SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM DISCUSSES CHINESE AND RUSSIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 007099

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDRESSEE)

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH RU ZK JA
SUBJECT: SCA DAS FEIGENBAUM DISCUSSES CHINESE AND RUSSIAN
ROLES IN CENTRAL ASIA WITH MOFA

TOKYO 00007099 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Joseph R. Donovan. Reasons 1.4
(B) (D)


1. (C) Summary. On December 7, on the margins of a
U.S.-Japan Dialogue on Central Asia, SCA DAS Evan Feigenbaum
assessed the challenges presented by Russian and Chinese
policies in the region with MOFA European Affairs Bureau
Russia Division Director Kuninori Matsuda. Feigenbaum
stressed that a key goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia was
to support the sovereignty and independence of the countries
in the area. U.S. policy strived, therefore, to create as
many options as possible and thus to be "anti-monopoly," not
anti-Russian. Matsuda said that Japan's policy aimed to
pursue the Japan Plus Central Asia Dialogue mechanism, while
assuaging Russian sensitivities about Japan's involvement in
the region. Japan was exploring ways to bring Russia into
the dialogue between Central Asia and Japan. Matsuda also
noted that Tokyo planned to develop a Vice Minister level
Strategic Dialogue with Russia. He asked for U.S.
suggestions of possible topics the two sides might discuss as
part of this newly inauguratedstrategic dialogue. Tokyo also
planned to raise concerns about Russia's weapons trade with
India and Southeast Asia. End Summary


2. (C) Asked by Matsuda about U.S. attitudes toward Russia in
Central Asia, Feigenbaum drew on a theme presented throughout
his meetings with Japanese officials. Feigenbaum stressed
that a key goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia was to support
the sovereignty and independence of the countries in the area
by helping to provide them with as many options in as many
directions on the compass as possible. More options, said
Feigenbaum, would promote increased
independence by offering alternatives for trade with
neighboring states and the global economy. U.S. policy
strived to be anti-monopoly, not anti-Russian. Feigenbaum
also gave a brief overview of the administration's rationale
for transferring responsibility for Central Asia from EUR to
SCA.


3. (C) Noting the similarities between U.S. and Japanese
goals and approaches, Matsuda said that Central Asia's
history as part of the former Soviet Union tended to cause
observers to view Central Asia through the prism of the old
USSR. However, it was important that the U.S. and Japan
begin to view the region not only from Russia's vantage
point, but from China's perspective as well. MOFA intended,
therefore, to pursue its direct Central Asia-Japan dialogue,
but also to seek ways to bring Russia into this dialogue
between Central Asia and Japan. Russia's initial response,
Matsuda continued, had been to question Japan's reasons for
becoming involved in Central Asia, in the first place.
However, during FM Aso's July meeting with Russian FM Lavrov
on the margins of the ASEAN meetings in Kuala Lumpur,
Japanese officials explained that Tokyo's main goal was not
to exclude Moscow, but to present options
to Central Asian states, he said.


4. (C) Matsuda asked for U.S. advice on possible subjects
that Tokyo might take up with Moscow as part of a newly
inaugurated Japan-Russia strategic dialogue that former PM
Koizumi and Russian PM Putin had agreed to during their 2005
summit. VFM Shotaro Yachi, in an attempt to demonstrate that
Japan considers its relationship with Russia to be on the
same level as that of Japan-US or Japan-UK, recently agreed
to upgrade the discussion by meeting with Russian VFM
Denisov. However, "as is usual with Russia-Japan relations,"
Matsuda noted, the Russians have been "very slow to
articulate subjects" for the meeting.


5. (C) The Russians remain mistrustful of involvement by
non-Russians in Central Asia, Feigenbaum agreed. A key

TOKYO 00007099 002.2 OF 002


objective, therefore, might be to reassure Moscow that in
pursuing its dialogue with Central Asia, Japan did not
necessarily seek to undermine Russia in the region. Noting
Matsuda's remark that Japan might include Russia in its
Japan-Central Asia dialogue, Feigenbaum cautioned that Japan
should also be on guard against any attempt to undermine the
Japan-Central Asia dialogue from inside. Despite U.S.
reassurances to the contrary, the Kremlin tended to think of
Central Asia as a zero-sum game. Russian media likewise
often had few nice things to report about U.S. and Western
involvement in Central Asia. However, with regard to Central
Asia in a Japan-Russia dialogue, Japan might
focus on subjects related to what should be common goals,
such as promoting economic stability, and cross-national
issues such as narcotrafficking and anti-terrorism.


6. (C) Japan, Matsuda said, also planned to raise its
concerns about Russia's weapons trade with India and
Southeast Asia. Russia had been looking to sell arms in that
part of the world because it has lost some of its old
customers, he opined. However, Tokyo did not like seeing
Asia-Pacific countries buying weapons from Russia.


7. (C) Matsuda added that Russia and China demonstrated
little support for Japan's efforts to obtain observer status
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Feigenbaum
asked what SCO actually does, noting that Washington believes
informal coordination among Central Asian leaders and others
is always welcome, but that the U.S. remained wary of some
aspects of the SCO.


8. (U) DAS Feigenbaum has cleared this message.
DONOVAN