Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TRIPOLI459
2006-09-01 14:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tripoli
Cable title:  

LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE

Tags:  CMGT OVIP PARM KNNP LY 
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Brooke F Adams 09/05/2006 08:57:11 AM From DB/Inbox: ECPO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00459

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: CONS AMB RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS AID ECON DEA
 DCM DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO263
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0459/01 2441425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011425Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1149
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0388
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1300
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000459 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2016
TAGS: CMGT OVIP PARM KNNP LY
SUBJECT: LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE
ARE THE REWARDS?

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000459

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2016
TAGS: CMGT OVIP PARM KNNP LY
SUBJECT: LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE
ARE THE REWARDS?

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Schulte conducted extensive
discussions on non-proliferation with Libyan officials and the
Jamahiriya press August 28-30. The Libyans agreed with our
assessment that Iran was working on a weapons program and that
it should comply with the IAEA, while stressing that
confrontation and deadlines would set back negotiating efforts.
Libya anticipates the Iran will use the NAM Summit in Havana to
politicize the IAEA report due August 31. Libyans also vented
their frustration that there wasn't a "Libya Model" for other
countries to follow, based on Libyan perceptions that they have
not received tangible rewards for deciding to comply with
international norms. If pressed, interlocutors either
acknowledge or dismiss our observations of the many advantages
that have accrued to Libya since its December 2003 decision to
end its WMD programs. Ambassador Schulte met with Secretary of
the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training and
Employment (GPCMET) Matouq Matouq and Secretary for European
Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison
and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, and academics
from Al-Fateh University. Ambassador Schulte also held a
roundtable discussion with Libyan-based journalists that
highlighted U.S. support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and
international concerns over Iran's lack of cooperation with the
IAEA. END SUMMARY.


LIBYANS CLAIM LIBYA MODEL DOES NOT OFFER ANY REWARDS
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2. (C) In a 75 minute meeting with Matouq Matouq and his
science advisors -- Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the National
Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed
Enami of the NBRD -- Ambassador Schulte heard the Libyan's
standard opening gambit, " the Libyan case is not a good model
for the rest of the world because Libya received no benefits
from its decision to give up WMD programs." Matouq oversaw the

Libyan WMD program before heading the GPCMET, and in his current
position he oversees the related scientific activities under his
very broad "employment" mandate. Matouq said, "I know we tell
all the Americans the same thing in every meeting, but it is a
basic fact that affects everything else we are trying to do."
He told Schulte the Iranians "scorned" Libya for giving up
something for nothing, and that within Libya, and especially the
scientific community, there was an "internal feeling of
resentment." He also described Libyan opposition groups in the
U.S. and the UK that criticized the Libyan government for its
decision to give up the WMD without negotiating for any concrete
rewards. Schulte reminded Matouq that Libya reaped major
benefits as sanctions were lifted, trade and investment
opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession,
and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of
mutual interest.


3. (C) Asked for his assessment of the U.S.-Libyan cooperative
activities up until this point, including the conversion of the
Tajoura facility, Matouq said that the conversion was complete
and successful. He hoped it would be fully operational by the
end of September with even better performance than before. He
was generally pleased with the on-going scientific engagement
program focused on biological life sciences, environmental
issues, water management, and mechanical engineering, but he and
his colleagues were frustrated that there weren't any
"deliverables" to show the Libyan people. While admittedly the
Libyan priorities are technology transfer and training, they
hoped for some specific, large projects that they could show the
Libyan public as the "reward." They wanted the U.S. to build
Libya a nuclear powered plant to desalinate water or generate
electricity, or they wanted the U.S. to build a radioactive
isotope production facility at Tripoli Medical Center to support
cancer research throughout Africa. Matouq's team has also
asked for water management assistance, microsatellites for the
Remote Sensing Center to work on environmental monitoring, solar
energy technology for power generation or water desalination,
and desertification prevention assistance.


4. (C) When Schulte reviewed the U.S. Global Energy
Partnership framework, Matouq responded, "there can't be a
double standard; technologies should be disseminated equally to
all countries through the IAEA. The UNSC should engage in more
outreach to identify and limit WMD capabilities of all
countries, while at the same time encouraging more use of
nuclear power as a clean and efficient fuel." Matouq, noting
Libya's full compliance with IAEA inspections, called for
universal, regular inspections by IAEA officials since human
interaction was a critical component of building confidence and
"cameras can be adjusted." Matouq said he would attend the IAEA
General Conference and would press his views in that forum.
IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS AND PRESTIGE OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE
MOTIVATION
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-------------- --------------


5. (C) Matouq's primary concern regarding proliferation was
the potential diversion of nuclear material rather than
enrichment activities by Iran or other countries. He said,
"political assurances are not enough given the regular changes
in government leadership." In his view, Iran was determined to
"use nuclear to its end," whatever that meant -- the end of its
fuel cycle, the end of its destructive power? Matouq, while
his science advisors nodded their concurrence, said that in
Libya's opinion the Iranian actions added up to weapons program
development. He believed that the Ayatollah originated the WMD
program in the 1980s, following on whatever research programs
might have been underway while the Shah ruled Iran. The WMD
program was initially deemed critically important to counter
Iraq, but now had taken on even greater significance.


6. (C) Ambassador Schulte pressed for Libya to make the point
forcefully to Iran that moving forward with its WMD program
would only lead to isolation and a lack of prestige. Matouq
replied that Iranian internal politics were driving its
decisions. Iranian dignity is now invested in its nuclear
capability. He broadened the discussion to argue that the
conflict in Gaza and the war between Israel and Lebanon only
encouraged Iranian fanatics, made it easier for the Muslim
Brotherhood to recruit members, and fostered the spread of
Wahabi radicalism. Matouq said, "continued Israeli killings
inflame public opinion; you must not underestimate how this
enrages Muslims." Using graphic language, he continued,
"Libyans see Israelis hunting human meat using high-tech U.S.
weapons and we can not accept this." Ambassador Schulte replied
that the leadership in Tehran was encouraging violence. He also
recounted the striking coincidence that the Hezbollah kidnapping
of Israeli soldiers and missile attacks on Israel happened
directly after Iran rebuffed Solana and the negotiating
proposals on non-proliferation. When Matouq countered that "if
the Israel and Palestinian problems were resolved, Iran would
have less room to maneuver," Schulte agreed and added, " we also
need to reframe the issue beyond a U.S-Iran debate and reflect
the concern of the entire international community.


7. (C) In a subsequent session with Libya's IAEA Governor and
Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee

SIPDIS
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati
Obeidi, Secretary for American Affairs at the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation
Ahmed Fatouri, Acting Americas Director Mohammed Hassan Ayaab of
the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and
International Cooperation and five academics from Al-Fateh
University. As Libya's representative to the IAEA, Obeidi
highlighted that Libya took the initiative to end its WMD
program and had worked closely with the U.S. and UK since
December 2003 to resolve any outstanding concerns.

HOW TO ENGAGE WITH IRAN - DEADLINES AND CONFRONTATION WON'T WORK
-------------- --------------
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Obeidi's message was that Libya is in full agreement
that the international community must prevent the spread of WMD.
It wants to show that differences can be solved through
peaceful negotiation. However, Obeidi advised, UNSC resolutions
would not lead Iran to give up its program. Pressure,
confrontation and challenge only make the Iranians more likely
to take a defiant stand in Obeidi's assessment. He believed
that Iran would try to avert straightforward compliance requests
by converting issues into a political debate about national
rights in the NAM and other public fora. "Political groups like
the NAM will support the Iranians' position without fully
comprehending the technical aspects of the case," Obeidi
continued.


9. (C) "We agree the Iranians are playing for time," Obeidi
said, "but you are helping them; why can there be no discussions
on enrichment?" Obeidi said that more realistic positions with
specific next steps could gain support, whereas setting a date
for sanctions implementation would only strengthen the Iranian
defiance. He said Libya was ready to work closely with the U.S.
and others at the General Conference and at the NAM to keep Iran
moving in the right direction, but that deadlines would not
help.


10. (C) Ambassador Schulte emphasized to Obeidi and the other
participants that Iran was trying to shift the debate from
substantive points to a "denial of rights" whereas nuclear power
encompassed not only rights but also obligations. Anticipating
that Iran would try to highjack the NAM summit in Havana, it was
important for other countries to convince them that security,
respect and prestige are assured through international
cooperation. The U.S. looked to Libya and others to make that
point, especially since Iran continued to delay access by IAEA
inspectors. Obeidi said that he looked forward to working with
Ambassador Schulte in Vienna.

LIBYANS FRUSTRATED AT DIFFICULTY OBTAINING U.S. VISAS
-------------- --------------
--------------


11. (C) Although the Libyans did not grant the Embassy
permission to conduct public diplomacy at Al-Fateh University,
the Americas Desk did arrange for five chemistry and engineering
professors to sit in on the Obeidi meeting and then host
Ambassador Schulte for lunch. The professors were not
interested in discussing policy, but did make clear their desire
for U.S. funded projects in the fields of science and
technology. All but one of the professors studied in the U.S.
during the 1960s and hoped that they would be able to visit
there again and send more students for graduate work. They noted
the extreme difficulty to obtain U.S. visas since most Libyans
are unwilling to travel to Tunisia for interviews at the
consulate. The academics also acknowledged that most younger
Libyans had limited English language skills and might not pass
the TOEFL requirements to enter a graduate program. Schulte's
carefully crafted presentation resonated with the Libyan
interlocutors, even the Al-Fateh University science professors
who professed to have no interest in policy.

PRESS QUESTIONS U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY
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12. (C) Twenty Libya-based journalists and photographers
attended a press roundtable with Ambassador Schulte for an
hour-long session on nonproliferation issues. There were also
many questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East and the U.S.
role in the recent violence in Israel and Lebanon. One reporter
queried, "why would Libya give up its relatively good
relationship with Iran to align with the U.S. on this issue?"
and Ambassador Schulte pointed out that it was not a U.S.-Iran
issue, but a matter of grave concern to the international
community. The IAEA had a clear position that reflected over
three years of review. Several questions focused on the Israeli
WMD program and questioned why the U.S. was not emphasizing the
need for action against Israel -- with the response that the
U.S. would support a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and
that progress on the Middle East peace process was an important
next step, along with the U.S. vision of two states living side
by side in peace. As long as the leadership in Tehran opposes
that vision and actively works against peace by trying to spark
violence, it is deflecting attention from its lack of compliance
with international obligations. Members of the Libyan press
contacted Embassy staff after the roundtable to express their
appreciation for the Ambassador's outreach efforts, commenting
on his effective and thoughtful commentary.


13. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have an opportunity to clear
this message before his departure.
BERRY