Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO7097
2006-12-21 08:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

U.S.-JAPAN CENTRAL ASIA DIALOGUE: PART ONE,

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV ECON ZK JA 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 007097 

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDRESSEE)

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV ECON ZK JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN CENTRAL ASIA DIALOGUE: PART ONE,
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

TOKYO 00007097 001.3 OF 009


Classified By: CDA Joseph R. Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 TOKYO 007097

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED INFO ADDRESSEE)

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV ECON ZK JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN CENTRAL ASIA DIALOGUE: PART ONE,
STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

TOKYO 00007097 001.3 OF 009


Classified By: CDA Joseph R. Donovan. Reasons: 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and
Central Asian Affairs Evan Feigenbaum and a team of State and
USAID officials met December 8 with Japanese officials for a
day of consultations on Central Asia. The U.S. team aimed to
integrate an intensive strategic and policy consultation with
focused discussions of U.S. and Japanese foreign assistance
priorities in the region. The MOFA delegation was co-chaired
by Shinsuke Sugiyama, Deputy Director-General of the Middle
Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, and Takeshi Yagi, Deputy
Director-General of the European Affairs Bureau, with
participation from five MOFA bureaus and five Japanese
government ministries and agencies. At the opening session,
which focused on strategic priorities, topics of discussion
included: (1) U.S. and Japanese strategic objectives in
Central Asia, (2) relations among Central Asian states,
Afghanistan, and others, and (3) U.S. and Japanese policies
toward Central Asia, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.


2. (C) Summary, continued: Both sides agreed that Japan and
the United States share the same broad goals for Central
Asia, thus it would be beneficial to pursue complementary
programmatic efforts in the region. Both explicitly rejected
the nineteenth century "Great Game" as an analogy for the
region's current strategic environment, although aspects of
Russian and Chinese involvement in the area raise a number of
questions for both Washington and Tokyo. Each side shared
its assessment of the political and economic situation in the
five Central Asian countries, generally agreeing that
Uzbekistan, while perhaps the country with the most inherent
potential, has been difficult to work with and continues to
be a disappointment, while Kazakhstan, less populous but with
natural endowments of oil and gas and better macroeconomic

policies, is showing promising signs, despite insufficient
progress on political reform. Relations with Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan also present challenges, but
both Japan and the United States are willing to continue
focused engagement on a spectrum of interests in each
country. The Japanese side stressed Russian and Chinese
sensitivity about Japan's role in Central Asia and asked that
the United States not broadcast the fact that the two allies
had held a consultation on the region; doing so, the Japanese
said, would raise questions in Moscow and Beijing about
Tokyo's motives. Septels report DAS Feigenbaum's discussions
concerning foreign assistance and trade and investment in the
region. END SUMMARY.

--------------
SHARED INTERESTS
--------------


3. (C) DAS Feigenbaum opened the meeting by thanking the
Japanese for hosting and by pointing out that it made sense
for two allies with an increasingly global partnership to
compare and coordinate, as feasible, their strategic plans
for Central Asia. Washington tries to pursue an integrated
strategy involving the coordination of strategies and
policies with programs and budgets, he said, thus it made
sense to try to do this, too, in consultations with key
partners. For this reason, said Feigenbaum, he had brought
to Japan a team that included USAID representatives, both
from the field and from Washington, and he had also brought
the SCA bureau's senior advisor for regional economic
integration. Feigenbaum noted that while the United States
has more traditional partners on Central Asia, especially in
Europe, not all of them are as serious as Japan with respect
to assistance budgets and project finance. The United States
and Japan each hit the four major baskets of interest in
Central Asia; both countries have: (1) strong strategic and
policy interest, (2) commercial activism, (3) robust
assistance programs, and (4) a demonstrated capacity for
project finance in the region. On that basis, said
Feigenbaum, there may be opportunities for the two

TOKYO 00007097 002.3 OF 009


governments to implement Central Asia programs in a
complementary, though not necessarily joint, fashion.


4. (C) Sugiyama agreed and then described Japan's overall
policy in Central Asia in the context of FM Aso's recent
foreign policy speech, in which he described the strategic
importance to Japan of cultivating strong political and
economic relationships with nations that lie along a path of
what Aso described as an "Arc of Freedom and Prosperity." As
described by Aso, the arc begins in Northeast Asia, continues
into Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam) through Central
Asia and the Caucuses, and into northern Europe.


5. (C) While the FM's presentation did not particularly
emphasize Central Asia, Sugiyama continued, it did refer to
the region in an important manner. In Central Asia and
elsewhere, Japan intends to pursue what Aso described as
"values-oriented diplomacy," aimed at promoting modern values
such as freedom, the rule of law, market-oriented economies,
and human rights, etc. Based on Japan's experience in the
Middle East and Africa, Tokyo officials believe this
values-oriented approach is the only way free people can
achieve economic and social prosperity, he said. The process
of adjusting Japan's diplomacy will take some time, he added.
Japan will need to employ values oriented diplomacy in a
prudent manner, taking into account the diversity inherent in
each Central Asian state.


6. (C) Sugiyama cautioned that the U.S. and Japan should
avoid being seen as "ganging up" on Central Asian countries,
or on other countries with interests in the region, notably
Russia and China. Tokyo would not insist on doing things
Japan's way -- some nations in the area must be able to adopt
their own approaches to development, especially political
development. Japan seeks to employ a "sensitive approach" to
states of the region, even as it implements values-oriented
diplomacy, he said. The Japanese delegation hoped to hold
more detailed discussion with the U.S. side about each nation
in the region.


7. (C) European Affairs Deputy Director Yagi concurred.
Noting that he had read some of Feigenbaum's recent speeches
on Central Asia, he pointed out that Tokyo's language on
Central Asia was almost identical to the views expressed in
Feigenbaum's speeches. "Like you," he said, "we are not
'anti-anyone'" in the region, he said.

--------------
CHALLENGES FACING CENTRAL ASIA
--------------


8. (C) Yagi provided an overview of basic Japanese strategies
toward Central Asia. In Japan's view, he said, the Central
Asian region faces a number of challenges. These challenges
range from classic geopolitical problems to new transnational
threats, and they include the resurgence of Russian influence
in the area -- especially following the withdrawal of U.S.
forces from Uzbekistan. Continued instability in Afghanistan
is worrisome. China, meanwhile, has a growing strategic role
backed by an economic focus on the countries of the region.
Although the threat of political instability does not appear
to be a problem, said Yagi, Russian influence, especially
when combined with Chinese influence, is most undesirable for
Japan. As a result, Yagi noted, Japan has two main aims in
Central Asia: (1) pursue regional development, conducted in a
sustainable manner, that will leave Central Asian nations
open to the international community, and (2) share the
universal values of democracy, human rights, and market
economics.


9. (C) China and Russia, on the other hand, do not, said
Yagi, demand that Central Asian governments adhere to
internationally accepted standards of human rights. The
region's leaders are therefore more comfortable with Russia

TOKYO 00007097 003.3 OF 009


and China than with the United States and Japan. Especially
following the "color" revolutions in Ukraine and elsewhere,
Central Asian heads of state have become alarmed by the
concept of democracy. Their reaction in this regard tended
to be somewhat illogical, he maintained. A second
complicating factor for Japan involves Russian and Chinese
trade with Central Asia, which amounts to USD 8-9 billion,
according to Yagi; U.S. and Japanese trade with the region
amounts, he said, is just one-third that amount. However,
Yagi maintained, despite an affinity among the region's
leaders for Russia and perhaps China, they, too, are
nevertheless concerned about the rising influence of these
two major outside powers. And they also seem open to
increased economic cooperation with Japan and the West to
counter trade barriers from these two giant neighbors.


10. (C) Faced with these challenges to Japanese interests,
Yagi continued, FM Aso hopes to promote bilateral and
regional cooperation with Japan. In the absence of
cross-border coordination, Central Asian nations would find
it difficult to face challenges such as transnational
narcotrafficking, terrorism, and environmental problems. On
the economic front, regional leaders might find it useful to
develop a common market. FM Aso hopes to emphasize three
guidelines for Japan's work with Central Asia: (1) look at
the area from a broad-based perspective, especially with
regard to the southern neighbors, e.g. Afghanistan, (2)
develop several trade routes that could be used as
alternatives to the PRC and Russia by stressing regional
cooperation, and (3) strive to work in a coordinated fashion
with the United States, "because we share the same values and
ideas about democracy, and because resources are limited."


11. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Sugiyama said that observers
sometimes remark that while the Taliban did nothing correct
in Afghanistan except to halt the narcotics trade, the
current Karzai administration appears to be doing everything
better except stopping narcotrafficking. Sugiyama stressed
that Japan understands the importance of achieving political
stability in Afghanistan and that Tokyo is prepared to
further international efforts in that direction. The United
States and Japan, he said, still have much to do in trying to
support Karzai's government. Asked by SCA Senior Advisor
Robert Deutsch about whether Japan would move forward with
tenders on its section of the Ring Road, Sugiyama reaffirmed
the Japanese government's commitment to complete its segment
of the Ring Road project, noting that the tender process was
underway.

--------------
U.S. VIEWS
--------------


12. (C) DAS Feigenbaum responded to the Japanese presentation
by stating that although Central Asia is admittedly not the
most pressing region of foreign policy concern to the United
States, the issues manifest there constitute a microcosm of
nearly everything that is important in current U.S. foreign
policy, with the obvious exception of the future of Iraq: (1)
a resurgent Russia, increasingly active in its neighborhood,
(2) an emerging China, with its growing regional and global
footprint (3) a problematic Iran, (4) the challenge of
Islam's future and the struggles within Islam, (5) the future
of Afghanistan, (6) the promotion of democracy in tough,
often hostile, environments; (7) the challenge of terrorism,
and (8) balancing promotion of political liberalization with
other goals. All of these challenges are manifest in Central
Asia in interesting, sometimes complicated ways, thus the
region receives more high-level attention than one might
expect from simply looking at its remote location on a map.
The United States, said Feigenbaum, remains committed to
staying involved in the area and is committed for the
long-haul -- by virtue of its presence, assistance, programs,
and high-level policy attention.

TOKYO 00007097 004.3 OF 009




13. (C) The United States, Feigenbaum noted, looks to avoid
the debilitating effects of Great Power confrontation and
rejects the "Great Game" metaphor for Central Asia. This is
not to say that competition among the major powers does not
exist. But the term is an oversimplification that is, in the
first place, insulting to Central Asian states because it
reduces countries of the region to little more than passive
receptacles of a game played by others, as if they lacked
independent interests, policies, goals, or capacity to pursue
those goals. Indeed, Feigenbaum said, some Central Asian
countries had pursued a balance to maximize their
independence, sometimes playing the major powers off against
each other. He offered the example of Kazakhstan's
"multivector" foreign policy; Kazakhstan had sought to
balance relations with Russia, China, the United States, and
now Europe. The "Great Powers" -- the United States, Russia,
China, India, Japan, and others -- also enjoy relatively
productive relations at a global level, with many of the
powers improving their relations with one another. The major
outside powers have some overlapping interests in Central
Asia, including the problems of narcotrafficking and
counter-terrorism. Central Asians should not, therefore, be
seen merely as objects of a struggle among outsiders.
Rather, said Feigenbaum, they are the very focus of U.S.
(and, hopefully, Japanese) policy in this part of the world.


14. (C) Washington takes a multi-dimensional approach to
Central Asia, he continued, focusing on several "baskets" of
interests simultaneously, including security, trade,
diversification of energy supply, promotion of political
reform, and combating transnational challenges. The United
States has worked to build capacity in the region across the
seams of these baskets -- for example, promoting the rule of
law has implications for both democracy promotion and trade;
modernizing customs and borders prevents terrorism but also
facilitates commerce. The U.S. has supported the development
of Drug Control Agencies in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
provided vaccinations to several hundred thousand children in
Uzbekistan (where U.S. assistance has constituted some 10
percent of Tashkent's public health budget),and offers
micro-credits to small businesses in various countries.
Among U.S. programs in the region, the economic "basket"
remains the largest.


15. (C) The U.S., Feigenbaum noted, also takes an active role
in promoting regional economic integration by: (1)
encouraging Central Asian states to integrate with each other
by removing economic and political obstacles to trade, such
as cross-border travel, (2) promoting integration between
Central Asia and its southern neighbors by looking to
Afghanistan as a bridge; and (3) helping Central Asia
integrate into the global economy by promoting WTO membership
and improving their investment climate. In short, the U.S.
has an "omni-directional" approach to the region, pressing
for expansion of economic linkages in every direction on the
compass; but Washington now places special emphasis on trade
routes to the south because it is the least developed
direction and new opportunities exist for energy trading and
infrastructure development. Supporting Central Asia's
sovereignty and independence, said Feigenbaum, means giving
these countries options: more than one dominant trading
partner, more than one market, and more than one pipeline
through which to move exports to the world. This policy is
not "anti-Russian," just "anti-monopoly." The countries of
the region, he concluded, deserve to have choices.


16. (C) Sugiyama agreed that political and institutional
development must advance in tandem with social, economic, and
trade reform. This, however, is difficult to do, and
presents an important impetus for the United States and Japan
to work together. Yagi concurred that Aso, too, rejected the
Great Game analogy, stating that Japanese policy toward the
Central Asians was to give them ownership of the issues. In

TOKYO 00007097 005.3 OF 009


addition, Japan wants to be careful not to do anything that
will provoke or upset Russia or China.


17. (C) Japan also realizes that enhancing regional
cooperation in Central Asia is more easily said than done,
said Yagi. When it comes to promoting regional cooperation,
it is best to start with issues that involve only one or two
countries but which might have regional impact and hope that,
by demonstrating success, other projects will follow.

--------------
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
--------------

Uzbekistan
--------------


18. (C) Yagi observed that for Japan, Uzbekistan was the most
difficult country in Central Asia to work with. At the same
time, it is the indispensable nation in Japan's Central Asia
policy. It has the largest population of the Central Asian
states and a long border with Afghanistan that can
potentially be destabilized. Whether or not President
Karimov remains in power, it will remain critical to work
with the Uzbeks. Everyone, said Yagi, is familiar with the
human rights and democratization problems of the country. He
noted that when former Prime Minister Koizumi visited
Tashkent in August, he personally raised the issue with
Karimov of the need to make progress on human rights and
reform, pointing to Japan's own experience to illustrate the
point. Karimov's responded that Japan's experience offered
useful lessons, and predicted his relations with the United
States would improve. Yagi said the Japanese have a
"realistic" view of this response, but nevertheless thought
it was a positive, if vague, statement. Japan views some
recent steps by the Uzbeks as positive improvements, such as
agreeing with the European Union to discuss Andijan and to an
Uzbek-EU human rights dialogue. Yagi asked for a U.S. view
on Uzbekistan.


19. (C) Feigenbaum responded that he was pleased Koizumi had
raised the issues of reform and human rights. The United
States (and Japan, for that matter) share several goals in
their approach to Central Asia: expansion of markets, more
openness and political reform, and promotion of regional
cooperation and integration. On all of these counts, said
Feigenbaum, Karimov's government appeared to be pursuing
policies at odds with our common approach to the region. In
contrast with Kazakhstan, Karimov had made some poor economic
choices, relying on discredited planning methods and
emphasizing cotton and gold. Politically, the GOU maintained
that the U.S. vision of democracy is a threat. On regional
cooperation, instead of being the economic lynchpin it should
be, Uzbekistan had rejected many aspects of integration,
insisting on its own way or no way. This is not, said
Feigenbaum, a uniquely "American" view of Uzbekistan; the
Tajiks, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhstanis all are skeptical of Uzbek
policies, find Tashkent a difficult partner, and have a
jaundiced view of its role in the region. The United States,
moreover, has a unique problem that Japan does not face,
namely Uzbekistan's effort to reduce the U.S. presence in the
country by removing the Peace Corps, NGOs, corporate
investors, a U.S. airbase, and some U.S. personnel. Yet the
United States continued to pursue dialogue with Uzbekistan
and would continue to do so. In 1991. most observers
expected Uzbekistan to be the most successful country in the
region. Instead, we are struggling to move forward even on
the issues we ostensibly agree upon, such as the threat of
terrorism or the need for investment in youth and education.
In short, Uzbekistan is a very difficult country, but we can,
and should, have a better relationship, and the United States
will continue to try, running programs and pursuing dialogues
where it is realistic to do so.


TOKYO 00007097 006.3 OF 009



20. (C) Asked by Yagi about the U.S. view of Europe's
sanctions and dialogues, Feigenbaum noted that the U.S.
approved of the decision to extend sanctions. The U.S. hoped
the dialogue would produce progress but had cautioned EU
partners not to conflate dialogue in itself with forward
movement on expressed European concerns. Yagi asked whether
the measures taken by the Uzbeks to harass non-governmental
organizations were aimed only at American NGOs. USAID's
Central Asia Mission Director Christopher Crowley responded
that steps have been taken to shut many NGO's, not just
American ones. Karimov simply sees the long term development
of a civil society and democratization as a threat. In
addition, the Uzbeks seem to be trying to block our
cooperation with other countries in the region. Highlighting
again that we are not hostile to the Uzbeks and that we want
to work with them, where feasible, Feigenbaum explained that
it is important that the United States, Japan, and the
European Union work together.

Kazakhstan
--------------


21. (C) Kazakhstan is viewed by the Japanese as relatively
more stable than Uzbekistan, and is very important to Tokyo's
programs in the region, Yagi said. Japan maintains good
foreign relations with Kazakhstan but recognizes that, in
essence, it is still ruled by an authoritarian regime. In
addition, Russia remains Kazakhstan's most important partner.


22. (C) Feigenbaum agreed that President Nazarbayev should
move forward on political reform but noted macroeconomic and
structural reforms in Kazakhstan. Corruption remains a
problem. Washington enjoys a robust and multi-dimensional
partnership with Astana and had hosted Nazarbayev in
September and issued a forward-looking Joint Statement.
Nazarbayev appears persuaded that we and our programs are not
a threat to him and has played an active role in promoting
educational exchanges. Crowley noted that, in a first for
USAID programs, Kazakhstan is actually co-financing many of
U.S. assistance projects in that country.

Kyrgyzstan
--------------


23. (C) Kyrgyzstan is a "bitter disappointment" to the
Japanese, said Yagi. The few projects the Japanese have
agreed upon have not gone well, and the country seems plagued
by a basic instability. Nevertheless, Tokyo will continue to
support the Kyrgyz and look for ways to work with them.


24. (C) Feigenbaum agreed that the Tulip Revolution had not
lived up to expectations, but noted that Kyrgyzstan faces
many challenges, including grinding poverty, a lack of
political will, and neighbors who are not supportive of
Kyrgyz democracy. After a rough patch over the summer,
U.S.-Kyrgyz relations had improved. Recent street
demonstrations had ended peacefully, Kyrgyzstan had a new
constitution, and the media and civil society remain brighter
spots. The U.S. maintains its airbase at Manas.

Tajikistan
--------------


25. (C) Yagi noted that Tajikistan is the only country in the
region in which Islamic parties are active. Japan is unclear
on the direction President Rahmanov is taking the country.
It appears that in his most recent cabinet shuffle he had
dismissed many of his allies, and this might be a setback.
Feigenbaum replied that the country had come a long way from
its civil war and was an increasingly important U.S. partner.
Tajikistan faces many challenges in the economic basket, but
we are excited about the potential for developing the
country's hydropower potential. We have also seen successes
in the field of counternarcotics, and Rahmanov seems eager

TOKYO 00007097 007.2 OF 009


for more American investment, even if the challenges remain
great.

Turkmenistan
--------------


26. (C) Yagi and Feigenbaum agreed that prospects for
improved relations with Turkmenistan are bleak. Yagi pointed
out that, despite Japanese attempts to engage, the Turkmen
refuse all proposals for cooperation and rarely participate
in regional meetings, such as the "Central Asia plus Japan"
Forum. When they do come, it is usually at a low level.
Feigebaum agreed the country is suffering from a personality
cult, but argued that efforts should continue to be made to
work constructively with Ashgabat. The U.S. maintains a
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement in Central Asia that
includes Turkmenistan. We also engage in some
security-related cooperation. The human rights situation is
poor.

--------------
RUSSIA, CHINA, IRAN
--------------


27. (C) Over a restricted luncheon hosted by MOFA, discussion
turned to the role of Russia, China, and Iran in the region.
With regard to China, Yagi said Japan casts a wary eye on its
activities in the region. Japan has noted the expansion of
Chinese commercial activity and is concerned that the large
loans Beijing is making in the region, e.g., 637 million USD
to Tajikistan, will lead to a debt burden and thus financial
instability. Although not interested in full membership,
Japan would like to know more about what the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization is about. Tokyo is inclined to view
the SCO as an organization where ideas are exchanged but
little actually gets done. Nevertheless, the potential for
cooperative political action exists, such as SCO summit
meetings or even military exercises. Feigenbaum raised
similar questions about the functions of the SCO. "What is
it," he asked, "a security group? an economic group? an
anti-American vehicle? or a "safe-zone," as A/S Boucher had
put it, for authoritarian leaders? The United States, he
noted, also wonders about SCO goals and purposes,
particularly in the field of security. The role of Iran in
the SCO and its 2005 statement about the U.S. military
presence were of concern. But the Chinese are playing an
interesting role in the region, building infrastructure and
restoring old trade patterns. This had begun to produce some
disquiet in the region, e.g., in Kazakhstan.


28. (C) Japan, said Yagi, fears provoking China in Central
Asia because it hopes to improve relations with Beijing more
broadly, particularly with regard to the Six Party Talks. So
far, according to Yagi, the Chinese have not reacted to
Japan's activities in Central Asia, e.g., the Japan plus
Central Asia forum. They seem preoccupied with promoting
stability in the Uighur areas of northwest China and
advancing their economic penetration of the region.


29. (C) Feigenbaum asked about Japan's views of Iran's
involvement in Central Asia. Despite the fact that the
Iranain brand of political Islam makes Central Asian leaders
nervous, they seem to willing to engage with Iran at least as
far as economic links are concerned. Hiroshi Fukada, Deputy
Director General of MOFA's International Cooperation Bureau,
noted that Iran seems to be seeking expanded influence in the
region, perhaps through involvement in the SCO. He warned
that the rise of radical or fundamentalist Islam is something
that should be watched. Sugiyama said there is concern that
Iran is trying to recreate the Persian Empire and is looking
to expand its influence, including to the north.


30. (C) Yagi noted that, among the major outside powers,
Russia seems most concerned about Japanese activities in

TOKYO 00007097 008.3 OF 009


Central Asia. The Russians have made it clear to FM Aso that
they are opposed to any "outside" activities in in the region
and that Moscow believes Central Asia is "theirs." As a
result, Tokyo is trying to be very transparent about what it
is doing in the region in order to avoid raising suspicions.
It has briefed Russia on the Central Asia plus Japan dialogue
and will continue to pursue this type of dialogue and
engagement with Moscow to lessen its suspicions. Feigenbaum
agreed the Russians are sensitive about Central Asia. He
noted A/S Boucher's recent trip to Moscow: we, too, have
tried to engage in bilateral discussions about Central Asia,
he said, but Moscow still feels threatened and is not much
interested in talking to us. They have occasionally tried to
block U.S. initiatives. The United States is realistic about
Russia's role, said Feigenbaum.

--------------
PARTICIPANTS
--------------


31. (SBU) The following participants attended the meeting:

U.S. Delegation
--------------

SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary Evan Feigenbaum

SCA Senior Advisor for Regional Economic Integration Robert
Deutsch

USAID Central Asia Mission Director (Almaty) Christopher
Crowley

USAID Europe and Eurasia Bureau Senior Program Officer
Timothy Alexander

Embassy Tokyo Political Officers (notetakers)

Japanese Delegation
--------------

Deputy Director General Shinsuke Sugiyama
Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Deputy Director General Takeshi Yagi
European Affairs Bureau, MOFA

Deputy Director General Hiroshi Fukada
International Cooperation Bureau, MOFA

Director Takeo Mori
First North America Division, MOFA

Director Manabu Miyagawa
Economic Security Division, MOFA

Director Akira Muto
Fourth Division, Intelligence and Analysis Service, MOFA

Director Tsutomu Nakagawa
Policy Planning Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, MOFA

Director Hideki Uyama
Central Asia and Caucasus Division, MOFA

Director Toshikazu Masuyama
Middle East/Africa/Russia Division, Trade Policy Bureau
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Senior Deputy Director Rintaro Tamaki
International Bureau
Ministry of Finance

Deputy Director General Hiroshi Niino

TOKYO 00007097 009.3 OF 009


Regional Dept. II (including Central Asia)
Japan International Cooperation Agency

Team Director (Afghanistan) Yodo Kakuzen
Regional Dept. V, Middle East, Europe)
Japan International Cooperation Agency

Team Director Hiroto Kamiishi
Global Development Partnership Team, Planning Group
Japan International Cooperation Agency

Director Shohei Hara
Division 2, Development Assistance Dept. IV
Japan Bank for International Cooperation


31. (U) This cable was cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary
Feigenbaum.
DONOVAN