Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO709
2006-02-08 08:46:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

JAPAN-DPRK TALKS CONCLUDE WITH ZERO SERIOUSNESS

Tags:  PARM PREL MNUC JA KS KN CH 
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DE RUEHKO #0709/01 0390846
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 080846Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8430
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0487
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0860
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 6670
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 4501
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 7563
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 5703
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000709 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC JA KS KN CH
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS CONCLUDE WITH ZERO SERIOUSNESS

REF: A. TOKYO 433

B. TOKYO 644

C. BEIJING 2089

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOSEPH R. DONOVAN. REASONS: 1.4
(b),(d).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 000709

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC JA KS KN CH
SUBJECT: JAPAN-DPRK TALKS CONCLUDE WITH ZERO SERIOUSNESS

REF: A. TOKYO 433

B. TOKYO 644

C. BEIJING 2089

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION JOSEPH R. DONOVAN. REASONS: 1.4
(b),(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: North Korea showed "zero seriousness" about
resolving its bilateral issues with Japan during February 4-8
Japan-DPRK bilateral talks in Beijing, MOFA Asia DG Sasae
told visiting CSIS Senior Advisor Robert Einhorn and
Political Minister Counselor Michael Meserve on February 8.
PM Koizumi remains unlikely to invoke unilateral sanctions
over the abduction issue, but Japan will continue to apply
its own "defensive measures," Sasae offered. Japan's
normalization talks team made it clear that only a "package
deal" that resolves the abduction, nuclear and missile issues
would bring about normalization of relations. During their
security talks, the DPRK failed to articulate a new position,
while complaining about the U.S.-Japan Alliance, BMD, and
U.S. defensive measures. Analyzing Kim Jong-il's January
2006 trip to China, Sasae said the North Korean leader most
likely used the visit to obtain economic assistance from
Beijing. Sasae expressed pessimism over prospects for the
Six-Party Talks, cautioned the United States and Japan are
losing leverage over the situation to China and the ROK, and
urged that the U.S. Government consider engaging in direct
talks with the DPRK. END SUMMARY

Outcome of Japan-DPRK Talks
--------------


2. (S) The North Korean delegation to the February 4-8 talks
with Japan had "nothing new to offer" and showed "zero
seriousness" about resolving bilateral issues with Japan,
MOFA Asia Director General Kenichiro Sasae told visiting CSIS
Senior Advisor Robert Einhorn on February 8, 2006. Instead,
Sasae said, the DPRK delegation "demanded something new" (the
turnover of Japanese NGO officials reported reftel B).
Confirming that Japan's delegation would be returning to
Tokyo later in the day, Sasae summed up the talks with the
following comments.


3. (S) On Abductions:


-- Japan told the DPRK it may invoke unilateral sanctions if
the abduction cases are not resolved. In fact, however,
while the Koizumi government must "accommodate the emotions
of the Japanese public" (70 percent of whom support
sanctions) it does not intend to implement sanctions because
it is convinced the move would not work and would worsen the
atmosphere surrounding the Six-Party Talks.

-- The Japanese government will continue to apply its own
"defensive measures" in response to the abduction issue.
Sasae cited implementation of the insurance requirement
imposed on DPRK vessels in March 2005 and the withdrawal
earlier this month of tax-exempt status of the pro-Pyongyang
General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Chongryon).


4. (S) On Normalization:

-- Japan made it clear it is ready to begin normalization
talks but made it equally clear it will not normalize
relations until the abduction issue and its concerns about
the DPRK's nuclear and missile programs are fully resolved.
In the end it is a "package deal," Sasae said.


5. (S) On Security Issues:

-- The DPRK had "nothing new to offer" on the nuclear or
missile issues and did not articulate positions on those
subjects. Instead, they focused on their concerns regarding
the U.S.-Japan Alliance and our effort to develop a ballistic
missile defense.

-- The North Koreans also complained about defensive measures
taken by the United States in the Banco Delta Asia case.
Japan's response was to point out that those were law
enforcement matters to be dealt with separately from the
Six-Party Talks, Sasae said.

Analysis of KJI's Trip

TOKYO 00000709 002 OF 002


--------------


6. (S) Asked what to make of Kim Jong-il's January 2006 trip
through China, Sasae replied that while it is possible that
Kim would like to follow China's path toward economic reform,
it is more likely he used the visit to obtain economic
assistance from Beijing. For the moment, it appears the DPRK
is focusing on trade with China, South Korea and Thailand.
At the same time Japan-DPRK trade figures are in sharp
decline. Sasae acknowledged that China and the ROK appear to
be competing for attention from the DPRK and that Pyongyang
is using this competition to its advantage. What is clear is
that U.S. and Japanese leverage over North Korea is
decreasing, Sasae cautioned.

Plea for Direct Talks
--------------


7. (S) Sasae said that "frankly speaking" he is pessimistic
about prospects for the Six-Party Talks because "both sides
appear to be waiting for the other to do something" and
distrust is on the rise. Even if the Six-Party dialogue
resumes, it "will be very difficult for both sides to please
each other." Alternatively, ratcheting up pressure on the
North could illicit dangerous, undesirable, or at best
unclear results. While pressure from China could be most
effective, Beijing appears unwilling to go that route, Sasae
added. He concluded the meeting by repeating an earlier plea
for the United States to engage in direct talks with the
DPRK. "They won't give us anything; it is you they want to
talk to. That is why I encourage your government to meet
with them."
SCHIEFFER