CONSULTATIONS ON BURMA WITH JAPAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TOKYO 000908

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2031
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV ECON UNSC BM CH JA
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON BURMA WITH JAPAN


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Classified By: POL M/C W. Michael Meserve. Reasons:1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: In February 15 meetings on Burma with a
visiting DOS delegation, Japanese officials said Japan:

-- shares U.S. values and objectives in Burma and is sending
the regime a similar message;

-- has significantly reduced its level of economic assistance
to the point that little Japanese economic activity remains;

-- is concerned that China, India and Thailand may be filling
the gap left by Japan's withdrawal;

-- is reviewing its Burma policy and that an extension of
ASSK's detention in May may prompt a policy change.

End Summary.

Sanctions and Engagement
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2. (C) During a February 15 meeting with MOFA Asian Affairs
Bureau DDG Toshihisa Takata, EAP/MLS Deputy Director Robert
Rapson and delegation reviewed U.S. policy toward Burma and
our bilateral and multilateral efforts to press the Burmese
regime to initiate a credible and inclusive political
process. Rapson encouraged continued close coordination
between Japan and the United States on Burma. Takata
asserted that Japan shares the same values of democracy and
human rights as the United States and wants to effect
meaningful change in Burma. He lamented, however, that there
had been no progress toward democratic reforms despite the
U.S./EU sanctions policy and the Japanese policy of
engagement. Nonetheless, Japan believed that the combination
of pressure and encouragement would take time to achieve
results and welcomed the recent ASEAN efforts to increase
pressure on Burma. Takata stressed that Japan sought to
achieve real change, not simply to send strong messages.
Even a small step forward would be welcome, he noted. Rapson
noted that absent "meaningful" pressure on the regime, it was
unlikely we would see "meaningful" political change and
reforms. The United States and others are also interested in
seeing the release of political prisoners, including Aung San
Suu Kyi, and an environment in Burma in which NGOs and other
humanitarian assistance entities could operate more freely.

Concern About Burma's Neighbors
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3. (C) Takata expressed Japan's concerns regarding China's
relations with Burma. He underscored Japan's view that the
PRC approved the status quo in Burma and would not seek to
change the regime's basic policy until after China had firmly
established its economic presence in the country. India's
ties with Burma were also a problem, he added. Rapson stated
that the United States was discussing the situation in Burma
with both China and India at senior levels and that they were
beginning to evince concerns similar to those of the United
States, especially regarding cross-border issues -- although
that had yet to translate into any specific actions/messages
to the regime. He noted that there were increasing
indications the Burmese regime takes seriously the views of
the international community, underscoring the importance of
sending a coordinated message to the junta. To help focus
the international community's attention on the regime, the
United States will work with others in finding an appropriate
opportunity in the coming months to bring Burma before the UN
Security Council again. Takata responded that Japan's
consistent message to the regime has been that it must be
more open to the international community and that it must
release all political prisoners. He advocated increased
coordination of the international community's messages to the
regime. Rapson and delegation concurred.

Japan's Engagement Efforts
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4. (C) Rapson and delegation took up the issues discussed
with Takata in greater detail in a separate February 15
meeting with a broader representation of MOFA officials led
by Foreign Policy Bureau Policy Coordination Division Senior
Policy Coordinator Tsutomu Nakagawa. Asked to elaborate on
Japanese activities in Burma, Nakagawa stated that Japan has
limited policy alternatives, but is trying its best through
constructive engagement to induce the regime to play a more

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positive role in the international community and to effect
democratic reforms. Japan's message to Burma is that it
must: 1) reactivate its dialogue with the international
community; 2) resume dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi; and 3)
release all political prisoners.


5. (C) Japan's primary effort in Burma involves providing
very limited grass-roots humanitarian assistance through
specific NGO projects on a highly selective basis, Nakagawa
continued. Japan's ambassador has repeatedly urged the
regime to allow NGOs greater freedom to operate within the
country. Although its ODA has already decreased by more than
half since 2002, Japan is planning further reductions in
economic assistance, Nakagawa noted. He cautioned that China
and Thailand appear to be filling the gap. Nakagawa said
that few Japanese companies are operating in Burma due to the
unavailability of trade insurance. Japan has no major
involvement in the Burmese economy at this time, especially
in the energy sector, he asserted.

Increasing International Pressure
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6. (C) Rapson re-emphasized that the United States is
working with partner countries to seek additional means of
increasing international pressure on the regime. It is
important for the Burmese regime to know that the
international community condemns its behavior, he stressed.
Nakagawa noted the recent helpful change in ASEAN's view
towards the regime, saying Japan wants to make the best use
of Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid's prospective visit to
Burma. Rapson agreed and hoped that Hamid would be able to
visit Burma soon, although signals from the regime on this
front were not encouraging. Nakagawa concurred with Rapson
that the United Nations could play a vital role in
influencing the regime. UN organizations operating in Burma,
the UN Special Envoy and the UN's efforts in raising the
international community's awareness of the problems in Burma
were all useful tools. Japan would encourage the UN
Secretariat's Political Bureau to brief UN members on Burma

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following FM Hamid's visit, Nakagawa stated.

Differences on National Convention
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7. (C) In providing the U.S. assessment of the regime's
so-called roadmap to democracy, Rapson indicated that the
United States and others view the National Convention as a
sham process designed to strengthen the regime's control and
to buy it additional time in power. Nakagawa noted that
Japan holds a somewhat different perception of the regime's
plan than the United States, though he acknowledged many
problems with the National Convention, particularly the
absence of some important groups. Nonetheless, Tokyo saw
some value in the regime engaging in this admittedly faulty
democratic process, even if the benefits were meager. For
that reason, Japan has encouraged the regime to speed the
process of adopting the charter and holding the planned
referendum, as well as to include all political parties and
ethnic groups in the process.

Narcotics Situation
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8. (C) After listening to the U.S. delegation's report on
the increase in Burma's narcotics trade, particularly on
increased production of crystal meth and "ecstasy" in Wa
state, MOFA expressed interest in learning more details of
the narcotics situation in Burma as it had received reports
of declining opium production. The two delegations agreed to
consult more closely on the matter.

A Policy Turning Point?
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9. (C) At a follow-on working lunch, Nakagawa was unusually
candid in explaining the recent modification in Japan's Burma
policy. FM Aso's early-December, Asia-policy address had
emphasized the importance Japan places on human rights and
democracy in the region. That was intended to send a clear
signal of Japan's willingness to toughen its policies toward
Burma and Cambodia, he observed. Following the mid-December
informal UNSC discussion on Burma, Japan had expressed its
dissatisfaction with the current situation to the regime and
informed the regime that Japan's policy could change if there
were no clear signs of qualitative improvement on human

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rights and democracy. Nakagawa said that Japan's Burma
policy continued under ministry-wide review and commented
that Tokyo might be approaching a "turning point." Opining
that it could not endure "more of the same" from Rangoon,
Nakagawa speculated that Japan might change its policy if
Aung San Suu Kyi's detention is further extended in May.
Indulging in a bit of personal speculation, Nakagawa said he
thought that FM Aso might be looking for a tangible
foreign-policy achievement prior to the LDP presidential
election in September, in which the Foreign Minister has
publicly and repeatedly expressed his intended candidacy.
Underscoring firmly that there were no such plans at present,
Nakagawa said that Southeast Asia might present an attractive
option for such an initiative, including a possible
high-level contact with the Burmese regime.


10. (U) EAP/MLS Deputy Director Rapson cleared this
message.
SCHIEFFER