. Embassy by self-described "moderate
Islamists," we have met with Jourchi and Akremi; indeed, the
President of AISPP, for whom Akremi works, was a guest at
Embassy's July 4 reception. In addition, we have often met
with contacts with similar political tendencies, such as
representatives of the Movement of 18 October.


9. (C) As in our August 17 meeting with Tunisian civil
society activists (reftel),the participants were clearly
genuine in their desire to find common ground, in spite of
their strongly held positions regarding recent events in
Lebanon and Iraq. We agree with their view that Tunisia has
the potential to serve as a positive role model for
democratic reform in the region. Indeed, the priority we
attach to this goal is reflected in our MPP. Given our
experience in trying to encourage this process through a
variety of policies and programs, however, we are less
sanguine than our interlocutors about the prospects for
success in the near term. Post will continue to look for
appropriate opportunities to include confirmed moderate
Islamists in our outreach, while remaining mindful of GOT
sensitivities. (None of our interlocutors is "illegal" in
the GOT's eyes, but all are suspect.) We are also mindful of
the obvious political motivations of our Islamist
interlocutors, given that Doulatli claimed that 60 percent of
Tunisians voted for an-Nahdha in 1989. End Comment.
BALLARD