Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TUNIS1650
2006-07-03 09:49:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tunis
Cable title:  

FREEDOM AGENDA QUARTERLY REPORT

Tags:  PREL KDEM PGOV KMPI KPAO TS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0009
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #1650/01 1840949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030949Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1164
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 7241
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1164
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1596
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 8172
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0702
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 001650 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG - HARRIS, NEA/FO, NEA/PI
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV KMPI KPAO TS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA QUARTERLY REPORT

REF: A. TUNIS 1565


B. TUNIS 1425

C. TUNIS 1424

D. TUNIS 1402

E. TUNIS 1390

F. TUNIS 1308

G. TUNIS 1255

H. TUNIS 1254

I. TUNIS 1253

J. TUNIS 1252

K. TUNIS 1238

L. TUNIS 1220

M. TUNIS 1204

N. TUNIS 1021

O. TUNIS 816

P. TUNIS 808

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HUDSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)


C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 001650

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG - HARRIS, NEA/FO, NEA/PI
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/02/2016
TAGS: PREL KDEM PGOV KMPI KPAO TS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA QUARTERLY REPORT

REF: A. TUNIS 1565


B. TUNIS 1425

C. TUNIS 1424

D. TUNIS 1402

E. TUNIS 1390

F. TUNIS 1308

G. TUNIS 1255

H. TUNIS 1254

I. TUNIS 1253

J. TUNIS 1252

K. TUNIS 1238

L. TUNIS 1220

M. TUNIS 1204

N. TUNIS 1021

O. TUNIS 816

P. TUNIS 808

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM HUDSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)



1. (C) SUMMARY: The one year anniversary of our Freedom
Agenda was marked by increased USG engagement and continued
GOT stagnation on political reform. This quarter, post
continued its active engagement of the GOT, which was
reinforced by Deputy Secretary Zoellick during his May visit
and the visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary Gray in June.
Positive steps were also taken to increase EU cooperation on
Freedom Agenda goals in Tunisia, and civil society activists
continued to speak out. Despite these efforts, the GOT did
not take any positive steps and reports of civil society
harassment and intimidation continued. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) HIGH LEVEL ENGAGEMENT: This quarter was marked by the
highest level State Department engagement in Tunisia since
the December 2003 visit of former Secretary Powell. During
his May 18-19 visit, Deputy Secretary Zoellick recommended
reconfiguring a multifaceted dialogue with the GOT to include
economic and social reform, human rights, and political
reform. The Deputy Secretary also made it clear to the GOT
that the "quality of our relationship will depend on moving
forward with political reform." Typically sensitive to any
criticism, Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali
acknowledged that the GOT "made some mistakes", but did not
indicate any positive progress on reform would be
forthcoming. The Deputy Secretary also met with civil
society representatives to encourage their efforts to promote
political reform (Refs G,H,I,J).


3. (C) NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary Gordon Gray reinforced

Zoellick's engagement during his June 27-28 visit to Tunisia.
DAS Gray raised our key Freedom Agenda goals with Deputy
Foreign Minister for the Americas and Asia, Saida Chtioui,
and also discussed our efforts with Tunisian contacts
(septels). Additionally, in response to continued GOT
harassment of civil society activists, on April 3 the
Department issued a statement criticizing these actions and
calling on the GOT "to take actions consistent with its
declared intentions to engage in democratic reform.
Throughout the quarter, post raised USG concerns about
restrictions on freedom of expression and association with a
wide variety of GOT and private interlocutors. For World
Press Freedom Day, post organized a successful May 4 DVC for
independent journalists with NEA/PPD Director Alberto
Fernandez (Ref K).


4. (C) Further, the Ambassador and other emboffs raised our
Freedom Agenda priorities in a number of meetings with GOT
officials and met with a wide variety of civil society
activists in support of our Freedom Agenda goals. From
attending NGO events to meeting one-on-one with activists
facing GOT harassment to discussing our efforts with local
journalists, post's support for key civil society entities
continued throughout the quarter. For example, Ambassador
and poloffs attended LTDH events and met with multiple LTDH
officials during the quarter. Emboffs were present at the
LTDH court appearance, the Bar Association sit-in, and the
national congress of a feminist organization, which further
demonstrated our commitment to our Freedom Agenda goals to
civil society and the GOT, whose security officials closely
monitor all independent civil society activities (see also
para 7).


5. (C) US/EU COOPERATION: Perhaps in response to the
escalation in GOT-civil society conflict, EU interest in
cooperation on efforts to encourage democratic and human
rights reform grew. On several occasions, EU officials in
Tunisia reached out to discuss how to use joint pressure to
further shared political goals in Tunisia. The European
Commission Head of Delegation and other officials explored
with the Ambassador and DCM greater coordination between US
and EU human rights messages to the GOT (Refs A,E). DAS Gray
met with EU officials in June to follow up on these
discussions and the way ahead (septel).


6. (C) GOT RECALCITRANCE: While civil society entities
appreciated our engagement, the GOT took no positive steps
toward political reform. In fact, no progress on Freedom
Agenda objectives has been noted, and the quarter was marked
by increasing levels of civil society harassment and
intimidation (Ref N). On May 27, the GOT violently blocked a
proposed National Congress of the Tunisian Human Rights
League (LTDH),and prior to the event, the GOT warned
diplomats to avoid the area (Ref F). Further, despite post
and Washington support for the establishment of an
International Republican Institute (IRI) office in Tunisia,
the Tunisian Embassy in Washington informed IRI in June that
the "relevant Tunisian authorities are not ready to examine
IRI's request to establish an office." According to Tunisian
human rights activists, the GOT also tried to exert control
over the independent Tunisian Bar Association by establishing
a new law institute that some lawyers fear would bring
entrance into the Bar Association under government control.


7. (C) CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM: Despite increased constraints,
Tunisian civil society remained active. In response to the
GOT law institute announcement, the Tunisian Bar Association
organized a May sit-in despite a heavy police presence and
reports of numerous physical and verbal assaults (Ref M). On
the margins of a conference held by the Tunisian Association
of Deomcratic Women (ATFD),Tunisian civil society also
expressed its intention to remain unified to advance
political reform goals (Ref C). Meanwhile, in addition to
the GOT blockage of its national congress, LTDH officials
said they expect the legal deadlock to continue indefinitely
(Ref B).


8. (C) OUTLOOK: A year into the Freedom Agenda, Tunisia has
made little progress on our Freedom Agenda goals. While the
GOT tries to give the appearance of a commitment to
democracy, the gap continues to widen between our efforts and
the GOT's willingness to respond and to work to increase
political space. However, the dismissal of a senior Ministry
of Interior official may be a sign to domestic and
international critics that the heavy-handed GOT response to
local activists may be coming to an end (Ref D). While
continuing our efforts to advance the Freedom Agenda goals,
post also awaits Washington guidance on an action plan for
following up on the Deputy Secretary's visit to develop a
strategy to further the goals of the Freedom Agenda.
HUDSON