LIBYAN BANKING SECTOR REFORM: SLOW AND UNSTEADY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000561

NEA/MAG FOR JEN GAVITO

NEA/PI FOR PATTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN ECON EINV LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN BANKING SECTOR REFORM: SLOW AND UNSTEADY


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Prospects for Libyan banking sector reform
remain unsteady and face derailment by systemic economic flaws,
according to a U.S. team working with the Libyan Central Bank on
a reform strategy. Confident in the utility and relevance of
their ongoing work, the professional experts at the same time
have grave doubts about the viability of genuine banking sector
reform in Libya. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff met with McKinsey &
Company Senior Advisor Gregory Wilson and his conduit to the
Libyan Central Bank, Project Director Tarek Ben Halim, on
September 21 to discuss McKinsey's work and the state of Libyan
banking reform. McKinsey is engaged in a Central Bank-funded
study for the reform of the Libyan banking system, including the
potential privatization of state-owned banks, systemic changes
to banking rules and opening the sector to foreign banks.

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Foreign Banks Question Libyan Market Conditions

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3. (SBU) The McKinsey team assesses that the Libyan Central
Bank's top priority is to draw in foreign banks to Libya, and
there is moderate interest from abroad. However, prospective
foreign entrants are immediately confronted by obstacles,
including a dearth of data on the Libyan banking sector,
uncertain terms and conditions for market entry, unclear
regulatory standards and a highly politicized Central Bank with
a history of policy reversals. Some foreign banks are starting
to establish start-up offices in Tripoli (most recently Qatar
National Bank). However, Wilson estimates that it will be at
least 12-18 months before there is a significant foreign bank
presence in Libya (i.e., movement beyond start-up offices).
This timeframe could easily slip if the long-expected roll-out
of a reformed Central Bank national payments program (now four
years in the making) continues to languish. A number of foreign
banks are reportedly awaiting this development before moving
forward in Libya. The McKinsey team's assessment is that the
current system is irretrievably broken. As an example of the
"broke beyond repair" assessment, some bank managers are not
facilitating a McKinsey audit ordered by the Central Bank
senior leadership.

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Property Rights and Other Laws Require Updating to Underpin
Economic Reform

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4. (SBU) The McKinsey team has been careful to conduct
multiple rounds of syndications with GOL officials to solicit
inputs and proposals for his study, and in order to avoid
roadblocks down the road. Thus far, there have been no major
obstacles thrown in the way of his findings. However, the
McKinsey study will almost certainly recommend a major overhaul
of the Central Bank's operations as one of its key
recommendations, and the team is deeply skeptical that there is
GOL appetite to implement real reform. Furthermore, Wilson
estimates that at least fifty percent of the changes necessary
for success lie well beyond the purview of the Central Bank.
The greatest of these is the question of clear property rights.
The lack of clear title for Libyan properties (due in part to
the GOL's destruction of private title records in the late
1980s) greatly complicates work in the real estate, construction
and tourism sectors, as well as all investment therein.

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Training is the Essential Element of Any Proposed Reform

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5. (SBU) Enhanced training will be at the heart of any
successful reform effort. Training is direly needed in the
whole range of relevant skills, as most employees lack basic
competency in financial analysis, international accounting
standards, utilization of balance sheets, and basic information
technology skills. Even the small team of the Central Bank's
"best and brightest" seconded to assist the McKinsey effort
required additional language and technical training. Overall,
regional training locations may emerge as the best options for
Libyan banks, and the Central Bank is leaning towards a
partnership with the Bahraini Monetary Agency toward this end.
[Comment: Funding Libyan financial sector training in the GCC

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and elsewhere, if allowable, could be an effective use of MEPI
Economic Reform pillar funds. End Comment]

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State-Run Bank Ownership Shifted From Central Bank to
Development Fund

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6. (SBU) Both interlocutors conveyed their genuine surprise
and unease at a recent GOL move to transfer the Central Bank's
five state-run banks under the auspices of the state-run
Economic and Social Development Fund. This change was, in their
view, an attempt by the GOL to give the impression that these
banks enjoy some measure of independence from the Central Bank.
However, the team assesses that this was a "paper move" only,
and its greatest practical effect will be to sow confusion among
foreign banks interested in entering the Libyan market.

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Aman Bank Judged Most Efficient

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7. (SBU) One institution that has stood out during McKinsey's
assessment work has been Aman Bank for Commerce and Investment
(HYPERLINK
"BLOCKED::http://bk.abci-ly.com/en/index.aspx "http://bk.abc
i-ly.com/en/index.aspx). Succinctly described as having "the look and
feel of a real bank," privately-owned Aman Bank is far ahead of
the competition in its provision of modern banking services.
Its entire operation is computerized, and it has placed ATMs
across Tripoli and into major cities countrywide. Aman bank
also provides its staff with proper training, including English
language training for all employees.
BERRY