Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO6858
2006-12-05 23:14:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

CCS SHIOZAKI-DUSD LAWLESS ON DPRI IMPLEMENTATION,

Tags:  MARR PREL PGOV JA 
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DE RUEHKO #6858/01 3392314
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 052314Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8889
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T TOKYO 006858 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: CCS SHIOZAKI-DUSD LAWLESS ON DPRI IMPLEMENTATION,
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

S E C R E T TOKYO 006858

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV JA
SUBJECT: CCS SHIOZAKI-DUSD LAWLESS ON DPRI IMPLEMENTATION,
COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE


1.(S) SUMMARY: Chief Cabinet Secretary Shiozaki told visiting
Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Lawless over dinner
December 3 that:

-- Japan needs more specifics from the U.S. before setting a
date to submit a bill to the Diet early next year to fund the
move of Marines to Guam.

-- a 2 2 meeting in mid-January would help smooth Diet
passage of realignment legislation;

-- "consultations" on realignment with the new conservative
Okinawa Governor will begin once he takes office December 10,
but Japan stands by its agreed commitments;

-- Prime Minister Abe is "very serious" about reexamining
constraints on collective self-defense. Discreet bilateral
discussion on the issue could continue at the policy level as
part of consultations on alliance roles, missions and
capabilities. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) In a dinner meeting with visiting Deputy Under
Secretary for Defense Richard Lawless December 3, Chief

SIPDIS
Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki outlined Japanese
government views on legislation implementing the Defense
Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) agreement, a possible 2 2
meeting in January, dealing with the new Okinawa Governor,
and collective self-defense.

DPRI legislation
--------------


3. (C) Shiozaki outlined Japanese government plans to submit
two bills on funding DPRI realignments to the Diet session
running from January-June 2007. A bill providing economic
incentives to affected base communities is largely finalized,
and should go to the Diet by late February, he said.
Legislation to permit funding of the planned transfer of
Marines from Okinawa to Guam using Japan Bank of
International Cooperation (JBIC) money could not go forward,
he said, until Japan received more concrete detail on U.S.
plans for the move. Further details will be essential in
order to secure Diet approval, said Shiozaki, and to fend off
challenges from the opposition. DUSD Lawless replied that
the U.S. side should be able to provide the detail Japan
needed by mid-to-late December. So long as the government
can provide "sufficient explanation" of DPRI funding in the

coming Diet session, said Shiozaki, the issue should be
resolved well before the Upper House election in July 2007.


4. (C) COMMENT: Shiozaki's comments on how the Cabinet Office
will manage the submission of the necessary legislation (one
legislative action or two) reflects the lack of consensus as
to how that legislation will be packaged, rather than any
reluctance to get on with the necessary approvals of funding.
In separate conversations, several Japanese government
officials more involved in the details of the legislative
strategy appear confident that a single, integrated bill will
be internally coordinated and submitted for Diet approval
during the February-March timeframe. END COMMENT.


5. (C) Holding a 2 2 meeting in mid-January that included
reference to realignment would be helpful in smoothing Diet
passage of DPRI funding legislation, said Shiozaki.

New Okinawa Governor
--------------


6. (C) The election of conservative candidate Nakaima as
Governor of Okinawa was a great relief, said Shiozaki. Many
within the LDP had expected defeat, he said, noting he had
been chided by ruling party Upper House Chairman Aoki to "pay
more attention to Okinawa." The central government planned
"consultations" with the new governor, to be held in Tokyo
soon after he takes office December 10.


7. (C) DUSD Lawless urged that the focus of talks with
Nakaima be on implementation of the realignment package
already agreed by both governments; "pulling the thread" on
any single element (especially the replacement of Marine
Corps Air Station Futenma) risked unraveling the whole deal.
Shiozaki agreed, emphasizing that Japan stands by its
commitments contained in the October 2005 2 2 Alliance
Transformation Agreement.


8. (C) MOFA Director-General for North American Affairs Kawai
noted that Futenma relocation must take place first, before
any transfer of Marines to Guam. Nakaima's public comments
during the campaign may have sounded critical of the
realignment plan, he said, but his actual position was far
more understanding. He seemed like a practical politician
who the government could work with, along the lines of
arrangements made with the Yokosuka Mayor regarding the
forward deployment of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Diet Member visits to Guam
--------------


9. (C) On pending requests by some Diet Members to Guam,
Shiozaki stated that any delegation should be "headed by the
LDP", and certainly not composed only of opposition
politicians. A group led, for example, by the LDP's Ishiba
and opposition Democratic Party of Japan "shadow defense
minister" Nagashima, should avoid unhelpful grand-standing,
suggested Kawai.


10. (C) Lawless advised that a Diet trip include visits not
only to sites planned for future construction under DPRI, but
also to U.S. naval and air facilities, to showcase their
vital role in guarding against regional contingencies. Kawai
added that, even among some conservative Diet Members, there
was a common misperception that the move of Marines to Guam
was only a plan to strengthen capabilities on the island,
rather than a balanced approach, which includes an effort to
reduce the burden on Okinawa. It would be useful to clear up
this mischaracterization, he suggested.

Collective Self-Defense
--------------


11. (S) Prime Minister Abe is "very keen" and "very serious"
about reassessing Japan's interpretation of its
constitutional constraints on collective self-defense, said
Shiozaki, adding that the subject is politically sensitive in
Japan. "We have a good sense of our future course" within
the Cabinet, he said, reflected in agreement between
President Bush and Prime Minister at their summit in Hanoi to
expedite BMD cooperation on BMD, including on operational
issues. Shiozaki acknowledged differences between his own
recent comments on collective self-defense and those of
Defense Minister Kyuma. Kyuma had been thinking of the
technical limits of a "PAC-3 based system" when he had
asserted recently that it would be "impossible" for Japan to
attempt to intercept a U.S.-bound missile, explained
Shiozaki.


12. (S) Collective self-defense is one of the most crucial
issues in the alliance going forward, said DUSD Lawless.
Operationally, it was a very real issue for U.S. forces,
given that U.S. bases in Guam and Okinawa were likely already
within range -- and targeted by -- North Korean missiles.
The U.S. and Japan urgently needed to rectify the current
situation, said Lawless, whereby both countries were fielding
BMD capabilities but could not yet operate them together.
Any impediments to data-sharing between U.S. and Japanese
Aegis, for example, had to be resolved quickly. Progress in
this area would send a strong, positive message to other
countries in the region, he added. Addressing the subject at
an upcoming 2 2 statement in a classified annex was an option
if desired.


13. (S) Kawai said progress could be made through an
assessment of concrete, realistic cases in which Japan might
face a choice on collective self-defense. This discussion
could occur bilaterally in policy-level discussions on
contingency planning through the DPRI process. Japan needed
to have a "realistic" discussion on collective self-defense
based on credible situations, he stressed, not an "abstract,
theoretical" legal debate. "If we can explain this issue to
the Japanese people realistically" based on the need to
respond to real-world dangers, said Kawai, they will
understand the need for a new approach in certain cases.

Afghanistan: Japan's role
--------------


14. (C) Completing Japan's portion of the Khandahar-Herat
ring road is a high priority, said Shiozaki, referring to
discussion of the subject between Prime Minister Abe and
President Bush in Hanoi. He noted that a new round of
bidding would be held this week on the contract for the
remaining Japanese-funded portion of the road. The U.S.
Embassy had been helpful in providing names of potential
contractors for the project, he added.


15. (C) Referencing Foreign Minister Aso's November 30 speech
on Japan's desire to promote an "arc of freedom and
prosperity", Lawless asked if there was anything more that
Japan could do to support NATO efforts in Afghanistan.
Shiozaki said that NATO had recently approached Japan about
participation in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in
Afghanistan. Although sending Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to
take part in a PRT was probably "too difficult" at this
point, he said, "there must be something" Japan could do to
"find a way around institutional barriers" and go beyond its
present contributions.

Abe to Europe
--------------


16. (C) Prime Minister Abe will travel to Europe in early
January, noted Shiozaki, and was likely to visit NATO. His
stops would include the UK, France, and Germany as well as
probably NATO and EU headquarters in Brussels. Exact dates
had not been set, but Abe would need to be back in Tokyo
before January 17.


17. (U) DUSD Lawless cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER