ABE ON THE EVE OF APEC: STRONG, DECISIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 006471

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/08/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR JA
SUBJECT: ABE ON THE EVE OF APEC: STRONG, DECISIVE
LEADERSHIP OVERSHADOWS EARLY CRITICISMS


Classified By: AMBASSADOR J. THOMAS SCHIEFFER. REASONS 1.4 (B),(D).


1. (C) Summary. Prime Minister Abe has moved quickly and
decisively to demonstrate strong leadership since assuming
office on September 26. Perceived as pragmatic and
effective, he is receiving approval ratings in the 65-75
percent range. Abe's emphasis on close ties with the United
States and the strength and reliability of the US-Japan
security relationship, highlighted during the visit of
Secretary Rice to Tokyo, have bolstered his public support.

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Prime Minister Abe's successful visits to China and Korea,
coupled with his decisive moves following North Korea's
nuclear test, have overshadowed early criticisms that his
cabinet picks had been poor and that his "Beautiful Japan"
package of domestic policies was too fuzzy and ambiguous. Abe
has reassured the LDP's pacifist-leaning Komeito coalition
partner that he and the LDP would not allow a debate or
reconsideration of Japan's non-nuclear status. LDP victories
-- aided by personal appearances by Abe -- in two
by-elections for Diet seats quieted Abe's detractors in the
LDP and has taken the wind out of the sails of the
opposition. End summary.

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Diplomacy, Elections Fuel Abe's Success
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2. (C) When Shinzo Abe first declared, "today I formed a
Cabinet to create a beautiful nation" on September 26, media
reports were less than complimentary. Faulted by even some
of his own supporters for winning the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) presidential election too easily, he
was criticized by many in the media and the opposition for
his lack of experience and failure to articulate a clear
policy vision. A Yomiuri Shimbun poll at the time showed
70.3 percent support among the general public, but only 9.1
percent said they were "very satisfied," with another 26.4
percent only "somewhat satisfied." Six weeks later, the
momentum has clearly swung in Abe's favor, as press attention
focuses on his policy successes and less on the personalities
of his cabinet members and advisors. His support rate in
polls ranges from the mid-60's to close to 75 percent.


3. (C) Within two weeks of his election as prime minister,
Abe surprised everyone by pulling off summit meetings in
Beijing and Seoul, upholding his campaign pledge to mend
frayed ties with Japan's Asian neighbors. He earned praise
for his firm response to the North Korean nuclear test,
including a meeting with Secretary Rice in Tokyo. At home,
LDP victories in two Lower House by-elections on October 22
boosted confidence in Abe's ability to work together with
coalition junior partner Komeito to win elections. Abe has
already begun using the momentum from those wins to push his
legislative agenda in the remaining four weeks of the
extraordinary Diet session. The revised Basic Education Law
and a bill elevating the Japan Defense Agency to a Ministry
are two likely recipients of Abe's strengthened mandate. An
extension to the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law,
authorizing Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces to provide
refueling support to counterterrorism efforts in the Indian
Ocean, passed quickly in October.

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But Serious Challenges Remain
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4. (C) One of Abe's most significant challenges is to
prevent the internal debate over security issues from
creating divisions between the LDP and coalition partner
Komeito. The Komeito -- whose Diet members are needed for
an Upper House majority and whose well-oiled electoral
machine holds the difference between victory and defeat for
scores of LDP Diet members -- is key to Abe's political
future and longevity as Prime Minister. Following the DPRK
nuclear test, calls by LDP executives and administration
officials for open debate on Japan's possession of nuclear
weapons ran counter to Komeito policy and conflicted with
many LDP leaders' views as well. Abe quickly reacted and
declared "the debate" was already over: Japan would adhere
to the three non-nuclear principles, rely on the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, and not develop nuclear weapons.


5. (C) While Abe came into office with strong conservative

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credentials and a reputation as a "nationalist" with strongly
held views, he has shown himself to be a pragmatic, political
realist. Abe is moving to the center and broadening his base
of support in order to win next year's Diet elections and to
have a chance of staying on as Prime Minister for several
years. (Note: Japanese Prime Ministers are limited to two
three-year terms.) Abe will have to skillfully navigate Diet
debates on controversial initiatives, such as constitutional
revision and a permanent dispatch law for the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces, while avoiding alienating either LDP
conservatives or Komeito's pacifist-leaning leaders. Embassy
contacts predict Abe will likely continue what some
characterize as his "boring, safe driver" approach through
next year, making it difficult for the opposition to pick a
fight. Further provocation from North Korea would only
strengthen his hand domestically, they say.


6. (C) Other domestic challenges include a difficult contest
in the Okinawa gubernatorial race on November 19 and internal
LDP debates over whether to readmit the so-called "postal
rebels." A win by the opposition candidate in Okinawa, Keiko
Itokazu, could help restore some of the shine to the
lackluster opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). DPJ
leader Ichiro Ozawa's less than impressive showing in his
first Diet debate with Abe and losses in the two by-elections
have done little to bolster the confidence of his supporters.
More problematic for Abe is the split within the LDP over
whether to readmit members expelled last year for their
opposition to Koizumi's postal privatization plan. Press
reports have made Abe look indecisive on the issue, as he was
forced to choose between taking back the rebels for their
proven vote-getting value or fulfilling his role as the heir
to Koizumi's political reforms. In the end, Abe, acting
more like a traditional LDP conservative leader than the
anti-LDP-old-boy, take-no-prisoners Koizumi, chose to
readmit some postal rebels who recanted their opposition to
postal privatization.


7. (C) Coming off a landslide victory in the LDP
presidential election, Abe was criticized for having a
too-easy ride to the top and presenting a fuzzy domestic
policy vision. His September 29 maiden Diet policy address
was criticized for containing too little in the way of
substance. The speech, which was peppered with English terms
unfamiliar to most Japanese, used the term "beautiful" more
than a dozen times, leading a group of Kyoto business leaders
to tell the Consulate General in Osaka-Kobe that they were
skeptical there was any real substance in Abe's message. The
press characterized his approach as "strategic ambiguity,"
coining the label "safe driver" to describe his answers
during initial Diet interpellations. The North Korean crisis
has kept the public and media's attention focused squarely on
security issues, but Abe will soon have to tackle difficult
-- and potentially vote-losing -- economic policy issues once
the new Diet session starts in January.


8. (C) Abe's initiative to establish new bureaucratic
structures within the Prime Minister's Office (Kantei) is a
work in progress, which may result in a stronger executive
with more effective decision-making processes and policy
coordination. However, at present, lines of authority have
yet to be clearly defined. Embassy contacts within the Prime
Minister's Office seem uncertain of their roles and
responsibilities and complain of turf battles. Others say the
Prime Minister tends to micro-manage and still answers his
own e-mails as if he were a first term Diet member. The
position of National Security Advisor Koike is particularly
problematic. With a broad mandate to create an "NSC" for
Japan and manage security policy, she is limited to a staff
of two and has no clear authority over any one issue.
Embassy contacts say she has been marginalized by CCS
Shiozuki and FM Aso but, retains her close friendship with
Abe and sees him often.

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Initial Criticisms of Abe
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9. (C) Reading the overwhelmingly positive appraisals of Abe
's first month as Prime Minister it is difficult to remember
the harsh reaction to his cabinet appointments in the first
few days of his term. Many in the LDP, media and opposition
charged Abe had made his cabinet appointments based on

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personal relationships, rather than experience or expertise.
He was accused of especially favoring those who had supported
him early in his campaign or who had been friends through the
80's and 90's. Many noted the cabinet's relative lack of
experience. Abe's Cabinet has 11 ministers with no prior
cabinet experience. The previous all-time record was
Koizumi's nine. While a certain amount of sniping from Abe's
opponents and those who failed to get tapped for senior
appointments was inevitable, the strong negative reaction
from conservative LDP supporters was surprising. Part of the
problem may have been the secrecy surrounding Abe's
decision-making, which appears to have been, in the end, Abe
deciding on his own without consulting anyone. Well-placed
Mission contacts in a variety of government offices, who are
usually well informed, seemed sincere when they confessed
before the Cabinet line-up announcement that they had no idea
who might be appointed, or to which ministries.


10. (C) Criticism of Abe began early inside the LDP and even
among his allies. Senior Vice Minister for Okinawa and
Northern Territories Affairs Katsuei Hirasawa (who served as
Abe's tutor when Abe was a school boy and had been appointed
Senior Vice Minister by Abe two days before) told Embassy
Tokyo that Abe did not trust most MOFA officials -- including
most notably Asia Director General and Six Party Talks
representative Kenichiro Sasae. As a result Hirasawa
claimed, Abe communicated only with one person at MOFA: Vice
Minister Yachi, and froze all others out. Hirasawa said the
appointment of Yuriko Koike as Special Advisor to the Prime
Minister for National Security had further muddied the waters
and made it impossible to determine which agency had the lead
in foreign affairs.


11. ( C) Hirasawa also noted that Abe's support from
conservative LDP Diet members, in particular those
affiliated with the conservative group, "Nihon Kaigi," was
fragile, and had been damaged by Abe's statements affirming
Prime Minister Murayama's declaration of Japan's war
responsibility, and by suspicions that he traded a promise
not to visit Yasukuni for a summit with China. Hirasawa
claimed confidently that Abe would have lost 100 votes in the
LDP presidential race from Nihon Kaigi Diet members had he
made his conciliatory statements on comfort woman and the
Murayama statement prior to the election.


12. (C) Executive secretary to former Prime Minster
Junichiro Koizumi Isao Iijima described the new Cabinet as
"very weak," telling Embassy Tokyo on the day after the
Cabinet line-up announcement that when Koizumi made cabinet
appointments, he always did so with a specific goal in mind.
Iijima did not think Abe had given enough thought to choosing
a Cabinet that would help achieve his administration's
priorities, such as winning the Upper House elections in July

2007. Iijima was troubled by the absence of experts like
Koizumi's Finance Minister Sadakazu Tanigaki and Koizumi's
Minister for Economic and Fiscal Policy Kaoru Yosano, and
wondered why Abe had not included former LDP Secretary
General Tsutomu Takebe after Takebe had worked so hard for
Abe's election. He also questioned the wisdom of
reappointing Taro Aso as Foreign Minister, a move he termed a
demotion for Aso. He thought Aso might try to sabotage Abe,
as he had sometimes opposed Koizumi on foreign policy in the
last administration.


13. (C) Chief Cabinet Secretary and longtime Abe personal
friend Yasuhisa Shiozaki became an early target of anti-Abe
critics. Shiozaki is known to have a short temper. His
impatience with bureaucrats and "tough boss" attitude while
MOFA Vice Foreign Minister has made him particularly
unpopular among some MOFA officials (a fact that would not
cause him any problems with Abe). His selection for a top
job was attributed to his long acquaintance with Abe -- they
met when both served as private secretaries to their
Diet-member fathers in the 1980s. Sankei Shimbun noted that
Shiozaki was not popular within his own party. Former LDP
Secretary General and Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiromu Nonaka

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described Shiozaki as very smart but "condescending, and a
poor communicator." He doubted Shiozaki or anyone else in
Abe's inner circle had the skills to orchestrate policy
priorities with the Diet or manage personnel issues behind
the scenes. Other Embassy contacts have echoed that
criticism, using terms like "lone wolf" to describe
Shiozaki's lack of communication and coordination skills.

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That said, in meetings with Ambassador Schieffer, Secretary
Rice, and other visitors from Washington Shiozaki has been
impressive and appeared to be in complete control of his
issues. An AFS student in the U.S. in the late 60's and
later a graduate student at Harvard, he is completely fluent
and at ease in English, which he often uses in official
meetings.


14. (C) The media also initially took an aggressive and
critical approach to Abe's cabinet, although much of the
criticism has since abated. One respected newspaper labeled
the new Cabinet the "Botchan Naikaku," a term connoting a
group of spoiled preppies. An NHK reporter scoffed at the
appointment of Finance Minister Koji Omi, saying he only got
the job because of his early and ardent support for Abe
during the LDP presidential campaign. A political cartoon in
the mainstream press portrayed Abe as a puppet. One Embassy
contact at a major news network described the new ministerial
lineup as a "Cabinet of friends." Unfortunately, he
continued, Abe had not appointed anyone with the political
skills to fight the entrenched bureaucracy. While there were
some policy experts among the new ministers, he didn't think
this particular lineup would accomplish very much. One of
the more sensational weekly magazines ran a story citing a
U.S. intelligence agency report that predicted Abe would
never survive next year's Upper House Diet elections.

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Comment
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15. (C) Six weeks into his administration, Prime Minister
Abe has proved the naysayers wrong, winning praise from the
mainstream press and strong support from the general public
for his diplomatic skills and leadership. Abe's foreign
policy and electoral successes, coupled with the
ineffectiveness of the opposition, have almost completely
overshadowed the early criticisms he lacked policy focus and
had made poor personnel choices. The initial media feeding
frenzy has also died down, as promises of sensational
revelations and scandals involving his cabinet choices failed
to materialize. While many Embassy contacts continue to
voice generalized concerns over Abe and his Cabinet, the
focus has shifted from personality to policy. Abe has shown
he can lead his party and the nation, but now must explain
where he would like them to go. Koizumi's success as Prime
Minister and his unprecedented popularity among the general
public was a result of his unswerving determination to reform
and his ability to convince the electorate that he was
sincere and would deliver on his promises for change. Abe
faces the same challenge.
SCHIEFFER