Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO6764
2006-11-29 07:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR ECONOMIC SUBCABINET MEETINGS, DEC.

Tags:  ECON ETRD PREL EAGR ENRG ECIN APECO JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0964
RR RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #6764/01 3330706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 290706Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8738
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5047
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 5140
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1146
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA 9017
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA 1505
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE 2443
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO 0055
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2961
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 6243
RUYNAAC/COMNAVFORJAPAN YOKOSUKA JA
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RULSDMK/DEPT OF TRANSPORTATION WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 006764 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DNSA MCCORMICK AND KTONG
STATE PASS USTR FOR DUSTR BHATIA AND DAUSTR BEEMAN
STATE PASS TO DEPT OF AGRICULTURE
TREASURY FOR U/S ADAMS AND FOR IA/DOHNER, HAARSAGER, AND
POGGI
USDOC FOR U/S LAVIN AND 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ/NMELCHER
STATE FOR E AND EB A/S SULLIVAN
AGRICULTURE FOR USDA/OSEC, FAS/ITP, FAS/FAA/IO/NA
SEOUL PLEASE PASS TO VISITING USDA DEPUTY U/S TERPSTRA
PARIS FOR USOECD
GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL EAGR ENRG ECIN APECO JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ECONOMIC SUBCABINET MEETINGS, DEC.
6-7

REF: A. TOKYO 5288


B. TOKYO 5600

C. TOKYO 5903

D. TOKYO 6250

E. TOKYO 6501

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d.

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 006764

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR DNSA MCCORMICK AND KTONG
STATE PASS USTR FOR DUSTR BHATIA AND DAUSTR BEEMAN
STATE PASS TO DEPT OF AGRICULTURE
TREASURY FOR U/S ADAMS AND FOR IA/DOHNER, HAARSAGER, AND
POGGI
USDOC FOR U/S LAVIN AND 4410/ITA/MAC/OJ/NMELCHER
STATE FOR E AND EB A/S SULLIVAN
AGRICULTURE FOR USDA/OSEC, FAS/ITP, FAS/FAA/IO/NA
SEOUL PLEASE PASS TO VISITING USDA DEPUTY U/S TERPSTRA
PARIS FOR USOECD
GENEVA ALSO FOR USTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: ECON ETRD PREL EAGR ENRG ECIN APECO JA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ECONOMIC SUBCABINET MEETINGS, DEC.
6-7

REF: A. TOKYO 5288


B. TOKYO 5600

C. TOKYO 5903

D. TOKYO 6250

E. TOKYO 6501

Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer for reasons 1.4 b/d.

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Prime Minister Abe has gotten off to a fast start in
the beginning of his administration with a strong political
and foreign policy agenda. However, he has yet to
demonstrate the same leadership on domestic economic policy,
regulatory reform, and international economic policy. In
preparations for December 6-7 Subcabinet Meetings, we have
sensed backsliding in the willingness of our working-level
interlocutors to engage in discussion of sensitive topics and
opposition to raising the profile of the meetings through
press coverage. In this environment, we believe it is
important to establish a common medium-term goal of
completing a study leading towards a U.S-Japan Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) that will be comprehensive and fully include
agriculture. We see exploring an FTA as a way to gauge the
level of ambition about economic initiatives and as a means
to prevent drift in the bilateral economic relationship. The
subcabinet meetings also provide an opportunity to encourage
Japanese domestic economic policy reform, including the
continuance and strengthening of the Council for Promotion of
Regulatory Reform (CPRR),and to take steps to promote FDI in
Japan through stock swaps, which is increasingly under

attack. End summary.

Abe Off to a Strong Start Politically...
--------------

2. (SBU) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has demonstrated strong
leadership since assuming office on September 26. Moving
quickly to defuse tensions with Japan's closest neighbors,
Abe pulled off surprise summit meetings in Beijing and Seoul
within days of becoming Prime Minister. He showed decisive
leadership in response to North Korea's October 9 nuclear
test. Abe's emphasis on close ties with the United States
and the critical importance of the U.S.-Japan security
relationship was highlighted in his meeting with President
Bush at APEC and during the October visit of Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice to Tokyo following North Korea,s
nuclear test. These foreign policy successes have bolstered
his public support.


3. (C) Abe came into office with strong conservative
credentials and a reputation as a "hard-liner," but has since
shown himself to be a flexible, pragmatic, political realist.
Reassuring the LDP's pacifist-leaning coalition partner,
Komeito, that the LDP will not reconsider Japan's non-nuclear
status or push hard in the near term to revise long-standing
defense policies, he led his ruling Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP) to electoral victories in two Lower House by-elections
in October and the Okinawa gubernatorial campaign in

TOKYO 00006764 002 OF 004


November. Abe is focused on the elections for the Upper
House in the summer of 2007, which could end his tenure if
the LDP goes down to defeat. Adopting what some in the media
have dubbed a "safe driver" approach, Abe has avoided pushing
aggressively on controversial issues in the conservative
agenda that might alienate Komeito, spook Japanese voters, or
hand the opposition issues to exploit in the summer campaign.


4. (SBU) Abe is now using the momentum from the recent
election wins and his high popularity ratings to get his
legislative program through the Diet before it recesses on
December 15. A new Education Law and a bill elevating the
Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry are the two top "to-do"
items on Abe's agenda. At the same time, Abe is navigating
Diet debates on constitutional revision and a law allowing
Japanese Self-Defense Force deployments overseas. Abe's
ambitious initiatives to establish new bureaucratic
structures and further centralize decision-making within the
Prime Minister's Office also remain works in progress.

...But Questions Remain About His Economic Agenda
-------------- --------------

5. (C) Abe's economic record after two months in office,
however, is less clear. As he became prime minister, we
identified the new government's commitment to growth and
reform, the orientation of its fiscal policy, and its ability
to bring strategic coherence to its trade and regional
economic relations as key to evaluating the direction and
efficacy of his economic leadership (ref A). A review of
these areas shows continued commitment on Abe's part, but it
also reveals the potential for drift in the bilateral
economic relationship.


6. (C) In economic circles, Abe has been generally commended
for his personnel choices, particularly at the second-tier
level of appointments. Some question whether Minister Koji
Omi will be effective at Finance, but the Minister for
Economic and Fiscal Policy Hiroko Ota is a protege of former
PM Koizumi's reform architect Heizo Takenaka, and his four
private-sector selections for the Council on Economic and
Fiscal Policy (CEFP) have strong reform credentials (ref B).
Similarly, Abe's new chairman of the Council for Promotion of
Regulatory Reform (CPRR),Takao Kusakari, used his first
press conference to stress his intention to maintain the pace
of regulatory reform.


7. (C) Abe has also said the right things publicly about
reform and growth. Neatly side-stepping the framing of
Japan's public debt burden (over 175% of GDP, the highest in
the OECD) as a tax-or-fiscal-restraint issue, Abe has
emphasized the need for growth in the Japanese economy. He
has even adopted the slogan "Without growth, there can be no
fiscal restructuring," a play on PM Koizumi's central
challenge that "Without reform, there can be no growth" and a
signal of the issue's importance. With that said, some worry
that, besides a proliferation of new committees and reform
pronouncements, PM Abe has not shown that he is ready or
eager to make hard decisions to implement needed reform.

TOKYO 00006764 003 OF 004


Even on signature issues like his promises of a "second
chance" for those who feel left behind by economic trends, we
have not seen the decisions that will guide program-level
responses and priorities (ref C and D).


8. (C) Furthermore, Abe has not laid down a clear policy
line with ministries on international issues that affect the
bilateral economic relationship. On the Doha Round, Japan's
stance remains a passive one of "wait and see," and his
agriculture minister has a reputation as an old-school
protectionist (ref E). On regional economic architecture, a
tension remains between a more Asia-centric economic policy
and recently improved Japanese rhetoric on APEC. On
regulatory reform, when we met with CPRR's Chairman Kusakari
recently, he expressed great frustration from battling
opponents of reform although he had been in office less than
a month. There have also recently been worrying signs of
backsliding on the liberalization of merger and acquisition
rules, particularly for triangular mergers through stock
swaps, a key tool for greater foreign direct investment.


9. (C) The uncertainty over the economic agenda with the
United States is clearly visible when discussion turns to a
Free Trade Agreement. In the past month, the Japanese
Business Federation (Keidanren),the American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan (ACCJ),and the U.S.-Japan Business Council
(USJBC) have all endorsed exploring greater integration of
the American and Japanese economies, either through an FTA or
a so-called "Economic Partnership Agreement" (EPA). From our
government contacts, in contrast, we have heard everything
from senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and METI
officials supporting the concept, to others in MOFA
cautioning that an announcement now of moves toward an FTA
might kill any hope of reviving the Doha Round, to strident
opposition from the Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF),to
uninterested shrugs from the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Or,
as a contact in the Prime Minister's Office told us, in the
field of economic policy, an FTA with the United States is so
far off on the horizon that it just is not getting
significant attention.


10. (C) In summary, Abe's clear political agenda and
leadership have not been matched -- so far -- in
international economic policy, making concrete progress
difficult in the bilateral economic relationship. The signs
of this are evident even in preparation for the December 6-7
Subcabinet Meetings, as we have sensed backsliding in the
willingness of our interlocutors to engage in even a pro
forma exchange of opinions about an FTA or discussion of food
safety issues (reportedly due to MAFF and Ministry of Health,
Labor, and Welfare objections). Moreover, working-level
contacts seek to keep press coverage of the event to a bare
minimum, and we have heard that preparations on the Japanese
side have been unusually intense and acrimonious. Perhaps if
the Abe administration is in "safe driver" mode, no one wants
to be the one caught speeding.

Setting the Path with an FTA

TOKYO 00006764 004 OF 004


--------------

11. (C) Because the atmospherics signal the potential for
drift in the bilateral economic relationship, we believe it
is important to set concluding an FTA study as a medium-term
goal, with the understanding that any agreement must include
the agricultural sector. Our objective must be to have a
pair of economies where it is as easy for an American
business to operate in Japan as it is for a Japanese one to
operate in the States. We believe that concrete short-term
steps are necessary to focus attention on the benefits of the
relationship, as well as the link between international
agreements and Abe's domestic reform agenda. For example,
your visit presents an excellent opportunity to show support
for the robust continuance and strengthening of the CPRR and
for the legal and tax changes necessary to enable increasing
FDI through stock swaps and triangular mergers. Now is a
particularly important time on this last issue as the
government and LDP are under intense pressure from Keidanren
to adopt rules on tax deferral and eligible stocks that will
totally gut the possibility of mergers through stock swaps.
By insisting on liberalization on these and other immediate
issues of concern, we can measure the level of Japan's
ambition in moving our economic relationship forward.
SCHIEFFER