EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S EAC IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000494

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER LY
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S EAC IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY
DAMASCUS

REF: N/A

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, Charge', U.S. Embassy - Tripoli,
DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(g)




1. (SBU) Charge' convened an EAC to discuss Embassy Tripoli's
current security stance in light of the September 12 attack on
Embassy Damascus, and last week's attack near Embassy Kabul.
Present at the EAC were CDA(A),MGT, MED, DAO, RMAS, POL/ECON,
Consular and the Acting RSO.


2. (S/NF) RMAS and RSO advised the EAC on the information that
they received from open sources regarding the attack in
Damascus. RMAS reported that they did not have any credible
threats directed towards Libya.


3. (S/NF) The RSO discussed the current security posture at
post. He briefed on a meeting he and Charge' held earlier in
the day with RSO's security contact (Libyan External Security
Organization (ESO) Col. Nuri Mokhtar) to discuss post's
unresolved security issues. (Note: Since ESO has
responsibilities for diplomatic security in Libya, RSO is
compelled to interface with them rather than Libyan law
enforcement entities on phsyical security matters. End Note.)


4. (S/NF) Below is the detailed list of the issues discussed at
the EAC, in the earlier meeting on the 12th and over the past 24
months. (Several of the issues were raised again with ESO
Director Musa Kusa in a September 13 meeting, see para. 5.)

(a) The Embassy's villa annex (housing RMAS, IRM
classified commo, and DAO classified commo.) is 8 kilometers
from the Embassy and is housed in a villa at the end of a street
terminating in a cul-de-sac. Five months ago, the Embassy
installed a drop-arm device that would restrict access and
afford 30 meters of set-back. The drop-arm was initially
installed with an agreement from the ESO that it could be used
and manned by Embassy staff. Once installed however, the ESO
stated that neither Embassy staff, nor existing ESO guards at
the site would be permitted to operate the drop bar. This
vehicle barrier is currently in the "up" position leaving the
annex vulnerable to a VBIED attack. Post and visiting
delegations have repeatedly raised this problem since the drop
arm's installation.

(b) Additional ESO/law enforcement support was requested
for the annex and the Embassy (housed in the Corinthia Bab
Africa Hotel). The hotel and annex currently have one ESO
vehicle each allotted for protection. The RSO has pointed out
that the vehicle at the Embassy is over 100 yards away and
practically useless in the event of an attack, particularly a
building over-run. More often than not, this vehicle has
unarmed guards without radios. Note: RSO does not consider the
ESO to be adequate in the counterattack realm. The organization
lacks doctrine, training and equipment with regards to
countering an attack. The vehicle placed at the annex is a
small Toyota Corolla and, often but not always, has been used as
a blocking vehicle directly underneath the open drop bar. We
pointed out that the vehicle is a blocking vehicle is a poor
alternative to the purpose-built drop-arm.

(c) The closure of two driveways in front of the hotel (to
afford additional setback for the embassy) was requested. Based
on commercial concerns, the hotel management has been hesitant
to agree to initiate security measures in the hotel. The hotel
currently has three driveways in front of the property. The
first allows vehicles to park directly in front of the hotel
while the second and third driveways are approximately 20 and 40
meters away from the hotel. Last year, the hotel was willing to
close the entrance (but not the exit) end of the first driveway.
Therefore, all three driveways remain open to vehicles and
VBIED attack. We reminded ESO that within 100 feet of the
glass-fronted lobby (well within the first and second drive-way)
a small amount of TNT, or equivalent, would cause devastating
damage to the lobby portion of the hotel.

(d) The Embassy is currently located on floors 5-8 in
tower one of the hotel. An individual departing the common
elevators can enter the Embassy with minimal restriction because
for insurance reasons, the hotel requires that doors be kept
open between the corridors and the elevator area. The Libyan
government (GOL) had prohibited the Embassy from providing its
guards with self-defense tools. Also, the ESO does little to
restrict pedestrian entrance to the elevators. The RSO
requested that all embassy doors be shut and a service elevator
be blocked from reaching embassy floors. During a recent
incident, a female EDP attempted to enter the embassy floors and
speak with the Charge' and it took over twenty mintues to
convince ESO to remove her. We explained to the ESO (and to the
hotel management repeatedly over the past two years) that if the
hallway doors were shut and locked, the embassy would have some
security and access control. The RSO has also raised concerns
that the hotel may be under surveillance.

(e) The ESO liaison officer's response to these requests
were that they would "respond soon." This has been a common,
oft heard response.


5. (S/NF) Charge' used a pre-existing September 14 meeting
between visiting OBO Real Estate Director and External Security
Organization Director Musa Kusa to raise the aforementioned
security issues at a higher level. RMAS Chief and RSOwee alo
pesen. Kusa stated that he would review our requests. After
expressing confidence that the Libyan authorities would never
allow an attack to reach implementation, Kusa questioned the
utility of the drop arm noting that while it would force a
detonation further out toward the street, people would still die
. He eventually allowed that if Libyans living behind the drop
bar do not object, he will allow its operation. He asked ESO BG
Muhammad Ajaj, to report back to him on our hotel-related
requests.


6. (C) Charge also flagged our security concerns for MFA North
America Director Mohammed Al-Ayyaib in a September 13 meeting.
The Embassy will continue to work with the Libyan authorities to
address these security issues.


7. (S/NF) The EAC also discussed the on-going development of
post's Emergency Action Plan along with our current personal
security, especially driving practices. The need to vary routes
and times of embassy vehicles including school buses was
discussed. The EAC also reviewed its motor vehicle policy
regarding transporting EFM's during emergency situations.


8. (S/NF) Without more specific and credible information, the
EAC agreed, that the embassy would remain operational and would
not curtail any of its upcoming events. The EAC proposed that
a meeting with the director of the ESO be requested.


9. (SBU) Post will re-convene the EAC should new information
arise.











BERRY
GOLDRICH