Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TOKYO6591
2006-11-17 06:51:00
SECRET
Embassy Tokyo
Cable title:  

U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TROLATERAL LUNCH ON

Tags:  PREL PARM KNNP MNUC CH AS KN KS JA 
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VZCZCXRO1783
OO RUEHFK RUEHKSO RUEHNH
DE RUEHKO #6591/01 3210651
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 170651Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8401
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4903
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1883
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 8185
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 1015
RUEHFK/AMCONSUL FUKUOKA PRIORITY 8849
RUEHNH/AMCONSUL NAHA PRIORITY 1340
RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 2256
RUEHKSO/AMCONSUL SAPPORO PRIORITY 9895
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA PRIORITY
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI PRIORITY 6226
RHMFISS/DISA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006591 

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E.O. 12958: DECL: FOLLOWING KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC CH AS KN KS JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TROLATERAL LUNCH ON
IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1718


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TOKYO 006591

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: FOLLOWING KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP MNUC CH AS KN KS JA
SUBJECT: U.S.-AUSTRALIA-JAPAN TROLATERAL LUNCH ON
IMPLEMENTING UNSCR 1718


Classified By: Ambassador J. Thomas Schieffer. Reasons: 1.4 (B/D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: At a Japan-hosted lunch on November 6
following the U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral meeting in
Tokyo, participants discussed cooperation on Resolution 1718.
The GOJ circulated a draft of Q & As to use in the event a
ship would not consent to boarding for inspection. U/S Joseph
suggested that Japan and Australia host a PSI exercise with a
North Korea scenario in the 2007 timeframe. The U.S.
proposed formation of a working group to stimulate
cooperation on implementation of UNSCR 1718. Parties agreed
that the U.S. would circulate a draft agenda for such a
group, and others would comment. Participants exchanged
views on the state of play on return to the Six-Party Talks.
All agreed that China was the key to success, that South
Korea would have to be brought along, and that the DPRK had
to take concrete actions toward denuclearization before
returning to the negotiating table. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) MOFA Director General for Disarmament,
Nonproliferation and Science Takeshi Nakane hosted a lunch
November 6 following the U.S.-Australia-Japan Trilateral
Meeting on UNSCR 1718 implementation. All agreed that the
morning discussion had gone well and that it was useful to
coordinate views on cargo inspection and other issues.


3. (C) On legal issues, MOFA Director of the International
Affairs Legal Division Masaki said that Japan agreed with the
United States and Australia on legal explanations on cargo
inspection, so far as they went. He explained that the
debate over parameters was very political in Japan because of
the Constitution and any possible role that Japanese
Self-Defense Forces would play in inspections. His
particular concern was how to handle a problem of a
third-country ship in international waters that would not
give consent for an inspection team to board. In the case

that such a delicate situation might arise, Masaki wanted a
common interpretation of that part of the resolution. He
provided a paper with draft Q & As to use in the event of
such a development (scanned and e-mailed to EAP/J Richhart).
The Japanese embassy in Washington had passed the draft to
its counterparts, he reported. Masaki said the UK had
already agreed to the language and asked for a reaction from
the U.S. and Australia. U/S Joseph said we would get back to
them, as did Australian Deputy Secretary Ritchie.


4. (C) Director Masaki also raised the possibility of
extending the concept of "global consent" as a way of
resolving the issue of non-consent to board a vessel.
Several on the U.S. delegation replied that it might not be
possible to resolve this issue in a global manner. Since the
resolution says that actions should be consistent with
national as well as international law, different countries
may have different ways of implementing the resolution based
on their own national laws and practices. In this way, the
resolution is similar to PSI practice. All parties agreed
that while there might be no global certainty on this issue,
it is vital that we continue to share information.


5. (C) Under Secretary Joseph proposed that parties agree to
use the PSI process as a way to advance the common agenda,
and suggested that Japan and Australia host a PSI exercise in
2007 with a North Korean nuclear scenario. Both Japan and
Australia agreed to consider the request.


6. (C) Nakane asked what modalities the U.S.-proposed working
group would have and on what specific issues it would develop
cooperation. Joseph replied that he saw the group as being
flexible with no formal trappings. He expected that it would
work to develop cooperation on legal and technical issues,
and perhaps to find ways to better share information. He
wanted it to be broad enough to reach out to additional
cooperators like Singapore and others. Participants would
include technical as well as policy agencies
(USG-participating agencies would include DHS, Energy, NSC,
the intelligence agencies, State and Defense). DOE/ NNSA

TOKYO 00006591 002 OF 002


Deputy Administrator Tobey added that the group could also
discuss research and development, but for this topic, the
group should be small so discussion could be candid. Deputy
Secretary Ritchie added that the group should meet soon,

SIPDIS
perhaps in the next couple of weeks. Joseph said that the
United States would propose an agenda, date and venue.


7. (S) Ritchie asked when Joseph thought Six-Party Talks
would resume. Joseph replied that it was hard to say, given
that much depended on the DPRK. The six parties could not
just agree to talk. There would have to be some promise of a
concrete outcome and some indication that the DPRK is moving
toward de-nuclearization. That might require some
preliminary negotiation, he suggested.


8. (C) Turning to China, all agreed that Beijing is the key
to success. Joseph said that Secretary Rice had been
encouraged by China's position during her recent visit and
that China may be reassessing its relations with the DPRK.
China must press for action by the DPRK. A return to talks
must be part of the process, not an end in itself. China
must not be allowed to throttle back its actions simply
because talks resume. Talks must produce concrete progress.
On detection and inspection, the United States hoped that
China would continue to be fully supportive. Maritime
interdiction might prove more difficult. As an aside, the
U.S mentioned that the Russians were moving in the right
direction on inspection and detection as well, but still had
a ways to go on interdiction.


9. (C) On Korea, all agreed that domestic political problems
will continue to limit ROK options. Other partners must work
to bring South Korea along. Nakane asked what others thought
the DPRK was likely to do. No one had a concrete answer, but
agreed that they would do almost anything that they thought
would improve their negotiating position. Ritchie and Joseph
both mentioned the DPRK statement that Japan should not be
party to the talks as ridiculous.


10. (C) Joseph asked about prospects for increased missile
defense cooperation. Ritchie replied that there are active
talks and exchanges between the Australians and the U.S.
leading up to the annual AUSMIN meeting, and that there may
well be some positive suggestions in the next three months.


11. (U) U/S Joseph cleared this message.
DONOVAN