U.S.-JAPAN-AUSTRALIA TRILATERAL STRESSES NEED FOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 10 TOKYO 006497

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP PGOV JA KN
SUBJECT: U.S.-JAPAN-AUSTRALIA TRILATERAL STRESSES NEED FOR
FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 1718


TOKYO 00006497 001.2 OF 010


ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR MESSAGE WILL BE RESENT WITH NEW
MRN/MCN.




TOKYO 00006497 002 OF 010


proceed, he said. U/S Joseph said that he was impressed by
the turnout from a variety of Japanese domestic agencies.
The three governments would require the participation by all
their relevant agencies if they hoped to achieve success at
implementing all aspects of UNSCR 1718.

--------------
Opening Remarks
--------------


5. (S) The passage of UNSCR 1718 was of critical importance
to the U.S. and represented several things, U/S Joseph
continued. North Korea,s nuclear test changed the regional
security environment and has undermined the nonproliferation
regime, he said, and UNSCR 1718 represents the international
community,s response to that challenge. It also presents
and opportunity to put into place missile defense
capabilities to protect countries in the region. The U.S.
trilateral agenda, would touch on a number of things:

-- Review of steps toward implementing UNSCR 1718 that have
been completed.

-- Discussion on a maritime inspections regime.

-- Architecture for detection of nuclear, radioactive
substances.

-- Adoption of steps beyond UNSCR 1718 in the context of and
in preparation for improving the security environment. These
future steps would include financial tools to disrupt DPRK
illicit activities, or steps to improve missile defenses.


6. (S) DFAT Deputy Secretary Ritchie voiced strong support
for international action toward North Korea. The DPRK,s
nuclear test, he continued, brought into focus the threat to
peace and security in the region, as well as the threat to
the nonproliferation regime. Australia welcomed North
Korea,s decision to return to the Six-Party Talks, but would
insist that the DPRK abandon its nuclear program as called
for in the September 19, 2005 statement from the last
Six-Party Talks. Canberra would call for the full
implementation of UNSCR 1718, independent of Pyongyang,s
decision to return to the talks, Ritchie said.


7. (S) The U.S., Japan, and Australia were likely to reach
easy agreement on next steps toward implementing UNSCR 1718,
Ritchie noted. It would be important, however, to look for
ways to mobilize support among countries in the region,
especially for those states that did not directly participate
in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) but which
nevertheless wanted to increase pressure on North Korea. The
trilateral countries must do something to &catalyze action8
in the international community, the DFAT official said.


8. (S) DFM Nishida said that Japan welcomed Beijing,s
announcement that the U.S., DPRK, and PRC had reached
agreement on the North,s return to the Six-Party Talks. The
resumption of the Six-Party Talks, however, was not an end in
itself. The DPRK, Nishida said, would need to comply with
UNSCR 1695 and 1718, and would have to abandon its nuclear
program in a full and verifiable manner. Even if the
Six-Party Talks resume, the DFM added, Pyongyang would still
not reach full compliance with the UNSCRs. Japan would
therefore not relax its sanctions, he noted. Nishida stated
that the trilateral countries would need to work with China,
South Korea, and Russia to apply pressure on the DPRK.

--------------
Implementation of 1718
--------------


9. (S) DG Nakane distributed a handout that summarized the

TOKYO 00006497 003 OF 010


measures that Tokyo has already taken against the North:

-- Banned official travel to/from DPRK, passenger ferry Man
Gyong Bong, charter flights. (July 5)

-- Designated 15 entities plus one individual as being
connected with WMD and/or missile transactions. (September
19)

-- Banned entry into Japan of DPRK ships, DPRK goods, and
DPRK citizens. (October 11)


10. (S) Japan had already implemented many of the items
stipulated under UNSCR 1718, Nakane noted, but needed to
consider two points further: cooperative action on 1)
inspecting cargo and 2) luxury goods. The Japanese
delegation distributed an &Illustrative List8 of luxury
goods to be banned, which Nakane emphasized was not final and
that Tokyo wanted the U.S. and Australia to refrain from
disseminating. The Japanese government was engaged in
internal discussions about how to define luxury goods in
hopes of meeting the November 13 deadline for countries to
submit lists to the 1718 sanctions committee. It might not
be possible for the U.S., Australia, and Japan to agree on
every item on the list, he noted. However, the Abe
Administration wanted to talk to trilateral participants
about &timing,8 and to review the items that were being
given to the regime. Tokyo understood that some UN members
were having trouble compiling a list of luxury good, and was
anxious to hear other ideas, Nakane said.


11. (S) The U.S. viewed UNSCR 1718 as a means to apply
leverage against North Korea to comply with its obligations,
Joseph responded. Sanctions must remain until the DPRK has
undertaken the complete, verifiable, and irreversible
elimination of its nuclear program. He emphasized that the
next round of Six-Party Talks would not be conducted on a
&business as usual8 basis, and that the parties must work
toward achieving a meaningful and concrete outcome.


12. (S) Outlining steps that Washington has taken pursuant
UNSCR 1718, the Under Secretary noted that the U.S. has:

-- Communicated with all relevant UN parties about the need
to fully implement the resolution.

-- Urged PSI participants to implement the agreement.

-- Urged key states to withhold bunkering services and to
inspect suspect cargo.

-- Warned nations that the activities of the Korean Mining
Development Trading Company (KOMID) may violate the
provisions of UNSCR 1718.

-- Worked to identify suspect vessels and to persuade other
countries to inspect suspect cargo.

-- Coordinated with Australia and Japan to achieve consensus
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR),and the Australia Group (AG).

-- Engaged with Taiwan to regulate entities producing machine
tools.

-- Identified entities for designation under E.O. 13382 in
order to disrupt DPRK illicit financial activities.

-- Cooperated with Japan to develop a list of persons and
entities subject to a travel ban and financial restrictions

-- Implemented existing legislation to re-impose economic
sanctions under the Arms Control Export Act ) a step that

TOKYO 00006497 004 OF 010


has practical as well as symbolic importance.


13. (S) DFAT DepSec Ritchie stressed that UNSCR 1718 would
need to be implemented independent of the Six-Party Talks
process. While Australia was not a party to the talks,
Canberra nevertheless remained skeptical that the next round
of Six-Party Talks would achieve anything. He suggested,
therefore, that trilateral discussion might proceed as if the
Six-Party Talks would not make any progress.


14. (S) Ritchie reviewed steps that Australia had taken in
support of UNSCR 1718:

-- Issued a condemnation of the DPRK,s October 9 nuclear
test.

-- Encouraged many countries to support UNSCR 1718 provisions
such as bunkering services and port inspections.

-- Implemented import controls regarding military and dual
use goods. Encourage implementation of the NSG, MTCR, and
AWG regimes.

-- Developed legislation aimed at implementing UNSCR 1718.

-- Directed the customs service to implement to the ban on
the import/export of prohibited goods.

-- Coordinated action across the Australian government to
proactively restrict cargo from North Korea.

-- Targeted transshipped cargo.

-- Worked at developing a luxury goods list.


15. (S) Canberra had also identified 12 entities plus one
individual as engaged in activities related to WMD and/or
missile proliferation, banned port access for North Korean
vessels and tightened visa requirements to restrict entry of
DPRK citizens, Ritchie reported.

--------------
Inspection Regime and Working Group
--------------


16. (S) U/S Joseph prefaced the U.S. inspection regime
proposal by noting that when Secretary Rice visited Japan and
the region three weeks earlier, she made it clear the U.S.
did not envision the inspection provision of UNSCR 1718 as an
embargo or blockade of North Korea. We would envision,
however, as a prerequisite to implementation of UNSCR 1718,
giving close scrutiny to North Korean cargo. U/S Joseph
stated that China, Russia, and South Korea must give close
scrutiny to North Korean cargo transiting their territory via
rail, road, and air, as well as their territorial waters, and
that the U.S. was encouraged by the responses from China,
Russia and South Korea.


17. (S) PDAS Patricia McNerney presented the U.S. proposal to
create an inspection regime for UNSCR 1718 implementation.
PDAS McNerney, reiterating that the inspection regime is not
a blockade or embargo, highlighted that the burden of
enforcement is placed on United Nations member states, with
the onus on the states to ensure their territories, waters,
and airspace are not used to support activities proscribed in
UNSCR 1718. PDAS McNerney stressed that actions should be
taken where maximum legal authority exists, and that law
enforcement actions will be essential, to include active
involvement of customs and border officers, enforcement of
export control laws, training of officers to detect
prohibited items, and robust use of the MOU on Port State
Control in the Asia-Pacific Region (the so-called "Tokyo
MOU") to inspect North Korean ships. (In connection with

TOKYO 00006497 005 OF 010


this last point, PDAS McNerney noted that 40 percent of North
Korean ships were detained in Tokyo MOU ports between January
and March 2006, very often for reasons of cracked hulls or
other similar maritime safety issues.) PDAS McNerney added
that securing the commitment of states in the region,
particularly China and other ASEAN states, will be key to
successful implementation of UNSCR 1718.


18. (S) PDAS McNerney stressed that we should reach out to
states to secure commitments to do the following: (1)
Subject cargo passing through their territory, airports, and
seaports -- regardless of specific information on the cargo
-- to increased inspection and scrutiny if going to or from
North Korea; (2) Implement increased screening of road and
rail shipments at border crossings (especially China and
Russia); (3) Agree to allow boarding and inspection of
vessels using their flag for compliance with UNSCR 1718; (4)
Pledge to increase information sharing regarding cargos and
deceptive practices used by North Korea to evade UNSCR 1718;
and (5) Endorse the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
if they have not yet done so.


19. (S) Turning to the issue of developing a cooperative
approach for use in international waters, PDAS McNerney
stated that, consistent with national and international laws,
states should consider available actions on the high seas, in
a manner that will create a deterrent effect on North Korea.
These actions should include (1) consensual boarding, in
which we should build on the work of PSI to target
third-country flagged vessels to North Korea and seek
commitment from states to allow boarding when we have reason
to believe UNSCR 1718 is being violated; (2) non-consensual
boarding when these are consistent with international law, as
no new boarding authorities were granted in UNSCR 1718; and
(3) deterrence actions, such as increased use of the
peacetime rights of "approach" and "visit" on the high seas
to determine a ship's nationality and increased overt
tracking of ships to and from North Korea. The goal of these
(and perhaps other possible) actions is to increase the
calculation on North Korea's part before it undertakes
shipments or transfers of proscribed items.


20. (S) PDAS McNerney presented the U.S. proposal for the
creation of a U.S.-Japan-Australia UNSCR 1718 Working Group,
which could identify and discuss the national and
international resources and assets available to implement
UNSCR 1718, develop a plan for increased information sharing
and for sharing the burden of implementation, and develop and
implement a plan to undertake radiation detection on the high
seas using existing capabilities. (Additional states,
including PSI partners such as Singapore, could later be
added to the Working Group.) Pointing out the sensitivity of
the following areas, PDAS McNerney suggested the Working
Group should also explore additional measures including overt
tracking, surveillance, and querying of North Korean owned,
operated, and/or flagged ships on the high seas and in
straits; clandestine surveillance of, and intelligence
gathering on, ships known to have been involved in
trafficking activities or otherwise raising suspicions that
they may be carrying prohibited cargo; and identifying "UNSCR
1718 scrutiny zones," areas constrained by geographic
coordinates and time for the purpose of intensified scrutiny.


21. (S) In conclusion, PDAS McNerney summarized that a
comprehensive inspection architecture requires strong
declaratory statements by states on readiness to fully
implement UNSCR 1718, credible actions by states to back up
statements, including increased scrutiny of cargo to and from
North Korea, enhanced use of authorities in international
waters, and an expanded working group to investigate what can
be done on the high seas.


22. (S) Following PDAS McNerney's presentation, U/S Joseph

TOKYO 00006497 006 OF 010


briefly summarized the U.S. position by underlining the need
for a formal mechanism such as the proposed 1718 Working
Group. U/S Joseph stressed that any actions taken in
international waters would be fully consistent with legal
authorities -- which UNSCR 1718 does not expand -- and he
further stressed that the United States envisioned very
selective actions, rather than "Rambo-like" actions, based on
assessments that a vessel is carrying cargo related to WMD or
missile systems. The U.S. position reflects the seriousness
with which we view the North Korean threat, U/S Joseph
stated, and emphasizes detection, as the U.S. is concerned
North Korea might transfer nuclear materials to other rogue
states or terrorist groups.

--------------
Australian Response to U.S. Proposal
--------------


23. (S) In response to the U.S. proposal, Australian DFAT
Deputy Secretary Ritchie pronounced Australia in "violent
agreement" with what had been said by the U.S.
representatives, and stated that Australia would welcome the
creation of the Working Group, which he predicted would be
very valuable. Ritchie foresaw two key issues that would
arise in connection with the inspection regime, namely how
participants would mutually task and coordinate maritime and
other assets, and how they would share intelligence. Ritchie
noted that the inspection provision of UNSCR 1718 had been
widely misinterpreted in public commentaries. Consequently,
it was important to stress that the inspection regime was not
an embargo, he said, echoing comments of U/S Joseph and PDAS
McNerney.


24. (S) The only significant area in which the Australian
view did not coincide perfectly with the U.S. view pertained
to PSI: Ritchie underscored the need to communicate to
current non-participants in PSI that "we love them too," and
he gently cautioned against scaring any countries off by
pushing PSI too aggressively. Although some countries have
lingering doubts about PSI, even those countries might still
participate in the inspection regime against North Korea.
Ritchie cited the case of Indonesia to highlight this point,
relating that although we had not convinced Indonesia to join
PSI, Ritchie judged that Indonesia would take action if it
were provided specific information on suspect North Korean
cargo transiting Indonesian territory. Ritchie also
emphasized the great value in talking to Singapore, a natural
partner, and he cautioned against neglecting Malaysia or
Thailand, in addition to Indonesia.

--------------
Japanese Response to U.S. Proposal
--------------


25. (S) Deputy Vice Minister Nishida thanked the U.S.
government for its efforts, and expressed Japan's
understanding for the proposed selective, rather than
"Rambo-type," actions with regard to the inspection regime.
Nishida stated that in order to obtain broad cooperation from
other states, we would need to emphasize the inclusive, vice
exclusive, nature of our efforts, and to enlist the help of a
broad array of participants. Japan has been working with
other countries and obtaining agreement in principle for
cooperation, but it is difficult to obtain support in
practice. Nishida further mentioned that he is slated next
week to visit India, another country hesitant to participate
in PSI, but an important player nonetheless. In concluding
his response, Nishida declared that intelligence exchange
must be maintained, the morale of customs and police officers
must be boosted, and mutual trust among the participating
countries would determine the success or failure of our
efforts against North Korea.


TOKYO 00006497 007 OF 010



26. (S) DG Nakane stated that Japan wanted to take necessary
actions, including cargo inspections, and pointed out that
Japan has been an active participant in PSI, has encouraged
other countries to participate in PSI, and desires to further
strengthen cooperation with other states in PSI and to
broaden PSI activities. Nakane pointed out that a maximum
effort is necessary within the scope of national legal
authorities, and to that end, Japan is investigating what is
actually allowed under Japanese law. With regard to China,
Japan was pleased that China has already expressed an
intention to expand its cargo-monitoring activities. Japan
is also hopeful that South Korea will consider PSI
participation. In response to the specific U.S. proposal for
a UNSCR 1718 Working Group, Nakane stated that Japan cannot
formally respond at this time, but would need to examine the
proposal, which would involve several government agencies,
and formulate an official response. (Nishida subsequently
indicated Japan,s interest in &follow-on8 discussions.)

-------------- --------------
PSI Progress, Urge Swift Decision on Working Group
-------------- --------------


27. (S) Before moving to the next agenda item, U/S Joseph
commented briefly on the Australian and Japanese responses.
U/S Joseph agreed with the Australian point that we must not
scare away any countries by insisting on full PSI membership.
While the U.S. views PSI participation as the standard of
good non-proliferation behavior, we also need to extend a
welcome hand to countries outside the PSI framework. U/S
Joseph cited two recent cases of success in expanding PSI to
Central Asia and to the Persian Gulf: Four of five key
Central Asian states have endorsed PSI and agreed to deny
over-flight rights to aircraft flying between North Korea and
Iran in cases where we have information on WMD cargo. This
year, five of six Gulf States have endorsed PSI, with Bahrain
hosting a PSI exercise the previous week. These developments
have sent a clear message to Iran, he pointed out.


28. (S) U/S Joseph acknowledged the Chinese and South Korean
sensitivities to PSI, but noted that each have come a long
way in their acceptance of the initiative. U/S Joseph
further agreed on the need to reach out to Singapore, and
expressed complete agreement with DVM Nishida's view that we
must be inclusive, not exclusive, in confronting the North
Korean problem. Finally, U/S Joseph expressed firmly the
hope that Japan will be able to respond to the Working Group
proposal very soon. The urgency of the threat means that, if
we are serious, we need to cut through the bureaucracy, he
stressed.

--------------
U.S. Detection Architecture Briefing
--------------


29. (S) William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense
Nuclear Nonproliferation, DOE/NNSA, briefed the assembly on
U.S. concepts for deterring North Korean nuclear
proliferation. The primary mission of the proposed detection
architecture is deterrence, not comprehensive inspection of
all cargo. Such deterrence is achieved by increasing the
probability of detection for illicit transfers of nuclear
weapons materials, and by declaratory policy regarding the
consequences of attempting such transfers. Tobey stated that
the U.S. is most concerned about North Korean transfers to
the Middle East, and therefore several transit areas were
key: China, Russia, Central Asia, the Straits of Malacca,
and the Suez Canal.


30. (S) Tobey reviewed the Megaports program, whereby NNSA
provides radiation portal monitors (RPMs) at seaports to
screen cargo containers; the "Second Line of Defense" (SLD)
RPMs provided at airports and land border crossings (road and

TOKYO 00006497 008 OF 010


rail); the DHS/CBP Container Security Initiative (CSI),
wherein CBP officers are posted to foreign seaports to
identify and refer high-risk containers to host customs
counterparts for inspections; opportunities for aircraft
inspections via an extended SLD program; the possibility of
opportunistic inspections using U.S.-provided radiation
detection equipment; and the Commodity Identification
Training (CIT) program, which familiarizes foreign customs
inspectors with WMD technologies sought by procurement
programs and proliferators.

--------------
Responses to Detection Architecture
--------------


31. (S) Ritchie noted the detection architecture briefing was
interesting, adding that Australia had considerable sympathy
for such programs. Ritchie stated that CSI and Megaports
were welcome proposals, but needed to be broadened in scope
to include not only U.S.-bound cargo. (Note: After the
conclusion of Ritchie's remarks, Tobey clarified that CSI
applied only to U.S.-bound cargo, but Megaports and SLD were
directed at shipments worldwide, not only those bound for the
United States. End note.) Ritchie further noted the
technical difficulties inherent in these programs, such as
how to effectively screen containers, and suggested it may be
beneficial if technical experts from each of the three
countries were to get together and work jointly on the
technical problems.


32. (S) DG Nakane responded that, with regard to the
Megaports initiative, cooperation was still underway between
Japan and the United States on the customs level. Regarding
CSI, DG Nakane also pointed out that the program is targeted
at cargo destined for the U.S., and queried whether the scope
might be broadened by looking at cargo beyond that headed to
the U.S.


33. (S) In response to the comments by Ritchie and DG Nakane,
U/S Joseph expressed U.S. openness to extending the scope of
programs like CSI and to collaborating on research and
development into nuclear materials detection. Although there
is a level of confidence in our ability to detect nuclear
materials, we are limited by current technology and we need
to do more. He seconded Ritchie's suggestion to bring
technical experts in this field together, in particular to
examine what we can do on the problem of remote detection of
nuclear materials, as this represented a gap in current
detection capabilities. U/S Joseph further suggested that
the technical experts' discussions could take place in the
context of the proposed Working Group. U/S Joseph expressed
every confidence that Japan would be able to participate in
the Working Group, given the gravity of the threat.


34. (S) DVM Nishida shared his personal view that there is
indeed a potential for cooperation on research and
development, and that the technical experts should convene as
proposed. As a final point, Nishida stressed the need to
ponder on a theoretical level what can be done beyond UNSCR

1718.

--------------
Conclusion
--------------


35. (S) In the final minutes of the session, which had ran
over the allotted time, Ritchie returned to the issue of
maritime inspections, noting the importance of Japan,
Australia, and the U.S. sending coordinated, common messages
to other countries in the region. The three countries need
to share with each other the messages they are giving to
other countries on this topic, as well as the outcomes of
such briefings, in order to better coordinate their

TOKYO 00006497 009 OF 010


approaches to other regional partners. Nishida again called
attention to China, Russia, and South Korea, as North Korea's
land-connected neighbors, and expressed Japan's hope for a
positive outcome to U/S Joseph's next stops on his current
East Asian tour. To this U/S Joseph responded that the U.S.
was encouraged by the outcome of recent U.S. officials'
visits to China, South Korea, and Russia, and that we
intended to explain in depth to our Chinese, South Korean,
and Russian colleagues how we can collaborate on UNSCR 1718
implementation, and how this implementation relates to the
Six-Party Talks.


36. (U) Participants:

Unite States
--------------

Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security
David Stephens, NSC, Acting Senior Director for
Counter-Proliferation Strategy
Joseph Donovan, DCM, U.S. Embassy
Patricia McNerney, ISN PDAS, DOS
Connie Taube, Embassy
William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear
Nonproliferation, DOE
MG Timothy Larsen, Deputy Commander, USFJ
Eliot Kang, ISN/RA Senior Advisor, DOS

Japan
--------------

Tsuneo Nishida, Deputy Foreign Minister

SIPDIS
Takeshi Nakane, DG for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and
Science, MOFA
Kiyoshi Serizawa, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Division, MOFA
Yasushi Masaki, Director, International Legal Affairs
Division, MOFA
Takehiro Funakoshi, Senior Foreign Policy Coordinator,
Foreign Policy Division, MOFA
Makita Shimokawa, Cabinet Counsellor, Office of the Assistant
Cabinet Secretariat for Foreign Policy, Cabinet Secretariat
Kenichi Takahashi, Cabinet Counsellor, Crisis Management and
Security, Cabinet Secretariat
Keiichiro Nakao, Cabinet Information Research Office
Mr. Ishikawa, National Police Agency
Mr. Manabe, Director, Policy Division, Self-Defense Agency
Mr. Takaya, Director, General Affairs, Immigration
Bureau, MOJ
Mr. Sugiyama, Director, First Division, Second Research
Bureau, Public Security Agency
Mr. Uno, Director, Investigation Division, Customs Bureau, MOF
Mr. Naka, Director, Research Division, International
Bureau, MOF
Mr. Hosotani, Director, Trade Control, METI
Mr. Takeda, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and
Transportation
Mr. Watanabe, Security Planning, Japan Coast Guard

Australia
--------------

David Ritchie, Deputy Secretary, DFAT
Murray Perks, Acting Head, Strategic Policy Division, DoD
Sophia McIntyre, Executive Officer, Counter-Proliferation
Section, DFAT
Justin Whyatt, Executive Officer, International Security
Division, DFAT
Group Captain Mathew Dudley (DoD),Australian Embassy
Robert Rushby, Counsellor (Customs),Australian Embassy
Jenny Bloomfield, Counsellor (Political),Australian Embassy


TOKYO 00006497 010 OF 010



37. (U) The U/S Joseph delegation cleared this message.
SCHIEFFER