JAPAN DEBATES COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 006736

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USCOMUS JAPAN FOR J00/J3/J5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2016
TAGS: MARR PGOV PREL JA
SUBJECT: JAPAN DEBATES COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer; Reasons: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's proposal to
review constitutional interpretations that restrict the
exercise of Collective Self-Defense has sparked a sharp
debate within the government and ruling coalition. The focus
of Abe's initiative has been on whether Japan has the
authority to intercept a U.S.-bound missile. However, the
broader debate on Collective Self-Defense also encompasses
the ability of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to protect
U.S. and allied assets operating in defense of Japan and
further afield. In 2003, the Koizumi administration expanded
the SDF's operational authority using an expanded definition
of "Individual Self-Defense," but stopped short of including
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) or out-of-theater operations.
Dovish elements of the ruling coalition and traditionalists
within the defense establishment have openly criticized Abe's
initiative. Officials in MOFA and the Cabinet Office say
that Abe is serious about constitutional reinterpretation,
but is unlikely to take action until after the July, 2007
Upper House election in deference to the LDP's coalition
Komeito ally. End Summary.

Clear and Present Danger
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2. (C) In recent weeks, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has
reiterated his campaign pledge to review the constitutional
"prohibitions" on the exercise of Collective Self-Defense.
Abe has suggested that self-imposed limits on the SDF's
authority to use force to protect U.S. territory and assets
should be adjusted in order to strengthen the bilateral
alliance. While recent comments have focused on whether the
SDF could intercept a missile bound for the United States,
Abe has also advocated enhancing the ability of Japanese
naval and air assets to engage threats targeting U.S. and
allied forces operating both in the region and further afield.

Nomenclature
--------------


3. (C) The Koizumi government took the first step towards
addressing legal barriers to bilateral operational
cooperation in 2003 with the passage of the Armed Attack Law.
Cabinet Counsellor for National Security Kenji Takahashi,
one of the law's authors, noted that this legislation
authorized SDF units for the first time to engage threats
directed solely against U.S. forces. Takahashi explained
that the government skirted the constitutional issues
involved by defining such operations as falling under the
category of "Individual Self-Defense." Since U.S. forces
operating in areas surrounding Japan could be considered
assets defending Japan, he added, an attack on a U.S. unit
would equate to an attack on Japan.


4. (C) Takahashi explained that confusion over whether
Maritime SDF units operating with U.S. vessels during the
July 5 DPRK missile episode could defend their American

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counterparts was related to legal barriers, not
constitutional interpretation. He asserted that SDF units
can only defend U.S. assets in the case of a "wartime
situation" as defined by the Armed Attack Law. In "peacetime
conditions," which include operations conducted under the
"Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan Law" (aka Regional
Contingencies Law),SDF units are only authorized the use of
force to protect themselves.

BMD: Breaking Precedent
--------------


5. (C) Some defense specialists, particularly in the Foreign
Ministry, have advocated using the same "Individual
Self-Defense" logic in the case of a missile launch on the
assumption that the destruction of an American city would
degrade the U.S. ability to fulfill its obligations under the
Mutual Security Treaty. Tetsuzo Fuyushiba, the sole Komeito
member in the Abe cabinet, told the embassy on the eve of
entering government that his party could accept this
approach. "We understand the operational necessities of
permitting the SDF to conduct such activities, it is just the
issue of constitutional reinterpretation" that is anathema to
Komeito and its largely pacifist voter base, he stated.
Fuyushiba said that as long as Abe expands SDF authority
under the banner of Individual Self-Defense, "we are willing
to work with him." Fuyushiba added, however, that Komeito
would strongly prefer that any new policy wait until after
the July, 2007 Upper House election.


6. (C) Traditionalists in the Japan Defense Agency and ruling
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) have taken a more strident
line on the issue, pointing to past official statements
linking missile defense operations with Collective
Self-Defense. The most authoritative of these came in
December, 2003, when then-Chief Cabinet Secretary (CCS) Yasuo
Fukuda announced the Cabinet's decision to deploy a Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) system. Fukuda stated that Japan's BMD
assets would only be used "for the defense of Japan and not
for the defense of third countries," thus the cabinet BMD
decision was "not related to (the issue of) Collective
Self-Defense."


7. (C) Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuhisa Shiozaki's November
21 suggestion that the government would review the Fukuda
formulation sparked an immediate rebuke from Defense Minister
Fumio Kyuma. Kyuma ruled out a review of the missile
intercept question based on "technical" grounds (Septel).
JDA BMD Office Director Koji Kano explained that it is JDA's
position that there is no reason to discuss the matter since
Japan would not be capable of intercepting a Taepodong headed
for the United States for many years. When pressed, Kano
acknowledged that once upgraded with SM-3 missiles in 2007,
Kongo-class Aegis destroyers would be technically capable of
intercepting a Taepodong missile in boost phase, but asserted
that chances for a successful hit were too low to justify a
debate over its constitutionality.


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Talk Now, Decide Later
--------------


8. (C) Cabinet Office and MOFA officials express confidence
that Abe will force the issue, but not until after the July,
2007 election. Cabinet Counsellor Kazunori Inoue asserted
that Abe simply has too much on his political agenda to
devote the political attention needed to press the Collective
Self-Defense issue before then. Other Cabinet Office
officials assert that despite CCS Shiozaki's September call
for a panel to review the issues related to Collective
Self-Defense, there has been no action to stand up a panel
either inside the Cabinet Office or within relevant
ministries.

Is Reinterpretation Enough?
--------------


9. (C) Many defense hawks in the LDP have argued that the
government's focus on constitutional reinterpretation only
complicates the political process without addressing core
practical issues. LDP Diet member Seiji Hagiwara, a member
of an LDP panel drafting a Permanent SDF Dispatch Law, said
that individual SDF commanders are unlikely to feel
comfortable taking action unless they have explicit legal
authorization to do so. Noting the lack of enthusiasm on new
authorizing legislation from the Cabinet Office and LDP
leadership, Hagiwara suggested that PM Abe seems more intent
on scoring ideological points than addressing real
operational issues.

A U.S. Role?
--------------


10. (C) Short of authorizing legislation, MOFA North American
Affairs Deputy Director General Kazuyoshi Umemoto has
suggested that the U.S. and Japan use recently established
bilateral mechanisms such as the Roles, Missions, and
Capabilities Working Group (RMCWG) and Bilateral Planning
Committee (BPC) to funnel political decisions on Collective
Self-Defense-related issues to operational commanders. While
welcoming U.S. input on substantive elements of the issue,
other MOFA officials have cautioned against a public U.S.
role in the debate to avoid giving the impression that PM
Abe's actions are motivated by orders from Washington.

Beyond the Far East, a Bridge Too Far?
--------------


11. (C) Former Ambassador Hisahiko Okazaki, an informal Abe
advisor and outspoken conservative commentator, predicted to
the embassy that Abe would ultimately push through a sweeping
reinterpretation of Collective Self-Defense that would enable
SDF units to engage in protecting sea-lanes in the Indian
Ocean and other global operations. Among LDP defense hawks,
there is strong sentiment for expanding SDF Rules of
Engagement for global operations, both bilateral and
multilateral. Nevertheless, senior LDP Defense Staffer

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Shigenobu Tamura said that dovish members of the ruling
coalition would strongly resist moving discussions on
Collective Self-Defense beyond the confines of the U.S.-Japan
security treaty. Komeito's Fuyushiba offered a similar view,
stating that any new operational authority beyond the "Far
East clause" of the Mutual Security Treaty is out of the
question from Komeito's perspective.

Comment: A Messy, but Important Debate
--------------


12. (C) Recent events on the Korean Peninsula and Japan's own
embrace of BMD cooperation have thrust once theoretical
questions of Collective Self-Defense to the front of the
security policy debate. There is growing awareness within
Japanese policy and political circles that the U.S. public
will not support a one-way defense guarantee forever,
particularly given the growing ballistic missile threat to
the continental United States. The U.S. can play an
important role in the ongoing internal debate by focusing on
concrete operational problems that Japan's current
restrictive approach present. Some of the most immediate
challenges may be resolvable through changes to current law
without formal constitutional interpretation. For the
broader question of constitutional reinterpretation, Japan is
moving in the right direction, but politics and bureaucratic
inertia will likely rule out any serious movement until at
least late next year.
SCHIEFFER