Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO822
2006-02-15 09:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

CHINA WATCHERS PIN HOPES FOR IMPROVED JAPAN-CHINA

Tags:  PREL PGOV ECON CH JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000822 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH JA
SUBJECT: CHINA WATCHERS PIN HOPES FOR IMPROVED JAPAN-CHINA
RELATIONS ON NEXT PRIME MINISTER

REF: A. TOKYO 0698


B. TOKYO 0775

TOKYO 00000822 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons:1.4(b/d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 000822

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2031
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON CH JA
SUBJECT: CHINA WATCHERS PIN HOPES FOR IMPROVED JAPAN-CHINA
RELATIONS ON NEXT PRIME MINISTER

REF: A. TOKYO 0698


B. TOKYO 0775

TOKYO 00000822 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons:1.4(b/d).


1. (C) Summary: No improvement in Japan's relations with
China should be expected during Koizumi's remaining seven
months in office, according to Diet members and academic
China specialists contacted by Embassy Tokyo. Citing
domestic political difficulties in both countries, our
interlocutors believe that Koizumi's successor will have to
overcome a growing sense of anti-Chinese nationalism if the
bilateral relationship is to be improved. Most believe that
the increasing economic interdependence between the two
countries makes it imperative for the next prime minister to
consider how to deal with visits to Yasukuni shrine, which
has become an unfortunate focal point for Japan-China
relations. Both the Diet members and academics we consulted
stressed the risky nature of direct U.S. involvement in the
Japan-China dispute, asserting that it threatened to expose
differences on history between the United States and Japan
which could be exploited by China. Strongly and unanimously
favoring improved relations with China, our interlocutors are
concerned about the possibility of Chinese criticism of
Japanese politicians during the delicate period leading up to
the LDP presidential election in September. At present,
however, it does not appear that any of Koizumi's most likely
successors value the benefits of improved Japan-China
relations more highly than the political benefits they
personally gain by appealing to Japanese nationalism. End
Summary.

No Improvement Under Koizumi
--------------


2. (C) A number of the Embassy's Diet and academic
contacts interested in China-related issues have all told us
on a confidential basis that no improvement in Japan-China
relations can be expected while PM Koizumi is in office.
They all point to the possibility of a new phase in bilateral
relations under the next prime minister, but recognize the

difficulties and uncertainties involved in achieving a
breakthrough in Japan's currently very difficult relationship
with China.

Domestic Political Constraints
--------------


3. (C) According to our interlocutors, the domestic
political situation in both Japan and China is to blame for
the current impasse. Many fault PM Koizumi for using
anti-China feeling in Japan to boost his popularity, taking
advantage of the country's increasing nationalism. While
Koizumi now understands the problems his Yasukuni visits have
created for Japanese diplomacy in Asia, he came to this
realization too late. Although Koizumi tried to tone down
his October 2005 visit, making it briefer and much less
formal than past visits, the issue had become so politicized
that the differences were lost on the Japanese public and
Beijing. Since much of Koizumi's popularity is based on his
refusal to compromise, changing his stance on Yasukuni would
be highly risky for him politically. Observers point out
that once the budget is passed in late March, Koizumi will
come under increasing political attack as the struggle to
replace him intensifies. Under such circumstances, taking a
major step on China relations will become virtually
impossible, our contacts say. They fully expect the matter
of prime ministerial visits to the shrine to carry over to
the next administration.


4. (C) Japan's China watchers also expect that Beijing will
not compromise on the Yasukuni issue. Several contacts cited
the Chinese leadership's need to use anti-Japanese sentiment
to unite the PRC's diverse population in support of the
Chinese Communist Party, now that communist ideology has lost
its authority. Expressing concern over weak civilian control
of the military, a number of our interlocutors noted
President Hu's need to demonstrate a hard line on Japan to
maintain the support of China's military. Tokyo University
Professor Akihiko Tanaka told us he believes U.S. expressions
of concern over Japan-China relations do have a positive

TOKYO 00000822 002.2 OF 004


effect on PRC thinking. He added, however, that there is no
indication China is willing to put the Yasukuni issue on a
separate track to advance relations with Japan in other
areas. According to Keio University Professor Kojima, the
Prime Minister's Yasukuni visits have become an unfortunate
focal point of the relationship. Although the PRC depends on
continued Japanese investment, technology transfers and
access to markets for Japanese-branded goods assembled in
China to continue its economic growth, Kojima feels President
Hu will adhere to his refusal to meet with Japanese leaders
until Tokyo makes a firm commitment on Yasukuni visits. That
is almost certainly the case ahead of the 17th Party Congress
in late 2007, he averred.


5. (C) Japan's growing economic interests and dependence on
China make it imperative that Japanese political leaders try
to deal with China in a constructive manner. Japanese
business leaders have increasingly expressed concern that the
"cold" political relations might begin to affect the "hot"
economic ties. Yet, growing anti-Chinese nationalism makes
it difficult to put the relationship on a positive track.
LDP Diet Member Taro Kono told the Embassy that despite his
reputation for working to improve ties with China, it has
recently become extremely difficult politically to take any
steps on China unless it can be shown that Japan is getting
something in return. As Senior Vice Minister of Justice,
Kono told us he has a number of ideas for improving relations
with China in legal affairs, yet he hesitates to take such
steps for political reasons. Komeito Diet Member Isamu Ueda
similarly told the Embassy that in years past, Komeito's
fraternal relations with the CCP were a simple matter of
shaking hands. But now that economic relations between the
two countries are so closely intertwined, real issues have
arisen that directly affect Komeito's supporters. When
Komeito's leaders visit Beijing, they are mindful to show
they are standing up for their constituents' interests, he
stated.

Japanese Nationalism and the China Threat
--------------


6. (C) According to Tokyo University's Tanaka, anti-Chinese
nationalism in Japan has developed as a counter-reaction to
anti-Japanese sentiment in the PRC. He assessed that over
the past few years, a fairly strong level of public support
for taking a hard line on China has emerged. Recent
statements by FM Aso and DPJ leader Seiji Maehara that China
is a "threat" are beginning to resonate, he said, noting a
Yomiuri/Gallup poll in November 2005 in which 76 percent of
the respondents labeled China a threat. The Komeito's Ueda
told us that although China cannot truly be considered a
threat in the face of Japan's military alliance with the
United States, China's growing offensive military capability
is cause for concern -- making transparency a priority issue.
LDP Diet Member Keizo Takemi separately expressed discomfort
with the growing political influence of China's navy in PRC
leadership circles. Japanese interests in the East China
Sea, the Senkakus and other territorial issues all run up
against the PLA Navy, he observed. Takemi believes the
Yasukuni issue has received too much attention and lamented
the lack of good news to counter the repeated clash of
interests with China.


7. (C) Nonetheless, nationalism is not yet the dominant
voice in Japanese politics. Professor Kojima reminded us
that a large segment of the population (including a solid
majority of the business community) still believes that Japan
must try to improve its relations with China, and that
Japanese political leaders should avoid statements and
actions that arouse the anger of Japan's neighbors. Many
people believe a balanced approach should be taken on
Yasukuni, he asserted. Recently the conservative Yomiuri
newspaper (Japan's largest daily) has joined with the liberal
Asahi Shinbum to condemn the Prime Minister's Yasukuni visits
and to urge a reevaluation of Japan's militarist past. LDP
Diet Member Kono noted that while politicians are quarreling
with the PRC, many entrepreneurs are becoming increasingly
concerned about Japan losing influence and market share in
international commerce due to Japan's bad relations with
China. He said that Japanese political leaders do not fully
understand Japan's growing economic interdependence with

TOKYO 00000822 003.2 OF 004


China and are not paying attention to the total negative
effects that the quarrel is having on Japanese interests.
The fact that PM Koizumi, Abe and Aso have said that visits
to the shrine are a personal matter may offer a way out of
this difficulty, Kono suggested.

A Challenge For Koizumi's Successor
--------------


8. (C) Our interlocutors believe that the leading
contenders to replace Koizumi are actively considering how to
approach the Yasukuni issue and Japan's relations with China.
Of the four top candidates, former Chief Cabinet Secretary
Fukuda and Finance Minister Tanigaki have already staked out
positions generally interpreted as promoting better ties to
China, but popular support for Foreign Minister Aso and
front-runner Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe is based in large
measure on their hard-line nationalist stance. Nonetheless,
a number of observers feel that Abe and Aso do not want to
place themselves in the same predicament as PM Koizumi by
committing to annual shrine visits. Still it is hard for
them to compromise without losing popular support. The
latter two have made a tradition of annual personal visits to
Yasukuni and have stated they will continue to do so. Our
interlocutors speculate they will try to do so under
circumstances that limit the negative fallout from Beijing.
The LDP's Kono observed to the Embassy that FM Aso has said
he will continue to visit the shrine, but has also emphasized
that it is a personal matter, indicating he understands the
sensitivity of the situation with China, despite his recent
provocative statements (ref A). Kono also noted that
although CCS Abe has taken a similar stand, he has been
relatively quiet on the issue since becoming Chief Cabinet
Secretary. Given Abe's well-established reputation as a

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nationalist, there is no political advantage in his joining
the anti-China crowd, Kono opined.


9. (C) The possibility that the next prime minister might
usher in a new phase in Japan-China relations depends in part
on the political circumstances in which the new LDP president
is elected. Tokyo University's Tanaka observed that given
the highly charged nature of the Yasukuni issue, shrine
visits may well figure in the LDP presidential election
campaign, forcing the winner to adopt a certain position on
Yasukuni or relations with China. He averred that much
depends on how Beijing reacts to circumstances in Japan
during this intense political period. For instance, should
the Prime Minister or one of the LDP presidential candidates
decide to visit Yasukuni during the shrine's April spring
festival or on the sensitive August 15 date, any Chinese
criticism would be used by the hard-liners to their
advantage, he opined.

Managing the Relationship Despite the Stalemate
-------------- --


10. (C) LDP Diet Member Koichi Kato told the Embassy that
he completely discounted the possibility of a near-term
improvement in Japan's relationship with China. However, he
thought that some risk-management steps should be taken to
prevent potential conflict. He cited the ongoing dialogue
between Vice Minister Yachi and Vice Minister Dai Bingguo
(ref B) as useful in that regard, even without a breakthrough
in the relationship. National Institute of Defense Studies
(NIDS) Research Fellow Yasuhiro Matsuda expressed the view
that such a channel of communication may prove invaluable
should a new prime minister wish to undertake an initiative
on China relations. He thought that a Track II dialogue
between Japan and China on history might also prove useful,
but wondered whether such a dialogue would be able to
overcome the growing distrust between the Japanese and
Chinese people.

U.S. Involvement
--------------


11. (C) Several of our contacts mentioned that direct U.S.
intervention in the Japan-China relationship is a
particularly difficult matter for Japan. The alliance with
the U.S. is crucial for enabling Japan to deal with China on
an even footing, yet U.S. involvement on the history issue

TOKYO 00000822 004.2 OF 004


may reveal differences between the two allies that could be
exploited by China, they said. Moreover, the Japanese public
is sensitive to perceptions of external pressure from the
United States. LDP Diet Member Takemi and others related
that nationalism in Japan is not only based on anti-China
sentiment, but on opposition to the United States as well.
Should the United States be seen as pressing Japan to adopt a
particular historical interpretation or policy, there could
well be a backlash against the United States, he warned.
Diet Member Takemi, who speaks Chinese and studied at
Harvard, explained that nationalists would assert the need
for Japan to be more independent of the United States and
would call into question the value of the security alliance.


Comment
--------------


12. (C) Our interlocutors disagree with PM Koizumi's
repeated visits to Yasukuni shrine, citing the need to
improve relations with China. They have also given up on
Koizumi resolving the current stalemate. Due to the
uncertainties in the LDP presidential campaign and the
numerous domestic political constraints, our contacts all
believe it is too hard to tell whether the next prime
minister will be able to improve ties with China, even if
that is a priority goal. The best chance for such an
outcome, they insist, is for a candidate with a good
understanding of the importance of Japan's interests in China
to be elected LDP president, and for China to tread carefully
in the run-up to that election. At present, however, it does
not appear that any of Koizumi's most likely successors value
the benefits of improved Japan-China relations more highly
than the political benefits they personally gain by appealing
to Japanese nationalism.
SCHIEFFER