Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO7084
2006-12-21 04:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

ABE'S SHORT HONEYMOON

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 007084 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON JA
SUBJECT: ABE'S SHORT HONEYMOON


DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE//PRIORITY//

Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 007084

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON JA
SUBJECT: ABE'S SHORT HONEYMOON


DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE//PRIORITY//

Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).


1. Summary (C) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's honeymoon with
Japanese voters has come to a quick end. Abe's popularity in
polls surged above 70 percent when he visited Beijing and
Seoul to better relations with Japan's neighbors and the DPRK
exploded a nuclear device. However, his popularity began to
slide when he let it be known that he would allow LDP postal
rebels expelled by former Prime Minister Koizumi to return to
the ruling party. While we assess that Abe's recent troubles
with the voters are not fatal, they bear watching, especially
in the lead up to the Upper House elections next July. End
Summary.


2. (C) Shinzo Abe assumed the prime ministership of Japan on
September 26 after a ho-hum campaign in which he was the
long-presumed winner. Immediate polling showed the Japanese
public approved of his government by a wide margin (ranging
from 63 percent to 71 percent approval, 14.2 percent to 18
percent disapproval across seven major newspapers and wire
services). His ratings stayed near that range through
October after Abe visited Beijing and Seoul to reengage their
governments in an effort to better Sino-Japanese and
Japanese-Korean relations. Abe's poll numbers began a long
slide after he let it be known that he would allow the
so-called postal rebels expelled by former Prime Minister
Koizumi to return to the party. Recent polls show the
approval rate for Abe's cabinet down in the 41.9 percent to
55.9 percent range in the same publications, with disapproval
running in the 30 percent to 32 percent range. Interestingly
enough, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ)
numbers remain essentially flat, holding in the 14 percent to
18 percent range over the same period.


3. (C) It is not unusual for Japanese Prime Ministers to
lose their popularity; former Prime Minister Mori left office
with a 6 percent approval rate. In the words of Secretary to
former Prime Minister Koizumi, Isao Iijima, "a cabinet can
survive with even a zero percent support rate, so Abe should

not worry too much" about his declining numbers. Abe's
present numbers still qualify him as a popular Prime Minister
by Japanese standards, but they are a warning sign of
possible trouble that could increase pressure on him to
perform well in the July 2007 Upper House elections, or else
risk a challenge to his leadership.


4. (C) Abe's acceptance of the rebel's return to the LDP has
put his reform credentials in doubt. The public does not
appear to want the LDP to return to the "good old boy" party
that it was before Koizumi's reforms. At the snap election
in September 2005, the LDP got huge majorities among
so-called "floating voters" who went with Koizumi on the
promise that he would be an agent for reform. Initially
these voters appeared to embrace Abe, but some may have
changed their minds. In one poll, 66 percent of voters in
the Tokyo metropolitan and Kansai regions that served as the
driving force for the LDP's overwhelming victory in 2005
opposed readmitting the postal rebels, with only 19 percent
in favor.


5. (C) Falling poll numbers have also caused renewed
criticism of Abe's Cabinet personnel choices. We hear from
multiple sources that in-fighting among the five personal
advisors to Abe and the Ministers whose portfolios they cover
is still prevalent. After three months in office, it is
still unclear exactly how the new system for bringing more
direct decision-making into the Prime Minister's office will
work. There are rumblings that Abe must show more leadership
and decisiveness if he is to have long-term success.


6. (C) Another problem, which actually predates the fuss
over the postal rebels and is inherited from former Prime
Minister Koizumi, is the disconnect between Abe's legislative

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program and the most pressing concerns of Japan's voters.
Abe has delivered on promises to amend Japan's 1947 Law on
Education, revise the Constitution, upgrade the Japan Defense
Agency to ministry status, and work toward delegating greater
authority to the prefectures, among many other legislative
successes in the just-concluded Diet session (septel).
Polling, however, continues to show that voters are far more
interested in pension reform and economic issues.


7. (C) Asked to rank what is most important to them,
Japanese voters overwhelmingly choose pension reform.
According to some polls, over 40 percent list it as the most
important issue facing the government. Over 20 percent
single out fiscal reconstruction and economic recovery as
pressing issues. Only six percent of Japanese identify
educational reform and constitutional revision, Abe's
signature issues, as matters important to them. Although Abe
made considerable strides toward fulfilling many of his
campaign pledges in the extraordinary Diet session that ended
on December 19, the media and political elites give him
little credit and the public seems largely indifferent.


8. (C) Comment: While Abe's ship has undoubtedly taken on
water in the past few weeks, we do not feel it is near
sinking. This slip in public popularity may, however, cause
Abe to be even more cautious in dealing with issues that
could have a negative impact. It will also likely cause him
to emphasize the abduction issue in his foreign policy
pronouncements, since that issue has been the source of much
of his popularity with the public in the past. We also
believe that his drop in popularity has increased the
pressure on Abe to do well in the Upper House elections next
July. Should the party stumble badly then, Abe will likely
face a strong challenge to his leadership.
SCHIEFFER