Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TRIPOLI472
2006-09-06 17:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tripoli
Cable title:  

LIBYAN SCIENTISTS DETAIL PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID ENRG ETTC PARM KNNP LY 
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Brooke F Adams 09/07/2006 03:55:53 PM From DB/Inbox: Brooke F Adams

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00472

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: AID AMB DEA ECON IPS LEGAT CONS DAO DCM ORA PA
 OMC RSO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO696
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0472/01 2491753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061753Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1174
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0405
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0004
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1328
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000472 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G, OES
CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDIONE
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ENRG ETTC PARM KNNP LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SCIENTISTS DETAIL PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 459 B) TRIPOLI 454 C) TRIPOLI 201

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000472

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G, OES
CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDIONE
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID ENRG ETTC PARM KNNP LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SCIENTISTS DETAIL PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 459 B) TRIPOLI 454 C) TRIPOLI 201

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Scientists working at the National Bureau for
Research and Development, linked to the General People's
Committee for Manpower, Training and Employment (GPCMET) headed
by Matouq Matouq have used a number of recent meetings to detail
the types of projects that they hoped would result from Libya's
decision to give up its WMD program. They are focused on
developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preparing Libya
for the challenges it faces from an expanding population and
dwindling water supply. During the recent visit of Ambassador
Schulte, reported reftel (a),Matouq and his team asked for
specific projects in the nuclear field as well as a cooperative
agreement to provide an overarching framework. Qadhafi told
Senator Specter during a meeting August 23, reported reftel (b),
that he believed the U.S. had offered to build him nuclear
powered facilities and help with technology transfer to "make
Libya the Japan of North Africa." During a NASA cooperative
effort on solar physics in March, Libyan scientists also
conveyed their wish list of cooperative efforts, reported reftel
(c). A recent meeting of the TSCC Nuclear Subcommittee also
focused on the scope of scientific cooperation desired by
Matouq's team (reported septel).

WHAT LIBYANS WOULD CONSIDER THE "REWARD" FOR GIVING UP WMD?
-------------- --------------
--------------


2. (C) Matouq Matouq and his science advisors, Dr. Ali Gashut,
Director of the National Bureau for Research and Development
(NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed Enami of the NBRD , regularly harangue
U.S. delegations that "the Libyan case is not a good model for
the rest of the world because it received no benefits from its

decision to give up WMD programs." If pressed, many
interlocutors will acknowledge that Libya reaped significant
benefits as sanctions were lifted: trade and investment
opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession,
and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of
mutual interest. However, other interlocutors, including
Qadhafi and officials at the General People's Committee for
Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation fixate on the
"rewards" to open almost any conversation about bilateral
relations. It seems that the Libyan leadership has determined
they need some "deliverables" to show the Libyan people,
especially to counter criticism of the Jamahiriya regime by
Libyan opposition groups, other Arab countries and Iran. While
the Libyan priorities are still primarily technology transfer
and training, they hoped for some specific, large projects that
they could show the Libyan public as the "reward."


3. (C) During the last few months, the Libyans have
highlighted the following activities that they would consider
"reward" for giving up WMD. In their view, if they had these
tangible projects to show the rest of the world, they could then
argue for a "Libya Model" that might apply to other countries.
During a recent meeting with Senator Specter reported septel,
Qadhafi said that he had been told the U.S. and other countries
would build nuclear power plants in Libya and that his country
would become the, "Japan of North Africa."


4. (C) The Libyans would like to see the following projects
supported by the U.S. At times, different Libyan interlocutors
have insisted that the U.S.G. should fund the activities as
compensation of the value of the WMD equipment that we took back
to U.S. In the August 29 meeting between Matouq and Ambassador
Schulte reported reftel (a),Matouq said that Libya had the
funding needed for any of the projects, but it sought technical
assistance and training.

THE LIST OF REWARDS
--------------


5. (C). As a first step, Matouq would like to see feasiblity
studies conducted by U.S. firms for nuclear power generation in
Libya. The list of project priorities also includes the
following:

* nuclear power generation for Libya - possibly for exporting
power to other countries

* nuclear powered water desalination plants

* a nuclear medicine center at the Tripoli Medical Center with
the ability to develop radioactive isotopes.

* solar energy technology for power generation

* solar energy technology for water processing - both
desalination and waste water management

* microsatellites for the Libyan Remote Sensing Center to use
in urban planning and environmental monitoring. They also
request licensing for high-resolution images received by U.S.
satellites to further work in desertification studies and water
resource management.

* technical and scientific training related to desertification
prevention, sandstorm research, desert geology, disaster
monitoring and meterorite studies

* water management projects

* an international project or bilateral project to build a new
telescope in the Libyan desert.


6. (C) Matouq and his team are generally pleased with the
ongoing scientific cooperation projects that are currently
underway on biological life sciences, mechanical engineering,
water management and nuclear medicine, but they are looking for
"big-ticket" items that they can use to expand scientific
research, generate employment, and counter criticism. Training
activities and visitor programs to exchange information may be
what the Libyans need, but it doesn't help them with their
public perception problems. Although the U.S. is expending
significant time and energy assisting with Libya's chemical
weapons destruction program, Libyans do not consider that
assistance as a "reward". On their balance sheet, the U.S. does
not get credit for activities that we intitiate or fund - -
paying for the removal of their dangerous materials, or helping
convert their Tajoura facility from HEU to LEU, or offering a
million dollar grant for Avian flu prevention, or any of our
many other bilateral programs.


7. (C) The Libyan scientists are reaching out to the G8
countries, especially France, Japan, and Russia, to request
assistance with the same list of projects. Both the French and
Japanese have signed cooperative agreements that are
non-specific but pledge future collaboration in these areas.
When the Japanese Ambassador to Libya was describing his
strategy, he acknowledged that some of the Libyan objectives are
unrealistic. He said," we know that a radioactive isotope
facility may not be cost effective for the Libyans or a good
business model, but if they want it and are willing to pay for
it, we will help them move forward. The cooperative effort
between our two countries is more important than the final
outcome; we will gain significant benefits from the process of
working together even if the results are not a guaranteed
success."


8. (C) While post looks to the TSCC nuclear subcommittee
(proceedings reported septel) to determine the appropriate scope
of nuclear cooperation, as export license restrictions are being
revised, hopefully some of the Libyan priorities will be able to
move forward in the short term, particularly on solar energy
applications. We appreciate NEA/RA and ISN efforts to continue
the scientific engagement activities already underway. If OES
organizes a delegation to visit Libya, U.S. officials should be
prepared to address the Libyan priorities, along with clear
guidance on whether or not an activity is feasible, and if so,
what timelines are possible. If delegation members can provide
ballpark cost estimates, Matouq and others in the Libyan
leadership can begin working through their convoluted system to
set aside funds for the activities. Post is also following up
on the cooperation efforts explored with the General Peoples
Committees during the Dobriansky delegation visit. Given the
lack of coordination in the Libyan Jamahiriya (translate: state
of the masses) government, we will attempt to ascertain the
additional priority opportunities in health, agriculture and
environment fields that are not reflected in the list presented
by Matouq's group of scientists.
GOLDRICH