Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO757
2006-02-10 10:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN CONSIDERING POST-SAMAWAH OPTIONS IN IRAQ

Tags:  PREL MOPS IZ UK JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2464
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKO #0757 0411002
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101002Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8545
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L TOKYO 000757

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2026
TAGS: PREL MOPS IZ UK JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN CONSIDERING POST-SAMAWAH OPTIONS IN IRAQ

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Joe Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b)(d
)

-1. (C) Japan is "comfortable" with the UK's intention to
complete its withdrawal from Samawah, on a conditional basis,
by the end of May, Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Masaharu Kono
told the DCM February 10, 2006. Asked about Japan's reaction
to the January 23 quadralateral meeting in London concerning
next steps in Iraq, DVFM Kono insisted that Japan had
anticipated this UK decision and said MOFA is now studying
various options. Because of the many operational aspects
involve, the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) is also doing
its own "homework," he explained. Kono recalled that the
Prime Minister had earlier informed the United States of
Japan's political decision to withdrawn the GSDF, and had
already informed the U.S. that Japan's Air Self-Defense Force
(JASDF) would remain. Japan is now mulling in what other
capacity it might remain in Iraq. He had spoken with FM Aso
about Japan's future role in Iraq that same day (February
10). It was too early to discuss the matter, Kono insisted,
but he hoped to be able to discuss Japan's plans in concrete
terms in the "not too distant future."

PRTs: What Japan Has Been Doing in Samawah?
--------------


2. (C) Kono explained that he was "not too clear" about the
Provincial Reconstruction (PRT) concept because the
explanations he had received from the UK and United States
were not quite the same. It was his general sense, he
stated, that a PRT is intended to help central and local
Iraqi authorities with the reconstruction of society and the
nation. Actually, that was precisely what the JASDF had been
doing for the past two and a half years in Samawah, he
suggested. The major difference is that Japan's operation,
with 600 personnel, was larger than the 30-40 person PRT
teams envisioned for good-governance capacity building.
Japan prefers to see exactly what kind of PRTs the United
States implements before committing itself. Kono jokingly
observed that the UK believes that Al Muthanna province does
not need a PRT because of the work that Japan has done there.



3. (C) The PRT concept continues to be developed, the DCM
responded, and offered to stay in touch on the matter. The
United States can accept a scenario whereby the role of the
GSDF would be completed by as early as the end of May and
looks forward to the JASDF playing a role in other areas.
The U.S. also hopes Japan will seriously consider taking part
in a PRT in Basrah or elsewhere. At the conclusion of the
meeting, Kono returned to the topic of Iraq to observe that
as Japan gets closer to a decision on next steps, the media
would likely be filled with a lot of baseless speculation.
"Don't be deceived" by the media, he warned. Once a decision
is made, the USG would be the first to be informed, Kono
underscored.
SCHIEFFER